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CHAPTER 1:  ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
  
A. THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
While preserving its character of a unitary State, the Republic of Moldova has, 
since the break up of the Soviet Union, striven to improve the fiscal relations among the 
State and the subnational levels of government on the bases of autonomy, legality and 
cooperation principles.1  Since 1996 the budgetary system consolidates the self-governing 
territorial units as autonomous entities.2  Moreover, in 1997 the Parliament formally 
adopted the conventions of the European Charter of Self Local Governments, and since 
1998 the law on local public administration and territorial reform discontinued the 
previous Soviet administration structure of rayons. In its place the Parliament created a 
basic legal framework for the implementation of a fiscal decentralization process in 
Moldova based on a two level structure: the first level formed by towns/village/commune 
(or, generically, the primarias); and the second level formed by the Judets (or, 
generically, the districts).3  This law also established the operating rules for subnational 
governments’ Council of Representatives (directly elected) and their respective executive 
authorities (the Judet Council’s Chairman—assisted by the General Financial Division of 
the Judet—and the Mayor’s Office).4  The same legislation also created the post of 
Prefect (appointed by the President of the Republic and subordinated to the State 
Chancellery) situated at each judet to supervise the legality of the decisions of judet and 
primaria Councils. The Prefects were also assigned the role of coordinating and 
controlling the de-concentrated functions of the State government in the territory. 
                                                 
1 The National Constitution (July 29, 1994) explicitly establishes that “the concept of autonomy 
encompasses both the organization and functioning of local public administration, as well as the 
management of the communities represented by that administration” (Art. 109).  The Constitution defines 
that: (a) the unitary State of the Republic of Moldova is administratively and territorially structured in 
districts, towns and villages; (b) some towns may be legally declared municipalities; and (c) some regions 
may be granted special forms of autonomy (Art 110 and 111).   Also, it establishes that villages’ and towns’ 
public administration authorities are represented by elected Local Councils and Mayors, and that the 
coordination of public services delivery at district level is performed according to the law by the elected 
District Council.  
2 In its Art.44, the Law on the Budget System # 847/96 (May 24, 1996) formally integrate the “Budgets of 
the Territorial-Administrative Units” in the budgetary process as autonomous entities as part of the 
National Consolidated Budget system.   
3 Henceforth, this report may generically refer to the first level of government as “primaria”, whatever its 
particular condition is (villages, communes, and towns).  Primaria is any settlement where there is a 
“primar”, i.e., mayor).  “Municipalities” has a higher status as compared to primarias, and also has a 
Mayor.  In Moldova, the concept of municipality corresponds to the concept of Cities in some other 
European countries.  Likewise, “districts” may be used to refer to intermediate level of government, 
whatever its particular denomination will be (Judet or rayon). 
4 Mayors were directly elected by the respective “primaria” or municipality citizens.   
 2
Table 1.1, Moldova: Population per Judet, 2001
in thousand people Total Population percentage
Total Urban Rural of total Urban Rural
Total Republic 4264 1934 2330 100.0 45.4 54.6
Without Transnistria and Bender 3635 1501 2133 85.2 41.3 58.7
Without Transnistria 3771 1625 2147 88.4 43.1 56.9
Balti 504 213 291 11.8 42.3 57.7
Cahul 191 48 143 4.5 25.1 74.9
Chisinau 383 53 330 9.0 13.8 86.2
Edinet 284 72 212 6.7 25.4 74.6
Lapusna 278 64 213 6.5 23.1 76.9
Orhei 302 67 235 7.1 22.3 77.7
Soroca 278 80 198 6.5 28.9 71.1
Taraclia 46 16 31 1.1 33.7 66.3
Tighina 170 35 136 4.0 20.3 79.7
Ungheni 261 76 185 6.1 29.2 70.8
Chisinau City 779 713 65 18.3 91.6 8.4
ATU Gagauzia 159 64 95 3.7 40.3 59.7
Transnistria including Bender 630 433 197 14.8 68.7 31.3
Source: Dept. of Statistical and Social Analises of the Rep.Moldova
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1.  The inherited administrative structure 
  
While Moldova is a geographically small country it is, together with Armenia and 
Eastern European countries, one of the most populated areas in the Community of 
Independent States (CIS) region—127 inhabitants per km2.  But, apart from Chisinau 
municipality (753 thousand inhabitants), the population is fairly distributed across the 
country (4.3 million inhabitants, 33.8 thousand km2).  Immediately before the 1998 
territorial administrative reform, Moldova still had the inherited Soviet structure with 45 
rayons (including its 35 rayons, the municipality of Chisinau, plus 6 rayons in the left 
bank of Nistru river, and 3 rayons in the Gagauzia region) of approximately uniform 
geographical size 
(between 700 km2 and 
900 km2), but with 
varying population size 
(Table A.1).  Population 
size of rayons varied 
from around 30-40 
thousand inhabitants 
(Basarabesca, 
Vulcanasti, Cainari) to 
around 137-190 
thousand inhabitants 
(Orhei, Bender, 
Balti,Tiraspol).  
Excluding Chisinau municipality, the distribution of rayon by population size had an 
average of 81 thousand inhabitants and a mode of 79 (Tables and Figures 1.1 and 1.2).    
 
Compared to most intermediate government units in Western and Central Europe 
(and transitional countries with three tiers of government), the rayons of pre-1998 reform 
                         Diagram 1.1:  Moldova: The Administrative Structure 
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Table 1.2. Moldova: Distritubion of Territorial Units, by population size
Rayons, 1998 Judets, 2001
Units % Freq % Acc Popul % Freq % Acc Units % Freq % Acc Popul % Freq % Acc
<30 1 2 2 25 1 1
31- 40 2 4 7 66 2 2
41 - 50 3 7 13 137 3 5 1 8 8 46 1 1
51 - 60 5 11 24 280 7 12 8 1
61 - 70 6 13 38 385 9 21 8 1
71 - 80 7 16 53 532 12 33 8 1
81 - 90 8 18 71 677 16 49 8 1
91 - 100 5 11 82 473 11 60 8 1
101 - 120 3 7 89 347 8 68 8 1
121 -150 2 4 93 271 6 74 8 1
151 - 200 2 4 98 345 8 82 3 25 33 520 14 16
201 - 300 98 82 4 33 67 1101 30 46
301 - 500 98 82 2 17 83 685 19 65
501 - 700 98 82 1 8 92 504 14 79
> 701 1 2 100 753 18 100 1 8 100 779 21 100
TOTAL 45 100 4292 100 12 100 3635 100
Source: Tables 1.1, and A.1
thous. 
Inhabitants
were small, both in population and in geographic sizes, which raised questions as to 
whether those local government units were sub optimal, i.e., not sufficiently large for 
allowing a rational self-governing administration. This meant that many of the rayons:  
• Did not have sufficient tax revenue capacity (see Chapter 3); 
• Could not retain qualified staff with the necessary expertise to manage the 
local public businesses;  
• Could not internalize potential externalities in consumption; and  
• Could not operate optimally public service facilities that generate 
economies of scale (including public utilities such as water, sewerage, 
garbage disposal, and public transport, as well as social services such as 
health care, police, and education) (see Chapter 2).   
 
As a result of these conditions, the quality of delivered local public services and 
the efficiency of public expenditures in most small rayons were jeopardized, and the 
horizontal fiscal disparities among rayons tended to increase.  Apparently, the options for 
the rayon system were quite limited, since each unit was to a large extent structured and 
maintained around principles of economic autarky; neither cooperation/ association 
among the rayon were a common practice, nor were the public service delivery 
outsourced to the private sector as a tool to help overcome the efficiency constraints 
imposed by their smallness and inherited managerial system.5 
 
2.  The 1998 territorial administrative reform 
 
 The 1998 reform aimed at rationalizing the territorial administrative structure and 
at introducing an alternative system of intergovernmental relations.  Law # 191 
(December 12, 1998) established a new administrative and territorial organization of the 
country (Diagram 1.1) by creating 10 larger intermediary level self-governing Judets 
(plus ATU Garauzia and Chisinau municipality), which consolidated the rayons from the 
previous structure. The 
1998 reform basically 
kept the first level local 
self-governments around 
15 municipalities and 
712 primarias—
including 50 towns and 
662 communes/villages.  
The municipality of 
Chisinau was granted the 
same self-governing 
status as the Judets.  
Gagauzia region enjoys 
                                                 
5 See “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Republic of Moldova”, prepared by KPMG for USAID, 
1994; also Monika Huppi, “Fiscal Decentralization”, background paper for PER (World Bank), 1996. 
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the special status of an autonomous territorial unit (ATU-Gagauzia). The territory on the 
left bank of the Nistru river (the Transnistria region) is still a contentions issue, and its 
status in the Republic of Moldova has not yet been entirely defined (Table 1.1).6 
 
 The new territorial administrative structure was organized basically in accordance 
with the principles in the European Charter of Self-Local Governments, and its second-
level (the intermediary level of government) reflected a more economically reasonable 
distribution of the number of judets by population size, and of the distribution of the 
population per territorial unit size (Table 1.2).  Figures 1.1 and 1.2 compare the size 
distribution of rayons versus judets according to their numbers and according to the 
percentage of the population that they housed.  Only one judet (Taraclia) may be 
considered of small size (46 thousand inhabitants), all the others were above 150 
thousand inhabitants, accommodating 99 percent of the country’s population.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the 1999 Law on Local Public Finance formalized the budgetary and 
intergovernmental fiscal relations of the vertical structure of government # 491 (July 9, 
1999)).  This Law established a resource basis (including local “own” taxes, shared State 
taxes, and non-tax revenues), a broad expenditure assignment of responsibilities, a 
formula for a transfer mechanism (although still “gap-fill” based), the rules to access 
borrowing, and the principles of the Treasury system for the sub national governments. 
 
 Although the new legal framework provided some autonomy to sub national 
governments (judets and primarias), in practice the Moldovan system of 
intergovernmental finance remained extremely hierarchical.  The Law on Local 
Government Finance, for instance, gave  judets significant discretion to interfere in the 
affairs of the primarias in their jurisdiction, including on revenue assignments, transfers 
and to some extent expenditure allocation. The paring of these two very different 
principles—the autonomy of primarias and the hierarchical financial dependency of 
primarias from judets—rendered the system contradictory and to a large extent 
unworkable.   
                                                 
6 On the status of Gagauzia and Transnistria regions, see Section C in this Chapter 
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Figure 1.1. Moldova: Distribution of Territorial Units, 
by population size
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 Also, the implementation of the 1998 reforms was actually too weak.  Two years 
have elapsed from the approval of the basic organic laws (the Laws on Territorial 
Administrative Organization, on Public Administration, on Local Public Finance) without 
any specific regulation for a proper implementation of these significant reforms.  For 
example, clear formalization of functions and responsibilities, including revenue sharing 
and delegated functions between Judets and primarias were never specified.  Also, the 
definition of property rights and the transfer of properties to the subnational governments 
was not completed.  Moreover, during this period, neither a satisfactory coordination of 
the decentralization process took place, nor any relevant integrated capacity building 
program was developed to help the newly decentralized authorities and respective staff to 
perform their role effectively and responsibly.  The absence of a concerted 
implementation effort for so long time created a sense of lack of strategic direction for 
the fiscal decentralization policy, which allowed for increasing regional discontent and 
political maneuverings—including allegations of corruption and generalized financial 
mismanagement practices, although not always convincingly demonstrated. 
 
3.  Rolling back reform 
 
 In the wake of the 2000/2001 political campaign, the hesitation and 
implementation weaknesses of the fiscal decentralization program drive were extensively 
discussed and political alliances were forged with the objective of backtracking the 
reforms initiated in the late 1990s.  As a result, instead of improving the system, and, for 
example, making use of the Courts and the existing institutions of the judicial system to 
enforce existing laws on the alleged misdoings,7 the Parliament proceeded to change the 
core of the fiscal decentralization system that had started being installed just two years 
ago.  The Amendment Law # 496, passed by the Parliament in June 27, 2001, shifted the 
General Financial Division from the locally elected Judet Council’s authority to the 
centrally appointed Prefect’s Office.8  This move to a large extent deprived the regional 
representatives of their legal financial autonomy.9 
                                                 
7 As was prescribed by the Law on Public Administration (Law # 186/98), in its Art. 30 (2), which said: 
“The dismissal or cessation of the activity of the local council shall be done by the Parliament, at grounded 
recommendation of the head of the state administration (Prefect), based on final decision of the Court.  The 
amendment to this Law approved by Parliament on January 2002  dropped the phrase “based on final 
decision of the Court.” 
8 The word Prefect and the phrase Prefect’s Office were introduced in the Law on Local Public Finance for 
the first time by the Amendment (Law # 496/2001).  The post of Prefect was created in 1998 by the Law on 
Public Administration and, according to its Art. 12, Prefects are appointed by the President of the Republic, 
by suggestion of the government, as the head of State administration in the territory.  Prefects are 
subordinated and report to the State Chancellery.  Previous to the Amendment (Law # 496/2001) the 
functions of the Prefect—besides coordinating the implementation of de-concentrated functions of the 
central government in the territory—were essentially the following: (a) to supervise the legality of Council’ 
decisions, (b) to report to the central government, and (c) to initiate judicial actions to revert illegal 
Councils’ decisions, if necessary.  As amended by Law # 496/2001 the Prefect’s executive powers over the 
local government were unduly extended, while the financial executive power of the elected Judet Council 
was eliminated. 
9 Initially, this change also created a confusion in the vertical hierarchy of the public administration, since 
the General Financial Division of local governments, which were previously under and reporting to the 
Ministry of Finance, after the Amendment (Law # 496/01)—as an organ of the Prefect’s Office—became 
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 This amendment marked the formal beginning of a process to shift the focus of 
the government from implementing decentralization of fiscal powers, back to 
emphasizing a policy of de-concentrated functions of the State throughout the national 
territory.  As a first step in that direction, a parliamentary commission for regulating Law 
# 496/01 and reviewing the territorial division of the country was installed.  Inter alia, the 
commission basically worked under two principles: (a) to increase the “vertical 
consolidation of the State Power;” and (b) to “reinstate the territorial administrative 
organization of pre-1998 reform”.  It appears that this simply meant restructuring local 
governments to resemble local branches of the central government, rather than to build 
upon the autonomous units as intended by the original 1998 legislation.10 
 
 One view of these changes is that they flatly contradict the subsidiarity principle 
of the European Charter of Self Local Governments, signed by Moldova, which states 
that decisions on policy should be taken at the most decentralized level consistent with 
making them efficient and effective.  There are at least two key reasons why Moldova 
should observe the principle of subsidiarity.  First, the central government is already 
swamped with its own policies and reforms, and would not have enough capacity to 
effectively deal with all the details required by the local issues. Second, common 
measures adopted from the center will hardly please every regional interest—given the 
regional diversities in incomes, traditions, and social attitudes.  These limitations could 
soon revive regional discontent.   
 
 In reality, the policy of emphasizing the de-concentration of central government 
functions at local level is the other side of the coin of the policy of dismantling the 
process of decentralization drive only recently initiated.  These frequent shifts in policy 
strategic direction may increase the risks of instability and may undermine the 
consolidation of an accountable fiscal system in the medium term.   
 
B.  UNSETTLED REFORMS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS 
  
The fiscal decentralization reform process in Moldova is still in a state of flux.  
The government approved Resolution no. 1387 in December 13, 2001 and the State 
Chancellery (through no. 1310-166) submitted  a new draft-Law “on territorial 
administrative structure” and a draft-Law amending and supplementing the “Law on local 
public administration no. 186/98” for the Parliament consideration.  After approval by 
Parliament the bills will become Laws in the early 2002. The new legislation formally 
will keep the three-level government structure (basically as reflected in Diagram 1.1), but 
replace the judets with the rayons, and essentially will strengthen the hierarchical 
                                                                                                                                                 
subordinated/reporting directly to the State Chancellery.  Later, through an executive arrangement, Prefects 
were to authorize the respective General Financial Division to report directly to the Ministry of Finance. 
10 These rearrangements in the territorial configuration of the country are issues still highly politically 
charged. 
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character of the government structure in the new system.11  The new legislation also 
retains the idea of removing from the local governments the autonomy for budget 
execution, since it maintains the subordination of the General Financing Division directly 
to the Ministry of Finance, instead of to the District Council—i.e., the rearrangement 
introduced by the amendment Law 496/2001 is preserved.  In this regard, the new 
legislation to come into force in 2002 will resolve the contradiction embedded in the 
current system (between the fiscal autonomy of primarias and their fiscal dependency to 
the districts), albeit it does that by suppressing local autonomy and, therefore, going 
contrary to the principles of fiscal decentralization. 
 
Specifically, the new legislation will introduce in 2002  the following changes in 
the structure of the territorial administrative system: 
a. The 10 judets structure will be discontinued and replaced by 32 smaller    
    rayons—plus 5 municipalities (Chisinau, Belti, and Bender/Tighina, 
Tiraspol, and Comrat), plus ATU Gagauzia, and plus ATU Transnistria; 
b. The number of primarias (and Mayors) will increase approximately by 140, 
by lowering the population threshold from the current 2,500 to 1,500; 
c. As is currently done, local administration will be carried out by directly 
elected Local Councils (at primaria level and at the district level).  But, the 
number of Councilors will be increased by an average of 73 percent (see 
Table A.2 in the Statistical Appendix).12 
d. Primaria and district will have Executive Committees headed by a Mayor 
and a Chairman, respectively—both indirectly elected among the members 
of the respective Local Councils; 
e. The post of Prefect and Prefect’s Office will be discontinued (to avoid 
duplication and conflict of authority) 
 
 Besides the increased hierarchical decision-making process and the loss in local 
autonomy, the new legislation will have several major implications, including the 
following: 
a. The problem of the smallness (sub optimal scale) of the territorial    
      administrative units is back in the scene again and a strategy to deal with      
      this problem will be required; 
b. The considerable increase in the number of Mayors (and staffing of their   
      respective offices) and in the number of Councilors in all Local Councils     
     quite certainly will substantially expand the structural recurrent    
      expenditures  on a permanent basis;13 
                                                 
11 The “Explanatory Note” which forwarded these draft Laws to the Parliament states that the first among 
the main objectives of the reform is the “vertical consolidation of State power.” 
12 Elections for Local Council representatives is expected to be anticipated for sometime during the first 
half of 2002. 
13 Surprisingly, the “Explanatory Note” to the draft Laws argues  in favor of  substantial savings to be 
brought about by the new legislation.  It argues for a reduction in the current wage-bill, on account of the 
dismissal of “redundant” staffing of the “local” administrations, as compared to the existing “normative.”  
Whatever the resulting wage-bill savings will be, it appears to be a stretch to attribute them to this reform. 
First, it appears that the number of “local” administration employees used for the calculations includes 
State civil servants stationed at the local level (which at least confuses the reasoning). Second, it could be 
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c. The transformation of a directly elected into an indirectly elected Mayor is    
      definitively backtracking at least in terms of political accountability.14   
      The loss in accountability could have major implications on economic  
      efficiency and governance in general; and 
d. The elimination of the role of the Courts in providing final judicial    
                        decision for the disputes involving local governments represents a major  
                        setback in the process of the separation of powers in the Republic of    
                        Moldova. 
 
C.  TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS WITH SPECIAL STATUS 
Despite the relative small size of Moldova, the design and implementation of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in the country is complicated by sharp disparities in 
economic base and by ethnic and political tensions.  Nevertheless, as has been the case in 
many other countries, an adequately decentralized system of governance and finance may 
be an important contributor to solving some of the existing tensions.  It should be 
understood, however, that the essence of these problems tends to be political and, 
correspondingly, the solutions also need to be political. This is the case with the heavy 
presence of the municipality of Chisinau in the economic and political arenas, the special 
demands by the ethnic region of Gagauzia, and the politically complex problem of the 
Transnistria region.  
    
The municipality of Chisinau does not only play an overwhelming role in the generation 
and distribution of fiscal resources in the country, but it also plays the role of the capital 
city, housing 20 percent of the country’s population. The municipality of Chisinau is on a 
fiscal basis treated differently from the rest of the intermediate levels of government. It 
benefits form higher per capita expenditure norms for health and education, for example, 
but it also is asked to contribute to the national coffers a higher share of the taxes 
collected in its territory. In addition, Chisinau’s Mayor traditionally has had a 
representative seat at the Government of the Republic of Moldova, and the municipality’s 
statute is regulated by an special organic law.  In general terms, there is little justification 
for any special fiscal treatment of Chisinau municipality other than for the fact that it is 
the capital city.  This calls for the explicit compensation for the potential additional costs 
to the municipality in the delivery of public services, including security, transportation, 
and environment.15  This compensation should preferably be in the form of a transparent 
transfers of resources as opposed to, as is now the case, special rules for Chisinau in 
                                                                                                                                                 
argued that if there are  personnel redundancies  in “excess to the current normative,” then they should be 
eliminated anyway, independently of any structural reform.   
14 In fact, the population will be electing representatives to Local Council (that can change functions and 
responsibilities from time to time), and not anymore directly choosing the chief executive officer that 
people can easily identify and make him/her personally accountable for the decisions taken 
15 There are, on the other hand, important benefits Chisinau municipality derives from being the capital of 
the country. In  particular, many enterprises have their headquarters located in Chisinau even though the 
factories may be spread across the rest of the country.  This fact, in combination with the derivation 
principle for the sharing of tax revenues as used in Moldova, has significantly benefited Chisinau from the 
revenue allocation system (Chapter 3).     
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many of the steps involved in the formulation of subnational budgets (Chapters 2, 4, and 
5).   
 
The region of Gagauzia has retained a special autonomy status since December 1994 
(Law # 344/94) in recognition for its ethnical, linguistic, and cultural peculiarities.  The 
People’s Assembly of Gagauzia can pass its own laws and regulations (as long as they 
are in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova).  The region also has 
its own judicial system, and its elected Governor (the Bashkan of Gagauzia) has a 
representative seat at the Government of the Republic of Moldova.  Outstanding issues 
for Gagauzia are more of a political and economic nature. Politically, Gagauzia has 
revealed its interest of having an independent representation at the Parliament, although 
so far not considered by the Republic of Moldova. Economically, Gagauzia has been 
pressing the central government for a “single channel” fiscal arrangement, whereby the 
autonomous government would keep all revenues from all taxes collected in Gagauzia’s 
territory and then would negotiate a single annual payment with the central government 
as Gagauzia’s contribution to the costs of national services.16  Apart from these 
outstanding issues, Gagauzia region already enjoys greater fiscal autonomy than the other 
regions, and it is well integrated into the country’s economic and political space. 
 
The region of Transnistria not only has its independent institutions (a directly elected 
Supreme Soviet, a Constitution, the Presidency, a Judicial system, a Central Bank, and its 
currency—the Transnistrian Rouble) and runs its own affairs but, except for smuggling 
activity, it is a separate economic space from the Republic of Moldova.  This is especially 
true in respect to the fiscal aspects, where there is no connection at all between the fiscal 
budget of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic and the rest of Moldova.  Transnistria has 
no representation neither at the Parliament nor at the Government of the Republic of 
Moldova.  Transnistria has developed its own independent foreign relations (especially 
with Ukraine and Russia) and pays no tax, nor submit itself to any legal constraint of the 
Republic of Moldova. 
 
 While the problem of Gagauzia is more a question of finding the appropriate 
scope of fiscal autonomy, under the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-
Government, the issues involving Transnistria are far more complex and go beyond the 
question of fiscal autonomy, including intricate problems of political and international 
relations.  In this regard, the local self-governing issues of Chisinau and Gagauzia can 
likely be managed in the short- and medium-term in the context of an appropriate 
asymmetric assignment of responsibilities and adequate levels of fiscal autonomy, which 
take into account their peculiar resource base and income capacity, and the special 
expenditure needs.  In this respect, Moldova may certainly profit from the experience of 
the other countries which have adopted an asymmetric approach in fiscal 
decentralization.  Otherwise, the improvement of the intergovernmental fiscal relations 
with Transnistria will certainly involve more complex and difficult arrangements, 
                                                 
16 Gagauzia’s authorities have argued that the “single channel” arrangement is anticipated in the special 
autonomy status Law, but Chisinau has rebutted the argument on the ground that this is an overstretched 
interpretation of the autonomy Law. 
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possibly demanding an economic integration approach to start with, and high-level 
political agreements with a long-term perspective. 
  
D.  CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS 
 Moldova is striving to overcome many institutional and economic development 
challenges.  The restructuring of its territorial administrative system is one of these 
challenges, which directly concerns to the attribution of fiscal powers on public policy 
decision-making and implementation processes.  In this regard, the designing of the 
territorial administrative structure is crucial, since it will underpin the institutional set 
up under which fiscal decentralization will take place.  The basic element underlying a 
sustainable design for decentralization is to provide local government with enough 
autonomy to perform, one that embodies the right incentives for the system to operate 
maximizing allocative and technical efficiencies. 
 
 A second challenge faced by Moldova is to what extent should the country 
decentralize at all its fiscal policies.  Actually, there is, a priori, no compelling reason 
why it should not do it.  Although the country itself is already geographically and 
demographically rather small, it is densely populated and composed by several ethnic 
groups, with diverse regional peculiarities that may require a regional/local approach.  
The question, then, should be better formulated as: in what areas of policies and to what a 
degree should fiscal decentralization be carried out in Moldova?  On this, the general 
basic rule to follow is the subsidiarity principle of the European Charter of Self Local 
Governments, which acknowledges that decisions on policy should be taken at the most 
decentralized level consistent with making them efficient and effective.  The observance 
of this principle would help Moldova to choose its strategic direction and could guide 
reforms of the administrative structure for an effective and consistent policy 
implementation.  Moreover, as mentioned above, the observance of this principle would 
release the central government officials from the administrative burden of detailed issues 
related to local interest, would allow the central authorities to focus on the other 
important challenges and reforms related to sectoral and macroeconomic policies, and 
would contribute to abate regional tensions.  
 
 A third challenge is to clarify from the outset between de-concentrated functions 
of the central government in the territory from the true decentralization of decision 
powers (autonomy) to the local governments.  The country will only realize the full 
benefits of the fiscal decentralization process when increasingly an appropriate, 
significant degree of autonomy is attributed to the local governments, and when local 
authorities and managers are made accountable for results.  Conversely, intensifying de-
concentration of central government functions at local level may correspond to dismantle 
the decentralization drive initiated after the 1998 reforms in Moldova.  A reversal in 
policy direction may demoralize the institutions of the administrative structure and 
undermine the credibility of the decentralization process. 
 
 In order to restore credibility in the decentralized fiscal system, the Moldovan 
administrative structure and institutions have to be strengthen by: (a) boosting capacity 
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for policy implementation; (b) developing fiscal and political accountability; (c) 
promoting flexible cooperation/ association among administrative units; and (d) 
exercising central coordination of the decentralization process. 
 
(a) Boosting capacity for policy implementation.  Since the mid-1990s, Moldova 
had experienced significant progress on the development of the legal framework and the 
territorial administrative structure in support of the fiscal decentralization policy.  
However, policy implementation was never properly carried out for lack of the required 
detailed regulation, for lack of technical and administrative capacities, for lack of 
understanding by the local authorities of the spirit of the decentralization reform, and for 
lack of enough commitment by the central government.  For instance, as observed above, 
the fiscal relations between the judets and primarias were never formally regulated, and 
no integrated capacity building program was developed, in order to clarify 
implementation issues and qualify local administrations to adequately execute their new 
responsibilities regarding to implementation of decentralized fiscal policies.  After all, 
structural reform does not finish with the mere approval of an improved basic legal 
framework.  Although a necessary step, this is not a sufficient condition for the results of 
decentralization to come to fruition.  An effective implementation of the specific policies 
have to take place, but this requires detailed and adequate regulations of the approved 
organic laws, a minimum critical level of understanding by the local authorities of the 
government intents, and a minimum level of development of technical and administrative 
capacities.  Therefore, in order to effect policy implementation the government of 
Moldova should be prepared to boost sooner than later an integrated capacity building 
program, aiming at qualifying staff and authorities at the local as well as at the central 
levels, in order to develop, upgrade, and at least maintain a critical level of technical and 
administrative capacities.  Although a sine qua non condition for the success of fiscal 
decentralization, this should not necessarily be seen as a policy sequencing issue, since 
the challenge of capacity building can be better overcome in the process of policy 
implementation. 
 
(b) Developing political and fiduciary accountability of local administrations.  
The benefits of decentralization can only be realized when local authorities and managers 
are provided with enough autonomy to perform and are made fully accountable for their 
decisions.  Moldova may consider restoring the exercise of accountability both 
horizontally and vertically.  Horizontally, elected public authorities would be judged by 
their own constituencies on the bases of their performance, and can be kept or removed 
from office through the democratic election process.  In this regard, direct election of the 
local chief executive officers (the Mayors in the case of primarias, and the Council 
Chairman in the case of the districts) would be the most effective system in order to keep 
local authorities accountable.  Vertically, the local executive officers and public sector 
managers are to report to the respective local Councils, and to respond to enquiries from, 
the Government and the National Parliament.  As a minimum, fiduciary accountability 
can only be complete in Moldova if an effective external audit system (to audit primarias 
and district accounts) is put in place (Chapter 5), and the role of the courts is reinstated to 
take final decisions on the disputes involving the local governments.  
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The set up of such stable institutional administrative structure is sine qua non for 
the effectiveness of decentralization policies, which Moldova still have to complete by:  
(i) finalizing the transfer of property rights over assets to the local governments; (ii) 
restoring revenue and budgetary autonomy (Chapter 3); (iii) discontinuing the mechanism 
of annual “negotiated”/”regulated” tax sharing ratio and the “gap-fill” transfers (Chapter 
4); and (iv) reforming the intergovernmental fiscal relations—including the transfer 
mechanisms and the formalization of the relations between districts and primarias 
(Chapter 4).  
 
(c) Promoting flexible cooperation/association among administrative units.  
Especially now with an even more fragmented (the new 32 smaller rayons) district 
structure, Moldova government may consider promoting association schemes among 
territorial-administrative units aiming at optimizing efficiency in consumption and in the 
production and delivery of essential public services.  Certainly this is the case with the 
utilities (energy, transportation, water treatment, garbage collection), but also with health 
care, where economy of scale (and in certain cases externalities) plays a major role.  In 
this regard, the transfers/grants mechanisms may be one possible instrument to be used to 
promote association of territorial units or their outsourcing of service provision.  Thus, in 
addition to the association of primarias and/or districts themselves around one larger 
provider, a more intense participation of the private sector (including for the education 
sector) should be encouraged both in the provision as well as in the financing of those 
services.  Certainly the central government should exercise the power of adequately 
regulating the sectors’ operation, but in such a way to preserve the economic incentives 
in order to increase efficiency by reducing waste in consumption and reducing production 
costs.   
 
(d) Exercising central coordination of the decentralization process.  The novelty 
and complexity of the tasks faced by local governments in the decentralization 
implementation process and the constant need for adjustments in the laws (in order to 
keep the basic strategic orientation on track, as established by the basic organic Laws) 
require central government leadership and coordination.  For this, Moldova could 
consider establishing a Multilevel-Interministerial Standing Committee, with 
representation of the local governments, and having deliberative powers to conduct 
decisions on decentralization.  This committee should be supported by an independent 
Group of International Experts, and by a Decentralization Monitoring Department at the 
Ministry of Finance.  The Group of Advisors would specifically work on the strategic 
issues for the Standing Committee deliberation, while the Ministry of Finance’s 
Monitoring Department would operate as a repository of information and on the 
preparation of follow-up studies on the decentralization implementation process.  The 
activities of these agencies should be fully transparent. 
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CHAPTER 2:  EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 In developing economies and countries in transition to market system, devolution 
of fiscal responsibilities are critical to improve efficiency and fairness, to increase 
accountability to the citizens, and to promote economic stabilization, thereby of prime 
policy concern.  Devolution of responsibilities encompasses the decentralization of fiscal 
powers to local and regional authorities, as well as a more balanced participation of the 
private sector (both in the production/delivery and in the financing of public services). 
 
 Moldova has made progress towards a market economy, but still has a long way 
to go on properly defining the role of the government in the new system, since many 
business activities and most service delivery activities, including those related to utilities, 
housing, health care, and education still remain to be divested.  The government role, at 
all levels, still needs to be optimized in the new open market economy in Moldova.  In 
principle, government intervention could only be justified where the private sector cannot 
do a better job—i.e., if there is no economic or social rationale for the government to 
intervene, the operation of any activity should just be left to the private sector, regardless 
of other considerations.  In this regard, apart from pursuing social equity objectives, the 
public sector intervention would be basically justified when there is a compelling market 
failure, such as those resulting from the presence of public goods (national defense, 
public order, and security), externalities (pollution, spill over effects), and uncontestable 
markets (public utilities, communications—where decreasing costs may drive out 
competitive forces).  In addition, the government should pursue social equity objectives 
in a way that minimizes distortions to the working of the market economy. 
 
 While still maintaining an undefined role of the State in the economy, Moldova 
has been experiencing a staggering decentralization process of fiscal powers among 
levels of governments since independence.  Because this process is eminently political in 
nature, difficulties in implementation are always expected, especially in the absence of 
strong administrative capacity, committed champion institutions, and clearly established 
strategic policy directions.  Successful implementation of fiscal decentralization policies 
requires a strong capacity building effort and a certain level of political consensus and 
consultation.  Decentralization policies that simply aim pushing down fiscal 
responsibilities to sub national governments may not be effective and may end up having 
counterproductive effects on the delivery of public services. 
 
 Since the fiscal decentralization reform of 1998, Moldova’s public administration 
has been struggling with the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to the three-level 
government: the municipalities/primarias (first level), the judets (second level), and the 
State (third level).  Except for few obvious areas, neither a clear definition of attribution 
of government functions, regarding social and economic sectors, nor specific 
competences, regarding regulation, financing and service delivery of functions has being 
sufficiently developed so far.  In practice this has generated confusion at all levels of 
government and reluctance on the part of the central bureaucracy to relinquish fiscal 
powers to local authorities.  The recently approved reforms on the local public 
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administration legislation17 made progress in some areas, but fell short of addressing 
most of the key pending issues and, in fact, did not help with some innovations in other 
areas.18 
 
 
A. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
 The assignment of public expenditure responsibilities in Moldova was first 
spelled out in law in 1998.  Before then, the lack of legal basis, allowed responsibilities 
for public service delivery to be easily shifted back and forth between the central and 
local governments.  Most public service expenditures were delegated to local 
governments, which acted basically as agents, executing central government mandates, 
without any relevant delegation or devolution of decision power.  Local autonomy was 
weak, local budgetary predictability practically did not exist and, consequently, 
incentives for local authorities accountability to the citizens were not existent, if not 
perverse. 
 
 After independence, and particularly since the mid-1990, Moldova started moving 
towards integration into the world economy and began setting up institutions congruent 
with the modern democratic European economies.  Following the accepted principles of 
local self-governance established in its new Constitution (1994), the country subscribed 
to the European Charter of Local Self-Governments (1997), and the Parliament passed a 
new Law on the Local Public Administration (Law # 186, 1998) and a new Law on Local 
Government Finance (Law # 491, 1999).  These reforms of late 1990s started putting in 
place a basic, modern legal framework for intergovernmental fiscal relations, where, for 
the first time, the new Law on Local Public Administration explicitly assigned 
expenditure functions to the local government—Judet and municipalities/primarias.  This 
new legal framework was broadly consistent with the European Union principle of 
subsidiarity, which aims to maximize allocative efficiency by proposing that decision-
making be taken at the lowest possible level of government, conditional to geographic 
internalization of the benefits and service delivery at minimum cost (Box 2.1, on 
principles and practice). 
 
                                                 
17 Law no. 781-XV December, 28th 2001, on Amending Law no. 186-XIV/98. 
18 An adequate fiscal decentralization design for Moldova will require that:  
(a) all the relevant financial inter-jurisdictional relationship be considered as part of a consistent, 
sustainable system.  This will require a clear definition of the scope of fiscal decentralization, by putting in 
place the adequate incentives for efficient local expenditures and service delivery, by providing local 
authorities and managers with autonomy to perform, and by assuring central policy coordination; and  
(b)  implementation be congruent with an adequate policy sequencing.  This will require that 
assignment of revenue sources should follow functions (the assignment of  expenditure responsibilities), 
and not the other way around.   A clear definition of expenditure functions and competences at the outset of 
the fiscal decentralization process is critical, in order to gauge required revenue sources and compensatory 
grants, allow for local budget predictability, and make the local authorities’ and managers’ accountable for 
their responsibilities. 
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Box 2.1 – Principles and Practice on Expenditure Assignment 
   
There is no fix, established rule on how expenditures should be assigned among government 
levels.  The extent and nature of decision-making power exercised by lower level authorities has varied 
considerably from country to country and may change from time to time, depending on technology and 
preferences.  Especially in unitary country, subnational governments are not constitutionally empowered to 
make independent decisions over a range specified public functions or services.   
However, general principles can be derived from best practices which indicates that policy 
decision on economic stabilization and income distribution are typically assigned to central government, 
while those related to allocative efficiency may be assigned to the local governments.  Otherwise, when 
decisions on economic stabilization and income distribution are left to the local governments, wrong 
incentive and conflicts may arise, and policies may render unsustainable.  Observance of the principle of 
subsidiarity—i.e., decisions taken at the lowest possible level of government consistent with allocative 
efficiency, including the internalization of the benefits within the geographic area and the provision of 
services at minimum cost—is fundamental to define the scope of local governments. 
More specifically, the national government in general retain responsibility for the provision of 
national public goods, international affairs, monetary policy, regulation, distribution and transfers to 
persons and businesses, fiscal policy coordination, regional equity, and preservation/promotion of internal 
common market.  The intermediate level governments may be responsible for education, health, social 
insurance, inter-municipal issues, and oversight local governments.  Local governments may take the 
responsibility for some local services, including the provision of utilities.  Beyond areas of exclusive 
functions/responsibilities which are attributed to each government level, the law should clearly specify 
competences on shared functions.  In this regard, central government should keep decisions on overall 
policies, setting standards, and auditing, while intermediate governments should be given competence on 
over-sighting implementation, and local governments should be more directly involved in providing/ 
delivering the services (and infrastructure).  
Assignment of respective responsibilities to regional vis-à-vis local governments should respond 
to the country conditions and be dependent on considerations such as economy of scale (arising from the 
indivisibilities and specializations), economy of scope (arising from related activities), cost-benefit 
spillovers, proximity to beneficiaries, consumer preferences, and flexibility on expenditure priorities.  In 
this regard, because of different local population size, distinct rural and urban characteristics, and diverse 
fiscal capacities, the assignment of responsibilities could be asymmetric, where larger local governments 
may end up having relatively larger responsibilities and higher degree of autonomy. 
Although there is no fixed rule, the bottom line for a workable expenditure assignment in Moldova 
should at least:  (a) obey the general best-practice guidelines delineated above; and (b) whatever is the final 
design of the expenditure assignment, it should be clear and well-specified in the law and be enforced 
accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The 1998-99 intergovernmental relations reform in Moldova should be 
understood only as an initial step, although critical to define the scope of decentralization 
and the role of local governments on public service delivery and its political 
accountability to the citizens.  This basic legal framework of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations of 1998-99 conforms to conventional principles of assignments of 
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responsibilities to local governments, and by and large with the Council of Europe’s 
Charter of Local Self-Governments, such as:19  
 
(a) Reserving the stabilization and distribution functions to the central 
government;  
(b) Assigning to the local governments (primarias and municipalities)  
responsibility for typically local functions; those able of increasing allocative 
efficiency, internalizing the benefits within the geographic area, and minimizing 
costs; and 
(c)     Assigning to the intermediate level of government (judets) mostly coordinating  
responsibilities, and some functions whose efficient operation requires larger 
benefit areas (than one municipality/ primaria) because of economy of scale, as in 
the case of some services in the health sector. 
However, while this framework was put in place, the adopted basic legislation 
remained too general, insufficiently regulated, and in certain cases still confusing.  
Further complementary legislation and regulation defining administrative procedures and 
specific competences (especially on policy formulation, on financing, and on the final 
service delivery) should be subsequently developed to sustain an effective 
implementation of the decentralization process.  Nevertheless, the reform stopped 
practically at the first step, and fell short of attributing specific detailed authorities, and of 
better defining competences in shared responsibilities, which ended-up exposing the new 
system to fundamental weaknesses, such as: 
 
(i) confusion and arbitrariness, since the competences (on setting policies, 
regulation, financing and service delivery), were never clearly understood, with 
responsibilities being disputed by different authorities and being shifted back and forth.  
For instance, social assistance to the poor (including relief to unemployed) were simply 
pushed downward from the central government to the local governments, without the 
necessary reviewing the affordability of entitlement system, or without defining specific 
competences of authorities or financing sources—contrary to the conventional wisdom on 
social assistance of assuring central financing and relying on local service delivery; 
(ii) unclear rules on shared responsibilities, especially on education and health care.  
In practice, the setting of policies and regulation, as well as wages (of teachers and 
doctors) continued to be paid by the center, while the maintenance of facilities (school 
and hospitals) was simply understood as left up to the local governments; 
(iii) policy inconsistencies with respect to ownership and maintenance of the capital 
stocks.  Although the legislation still establishes that local governments are also 
responsible for the capital expenditures, in practice investment has been understood by 
the local authorities as a central government responsibility, since most of property rights 
of local facilities—including utilities—are still central government’s.  
                                                 
19 See Box 2.2. 
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 Compounding to these weaknesses there was also an almost complete absence of 
capacity building, coordination and leadership by the central government in the 
implementation process of fiscal decentralization.  This situation on the assignment of 
responsibilities of local governments rendered the implementation of decentralization 
ineffective and hardly sustainable.   
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Box 2.2 
                   Republic of Moldova – Assignment of Responsibilities 
 
State Functions : Decentralized Functions to : Responsibility/ 
Functions Central Territorial Agencies 
(de-concentrated functions) 
Judets/Districts Municipalities/ primarias1 
Monetary Policy NBM    
Foreign Affairs  
and Trade 
Min. Foreign 
Affairs 
   
Statistical Serv. St.&Soc.Dept. Terrt. Division of Statistics   
Defense Min. of Defense Military Centers (conscription 
centers) 
-Coordination of administrative 
activities 
-Military administrative 
activities (conscriptions) 
Justice/Internal 
Security 
Min. Justice 
Min. Interior 
Nat. Sec.Ministr 
Terr.Div.for Nat. Security 
Offices of Registration 
Regulation of Land Properties 
Police Inspectorate-Civil defense 
-Regional police services  
 
-Local police services 
-Fire brigade  
Economic Policies Min. Finance 
Min. Economy 
Territ. Agency for Privatization 
Control & Audit Division 
Territ. Agency of State Treasury 
 -Local markets and market 
places 
Agriculture Min. Agriculture 
and Food Proc. 
Veterinary inspectorate 
Rural Extension Services 
-Some agricultural related services -Some agricultural related 
services 
Regional 
Development 
Min.Transp:regl. 
Roads Fund: 
finances 
Terr.Construction Inspectorate -Construction and mainten. of 
Regional roads and other 
infrastructures 
-constr.&maint.of local 
infrastructures (roads, 
streets,st.lighting,bridges etc) 
Traffic and Public 
Transport 
Min. Transport 
Regulates 
-Highways, air, and rail transport  
 
Local transport  
-Local transport subsidies 
Education 
 
Min. Education -Colleges, Univers., Resear. Inst. 
-Curriculum development 
-Teaching material 
-Teachers’ salary; Subs. buildings  
-Pre- & primary schools 
-Second. school & Gymn. 
-Lyceums 
-Vocational schools 
-Pre- & primary schools 
-Second. school & Gymn. 
-Lyceums 
-Vocational schools 
Health care 
 
Min. Health - Specialized hospital care 
- Public Health 
- Health Protection 
- Doctors’ salary 
-Non-specialized hospitals 
-District hospitals 
-Social & sanitary establish. 
-Health care (incl. primary) 
-Ambulatory care 
-Ambulance service 
Culture, Leisure 
Recreation and 
Parks 
- Min. Culture -Libraries 
-Sports, Leisure 
-Bldgs.cultur. events (maint.) 
-Coord. Sports, Leisure 
-Coord.cultural events 
-Museums, Libraries 
-Sports, Leisure, Parks 
-Bldg.cult.events (mainten.) 
Public Utilities -Regulated by 
Line Ministries 
-off-bdgt.comp. 
-District heating 
-Electricity 
-Gas 
 -Water treatm.&supply 
-Sewerage, solid waste 
Urban 
development and 
tourism 
- Regulated by 
Min.Env.Constr. 
& Terr.Develop. 
 -Regional Spatial Planning 
-Regional Econ. Development 
-Tourism 
-Town planning 
-Spatial planning 
-Tourism 
Housing and 
communal serv. 
-Regulated by 
Min.Int.Aff. 
  -Housing and communal 
services 
Social Security and 
Welfare 
Nat. Sec. Min. 
(Social Sec. 
System)—Social 
Fund 
Terr. Division for the National 
Security System 
 
 -Personal serv.for the elderly & 
handicapped 
-Nurseries, homeless, families & 
child care 
-Housing for the poor 
Social Protection Labor, Social 
Prot. & Family 
Ministry 
Insp.for the Protection of Labor 
Force Office 
 Social Assistance for the poor, 
including unemployment relief 
Environment & 
public sanitation 
Min. of 
Environment 
Environmental protection 
(Terr. Ecological Agency) 
-Regional environmental issues -Local environ.protection 
-Sanitation & cemeteries 
Sources: 
Notes:  1  includes towns, communes, and villages 
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Deconcentrated vs. decentralized responsibilities 
 
 The 1998 Law on Local Public Administration (Law # 186/98) distinguished 
between the deconcentrated and decentralized public services, attributing the 
responsibility for the former to the central government and for the latter to the local 
authorities.  The deconcentrated public services are responsibility of the ministries and 
other central agencies.  Many of these authorities are situated in the territory and until 
very recently were locally supervised by the Prefects (Box 2.2).  Examples of these 
central agencies and bodies include: Territorial Division of Statistics, Military 
Conscription Centers, Territorial Division for National Security, Police Inspectorates, 
Territorial Agencies for Privatization, Territorial Agencies of the State Treasury, 
Veterinary Inspectorates, Territorial Division for the National Security System, 
Territorial Environmental Protection Agencies, Territorial Construction Inspectorate, 
Territorial Education Department, Territorial Health Department, Territorial Inspectorate 
for the Protection of the Labor Force, as well as Colleges, Universities, specialized 
hospitals, and libraries. 
 
The Law defined decentralized public services those that are not subordinate to 
central authorities, and that should be autonomously organized at the administrative-
territorial unit level.  The latter includes all the local public agencies pertaining to the 
autonomous territorial units, judets, and primarias/ cities/ towns/ villages.  However, in 
December 2001 article I of the amendment (Law # 781-XV/2001) to the Law on Local 
Public Administration eliminated the distinction between deconcentrated and 
decentralized public services, which may have added to the present confusion of 
responsibilities of functions and competences among levels of governments.  Apparently, 
some sectors of the central bureaucracy continue to be reluctant to accept the idea of 
decentralizing functions/ competences to local authorities. 
 
Exclusive, shared and delegated responsibilities. 
The current legislation has not yet established a clear distinction between 
exclusive, shared and delegated responsibilities of sub national governments in Moldova.  
So far, the responsibility for the implementation of the most of public services has been 
pushed down to the local governments without a clear specification of their 
competences—whether regulation, financing, or service delivery.  The general 
understanding is that regulation (including policy formulation, and setting standards) has 
been retained by the central government, while financing and delivery competences have 
varied according to the function.  In some cases, it has been implicitly understood that 
urban services in general, especially housing and supply of some utilities (e.g., water 
treatment and supply, sewerage and solid waste collection),20 as well as local urban 
                                                 
20 But district heating, electricity and gas are kept as responsibilities of the central government. 
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services (e.g., local transportation services, construction and maintenance of local 
infrastructure like local roads, bridges, street and street lighting) are exclusive 
responsibilities of the first level local governments (i.e., municipalities/ primarias).  It has 
been also understood that those services should be financed by local governments’ 
respective budgets; although the State still exercise the power of regulating and 
approving the tariffs charged on utility services.  Are also exclusive responsibility of the 
first level local governments conscription administrative activities, local policy services, 
fire brigade, local markets and some agricultural related activities, local tourism, spatial 
and city planning, and the operation and maintenance of local museums, libraries, parks, 
leisure, sports and cultural buildings. 
 
The second level of local governments (Judets) is assigned with coordination of 
regional activities (including administrative, fiscal, and social), regional police services, 
some agricultural related activities, regional tourism, regional spatial planning and 
economic development, regional road and infrastructure, and the delivery of most of the 
health care services (including non-specialized and district hospitals, sanitary 
establishments, and primary health care).21   
 
Important areas of education, health care, and environment are considered areas 
of shared responsibility, although still without a precise formal definition of the specific 
competences of central, judet, and first level local governments. In practice, in the health 
sector the central government has been responsible for the specialized hospitals, public 
health programs and the health protection system, while the judets are responsible for the 
non-specialized and district hospitals, social and sanitary establishments and the primary 
health care, and the municipalities/primarias for the ambulatories, outpatient health care, 
and the ambulance services.  
 
 In education, the central government is in charge of tertiary education, 
curriculum development and teaching materials, and local governments (first and second 
level) are in charge of pre-, primary, and secondary schools, gymnasium, lyceums and 
vocational schools.  Nevertheless, the specific responsibilities and competences of judets 
and primarias/municipalities in the area of education have not yet been formally defined, 
leaving room for concurrent involvements and, so, inefficiencies.  In environment and 
public sanitation the local governments are responsible for sanitation and cemeteries, but 
the rest of environmental protection responsibilities are also shared among the central, 
judet, and first level local authorities, but also without attribution of specific 
competences.  The problem with the poorly defined areas of shared responsibilities is that 
services tend to be either duplicated or under-provided, which end up increasing 
inefficiencies.  Given the severe budgetary restrictions in Moldova, the under-provision 
of the public services tends to be the most likely scenario in these areas of local interest, 
with a direct negative impact on the population. 
 
The law does not distinguish delegated responsibilities either.  The Law on Local 
Public Finance (Art. 2) refers to “delegated functions” by the central government to the 
                                                 
21 But responsibilities for highways, air and rail transport, as well as the public health protection programs 
and specialized hospital care are State responsibilities.  
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territorial units, but does not define what these delegated functions are.  Yet, in order to 
avoid indiscriminate unfunded mandates, the same Law has a provision (Art. 10.1.a) 
which establishes that the State budget has to provide the territorial unit budget with 
“special purpose transfer” corresponding to the expenditures of delegated functions.  
However, since the end-1990s the delivery of many functions (mainly social assistance 
services) have been pushed down (implicitly, or informally delegated) to local 
governments, but without the provision of corresponding source of revenues or a careful 
review of affordable entitlements, so that local authorities could properly gauge the need 
for “special purpose transfers”.  Basically, most of the public services under the broad 
category of “social assistance” (including support to the elderly and handicapped, 
nurseries, homeless families, destitute child care, unemployment relief, and social 
assistance to the poor) are apparently understood as delegated functions to the local 
governments.  As delegated functions these would be financed by the State.  However, 
some other times the same list of functions have been understood as shared functions.  
This lack of clarity has been a major source of confusion and inefficiency. The lack of 
clarity has de facto imposed unfunded mandates on local governments. The overall 
outcome has been worsening in the access by beneficiaries to the services, increasing 
deterioration in the quality of services, and an accumulation of payment arrears at the 
local government levels, mainly salaries.   
 
 
B. PATTERN AND STRUCTURES OF EXPENDITURES  
 The Law on the Budgetary System and Process (organic Law # 847/96, Article 2) 
formally acknowledges and integrates local governments (Judets and Municipalities/ 
Primarias) as autonomous entities into the country’s budgetary system.  Together, with 
the State budget, the local budget forms the consolidated budget system.22  Nevertheless, 
annually the central government issues expenditure “norms” for the preparation of the 
budgets, which the local governments have to follow suit in order to access 
supplementary resources from the State budget (Box 2.3).  In Moldova, expenditure 
norms have not only played a central political role in the negotiations of grants and 
transfers for planning purpose, but frequently been also used as a policy tool to condition 
execution of local budgets.23   
                                                 
22 The national public budget system also includes the State Social Fund Budget, and the other extra-budget 
Funds (performed by “off-budget” institutions, like public autarkies—e.g., the some universities, hospitals, 
research institutes—and state enterprises, e.g., utility companies), but these are not part of the so-called 
consolidated budget.  The State Social Fund Budget includes pension, unemployment, and also 
“categorical” social assistance (e.g., for single mothers, disabled, war veterans).  Most social assistance for 
the needy (e.g., elderly people, orphans, the poor, and the destitute in general) is also carried out by the 
local government budgets.   
23 Sometimes the “norms” initially used as merely a planning tool ended up conditioning the use of 
transfers for a particular purpose—e.g., pay teachers’ salary—during the execution process.  This is a 
pending issue still to be clarified.  If the government wants to operate conditional transfers, better to do it 
through “block transfers associated to programs” rather than to protect generic budget line items, like 
salaries.  The latter can be justified on efficiency grounds, since the “protection of generic budget line item 
(i.e., input)” may limit the optimum allocation of factors of production in the local provision of public 
services, while “block transfers associated/conditional to programs” can more easily be evaluated against 
measurable outcomes indicators. 
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 Moldova can also significantly improve on expenditure budgeting, particularly in 
respect to the system of expenditure “norms”, which is still regulated centrally.   As these 
norms do not (cannot) take into account all local peculiarities and specificities, they tend 
to cause misallocation of public resources.   Also arrears accumulation tends to emerge as 
a consequence of the implicit “unfunded mandates” to sub national governments that the 
fixed norms may end up representing.  Although efforts have been made to establish the 
norms on a capitation basis (per capita, per student, per occupied bed), in reality, because 
of the political pressures, the system has still been functioning as oriented by the 
maintenance of the existing institutions and employment.  An evidence of these 
inefficiencies has been the accumulation of arrears in several sectors and the increasing 
employment in the already bloated public institutions (Box 2.3).  
 
 
BOX 2.3:  The Use of Expenditure Norms for Budgeting 
 
The central government of Moldova issues expenditure norms for practically all areas of 
local government budgets, and this work has been the responsibility of the branch departments 
of the Ministry of Finance.  Unlike the old Soviet norms, however, which were often expressed 
in physical standards, the current norms are already mostly client-based.  This criterion avoids 
many of the inefficiencies associated with the use of norms, such as hoarding idle facilities or 
building excess capacity.  It is important to emphasize the importance of this change in policy for 
increasing the efficiency of public resources.  Nevertheless, the setting of budgetary norms 
remains one of the most contentious issues in budget formulation (and execution) and has been a 
central piece of negotiations and discussions between upper and lower-level governments.  
The current methodology used in the computation of expenditure needs for sub 
national governments is similar across the different areas of functional expenditures. In the 
case of education, there are different capitation norms for each level of education (e.g., 
kindergarten, primary).  The amount of lei per student is set on the bases of how much was 
spent in the previous year and projected inflation for next year. In principle, “norms” are 
adjusted upwards if there is a change in mandated expenditures, such as an increase in 
teacher salaries. However, the overall adjustment does not necessarily reflect inflation and 
salary increases, but rather reflects “what is feasible for the entire budget.”  The actual 
expenditure needs is computed as a function of the number of children of school age rather 
than the number of students actually enrolled, and the basic per student norm is actually 
adjusted for several jurisdictions, in general to compensate for unit cost differentials.  In 
recent years, norm setting has been more often driven by fiscal realities and less and less by 
declarative legislation. For example, the Law on Education of 1995 states that expenditures 
on education in the consolidated budget should be at least 7 percent of GDP.  However, this 
aggregate sectoral norm has not been respected for years. In reality, as norms have been 
reduced in real terms, no money has been available for capital repairs and maintenance, 
making it clear to the territorial units the need to use more cost recovery measures and to 
adjust the quality/quantity of services provided. 
Below are some examples of the norms setting, used in the instructions for the 
preparation of the local budgets for 2002. 
 
Education.  Pre-school education expenditures is based on the total number of children aged 3 to 
6 registered on January 1, 2001 as presented by the Department of Statistical and Social Analysis, 
at an average cost of Lei 918.3 per child.  Primary, secondary, and high school education 
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Fig. 2.1. Moldova: Public Expenditure as a share 
of GDP, 1997-2001
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expenditures are based on the number of children aged 7-16, at an average cost of Lei 827.4 per 
student. For Boarding Schools (normal schools) the average expenditure is Lei 3,637.85 per 
student and for special schools Lei  4,717.84. 
Exceptions are allowed in the system of norms.  For example Chisinau gets a favorable 
treatment “…because Chisinau incurs much higher expenditures in supporting children and pupils   
in educational institutions ...registering the highest levels of class and group completion ..”  Thus 
the average cost for pre-school students in Chisinau is Lei 2,306 and Lei 1,547 for primary and 
secondary students, respectively.  Another example is ATU Gagauzia, which is also given 
preferential treatment, based on the allegation that Gagauzians have to master several languages.  
However, rather than different norms, Gagauzia got in the 2002 budget an additional conditional 
grant for education of Lei 1.2 million.  
 
Culture, arts and sports.  Expenditure norms are calculated on the basis of population, with Lei 
7.5 per capita; but Chisinau gets 2.25 times that amount, and ATU Gagauzia gets a conditional 
grant of Lei 0.5 million. 
 
Health care.  Expenditure norms are supposed to cover Basic Free Healthcare Package with Lei 
64.72 for children under 14, Lei 93.84 for the working age population, and Lei 161.80 for the 
population of retirement age. The health norms for Chisinau are increased by 62 percent on the 
basis of more frequent visits and higher cost of utilities.  In the case of health care the central 
government also tells local governments how their funds should be spent. In particular, for 2002 
it requires that at least 35 percent of the local budgets on health should be spent on primary care 
and 15 percent for emergency assistance.  
 
 
 
Local Government Expenditure Patterns 
While the consolidated public expenditure in Moldova experienced a dramatic 
continued fall as a share of GDP, since mid-1990s—from 46.3 percent in 1997 to 24.7 
percent in 2001—the local government 
expenditures, after dropping from 15.7 to 7.8 
percent of GDP between 1997 and 1999, recovered 
to 9.3 in 2001.  The local government expenditures 
that had fallen as a share of the consolidated public 
expenditure until 1999 to 24.4 percent, increased to 
37.8 in 2001 (Figures 2.1 and 2.2).  These current 
local government shares in GDP and public 
expenditures in Moldova do not differ much from 
those of other European countries, specially 
countries in transition and those in the Southern 
Europe.   
 
The real per capita expenditure of the State budget systematically dropped 50 
percent between 1997 and 2001, while that of the local budget dropped 54 percent until 
1999 but increased almost 30 percent after that—which dramatically recovered the share 
of the local budgets in total public spending (Figure 2.2).  This may have been a 
significant positive impact of the local public finance system reform which took place 
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Fig. 2.2. Molvoda - Local Govts. Share in Public 
Expenditures
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State Local Total State Local Total
Total Expenditures 68.3 31.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Current Expenditures (*) 69.3 30.7 100.0 96.4 92.0 95.0
    General Public Services 57.3 42.7 100.0 4.7 7.4 5.5
    External activity 100.0 100.0 2.0 1.3
    National Defense 100.0 100.0 2.4 1.6
    Judicial authorities 99.9 0.1 100.0 1.1 0.0 0.8
    Mantenance Publ. Order & Nat.Sec. 83.1 16.9 100.0 7.1 3.1 5.8
    Education 28.7 71.3 100.0 7.7 40.5 18.0
    Scientific research 100.0 100.0 1.0 0.7
    Culture, art,sport & youth actions 59.2 40.8 100.0 1.7 2.5 1.9
    Health Care 37.6 62.4 100.0 6.0 21.8 11.1
    Social Security and Support 88.1 11.9 100.0 14.9 4.4 11.5
    Agr., Forestry, Fish. & Water Mgt. 77.6 22.4 100.0 3.0 1.7 2.6
    Environ.prot.& Hydrometeorology 97.7 2.3 100.0 0.3 0.0 0.2
    Industry and Construction 76.0 24.0 100.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
    Transp,RoadMgt.,Com.& Inform. 87.2 12.8 100.0 2.7 0.9 2.1
    Complex for Fuel and Energy 99.3 0.7 100.0 0.6 0.0 0.4
    Public utilities and Housing 10.6 89.4 100.0 0.4 4.8 1.8
    Public Debt Service 100.0 100.0 24.0 16.5
    Completion of  State Reserves 100.0 100.0 0.4 0.3
    Serv.related to Economic activity 90.8 9.2 100.0 0.5 0.1 0.4
    Other  expenditures 88.2 11.8 100.0 15.8 4.7 12.2
Capital expenditures (**) 39.5 60.5 100.0 2.9 8.0 4.5
Net Lending 100.0 100.0 0.7 0.5
Source: Ministry of Finance
1  Exclude extra-budgetary public expenditures
(*)  Include maintenance expenditures
(**) Include only "Capital Investment" (since maintenance expenditures are include in "current 
expenditues")
hares by Level of GovFunctional Compositio
Table 2.1 - Total Expenditures by Level of Government, Functional 
Composition, 1997-20011
since 1998 (Chapter 1) by relatively protecting 
local government budget expenditures despite 
the more recent fiscal adjustment policies. 
 
 The share of each level of government 
and internal composition of their budgets 
remained quite stable since the end-1990s, and 
their averages in the last five yeas are shown in 
Table 2.1.  This structure is consistent with the 
statutory assignment of responsibilities 
described in the previous Section.  The central 
government budget has almost solely responded for the expenditures on external 
activities, national defense, judicial system, maintenance of public order, scientific 
research, social security, environment, transport and information, the complex of fuel and 
energy, national public debt service, and services related to economic activities.  The 
local government budgets have a dominance in the social sectors and have significantly 
responded for expenditures on 
education, health care, public 
utilities and housing, but also on 
capital expenditures—the latter 
mainly due to the fact that not 
much investment was afforded 
by the central government due 
to severe financial constraints 
during the period. 
 
 In terms of functional 
composition of expenditure, the 
structures of the local vis-à-vis 
State budget are also quite 
distinct, reflecting their more 
specific assignments of 
responsibilities.  On the one 
hand, although almost 40 
percent of the State budget has 
been spent on public debt 
service and social security24, the 
State budget has also spent 
resources in practically all the 
other public budget items, since some areas are still considered of shared or concurrent 
responsibilities with the local governments.  On the other hand, although the local 
governments have a limited and focused mandate, some decentralization of functions and 
competences has already taken place in critical areas of public services, so that local 
budgets have allocated more than 60 percent of their resources on education and health 
related expenditures (table 2.1). 
                                                 
24 I.e., mainly subsidies to the State Social Fund Budget. 
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Item Share of Each Level Structure of Budgets
Local 
Total
Judet 
Bdgt.
Mun/Pri
maria 
Bdgt.
Local 
Total
Judet 
Bdgt.
Mun/Pri
maria 
Bdgt.
Expenditure and Net Lending 100 63 37 100 100 100
Current Expenditures 100 61 39 91 87 97
    General Public Services 100 44 56 9 6 13
    External activity
    National Defense
    Judicial authorities 67 39 28 0 0 0
    Mantenance Publ. Order 100 98 2 3 5 0
    Education 100 36 64 40 23 69
    Scientific research
    Culture, art,sport & youth 100 57 43 3 2 3
    Health Care 100 97 3 21 32 2
    Social Sec.& Support 100 78 22 4 5 2
    Agr., Forestry, Fishery 100 98 2 2 3 0
    Environ.prot.& Hydrom. 100 99 1 0 0 0
    Industry and Construction 100 100 0 0 0 0
    Transp,RoadMgt.& Inform. 100 92 8 1 2 0
    Complex Fuel and Energy 100 0 100 0 0 0
    Public utilities and Housing 100 60 40 5 5 5
    Completion of  State Reserves
    Serv.related to Econ. Activ. 100 123 -23 0 0 0
    Other current expenditures 100 79 21 3 4 2
Capital Expenditures 100 87 13 9 13 3
    Capital investments 100 88 12 9 13 3
    Net lending 0 0
Source: Ministry of Finance
 Table 2.2 : Moldova: Local Expenditures by Function, 1999-2001
(Share of each level and Structure of Budgets)
 
Functional Composition of Expenditures 
 The specific assignment of responsibilities between the Judets and municipalities/ 
primarias is not completely defined in the legislation, especially with respect to 
education, and many of the attributions have been decided at the Judet level taking into 
account the delivery capacities at the primarias’ level.  The experience of the period 
1999-2001 shows that judets’ administration assumed most of the responsibilities for 
health care, maintenance of public order, social assistance, agriculture related issues, 
environment, transportation, road 
management, and capital 
expenditures.  Especially 
education, but also to certain 
extent culture, arts and sports, 
were the functions where 
municipalities/ primarias have 
played a relatively more 
significant role in service 
delivery.   
 
As observed in the 
relationship between the State 
and the judets, here also the 
mandates of the first level of 
government is relatively limited 
and more focused in few areas.  
In terms of the structure of their 
budgets, “education” and 
“general public services” have 
been by far the most important 
budgetary areas of municipalities/ 
primarias level of government (82 percent of total expenditures), while “health care” and 
“education” have been the most important for the judets’ administration (together 55 
percent).  Judet budgets also cover a larger range of functions than that of the 
municipalities/ primarias. 
 
 It is difficult to evaluate the allocative efficiency of local budgets, since 
competences on regulation, financing and delivery have been confusing and not well 
defined among the second and first level.  In the social sectors, especially in education, 
there implicitly is an array of joint/ concurrent responsibilities.  These ill-defined 
responsibilities may be causing inefficiencies, because of the waste of resources, which 
may emerge from duplication, or under-provision of services in the overlapping areas of 
authority.  For instance, although the law establishes that capital expenditures (including 
maintenance and investment) are a responsibility of the respective jurisdiction budget 
(judet or municipal), this has not been always the current understanding of the Judet’s 
Council representatives and Mayors who end up deciding on the final allocations.  This 
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issue may have major practical efficiency implications that the pure observation of the 
ex-post budgetary allocation cannot reveal.  
 
 Another area of overlapping responsibility, which may be generating 
inefficiencies, is social assistance.  While it is clear that payment of pension for retirees, 
unemployed and some few other specified benefits are up to the national Social Fund 
Budget, it does not seem clear who is responsible for the “social assistance to the poor”.  
For instance, although arguing that social assistance is an exclusive State budget 
responsibility (against what is established in the Law on Local Public Finance), some 
Judets and municipalities have developed their own schemes to help support the local 
poor.  Some Judets charge a 1 percent payroll tax on local businesses in order to fund 
these expenditures in their jurisdiction.  Also, one municipality reported that it has 
created a municipal fund to additionally support the local poor—with such a fund 
maintained by one day of salary per year charged on local businesses.  Arguing of low 
purchasing power, some municipalities have also been heavily subsidizing utility services 
(mainly water supply) to the local population in general, without any selection or 
targeting criteria for their social assistance programs “to the poor.”  It seems that there is 
indeed much duplication of social services and overlapping authorities going on in 
Moldova, which represents a significant potential for waste of resources and/or under-
provision of services to the population.    The government may consider reviewing this 
issue, with the objective of consolidating and rationalizing programs and assigning 
responsibilities accordingly.   
 
Since financing capacity tends to be inversely correlated with poverty indicators, 
responsibility to combat absolute poverty would be better assigned to the central budget.  
By the same token, basic education (mainly primary) and a minimum package of public 
health care (including prevention of contagious diseases) should be regulated and 
financed directly by the central government.  Nonetheless, delivery should be delegated 
to local authorities, who are better positioned for selecting and targeting beneficiaries.  
These are example of areas where better reassignment and clarification of responsibilities 
are certainly needed in Moldova.    
 
 The importance of “public utilities and housing” has been more or less equivalent 
for both judets and municipalities/ primarias (about 5 percent of the budgets).  But this 
may be hiding a major problem for the government in general, since this area has 
represented a great fiscal risk.  Utilities have been supplied by off-budget companies 
which, depending on the specific service, are administered either by the State directly 
(electricity and gas, for example), by the judets, or by the municipalities/ primarias.  
Although the utility subsidies tend to be high, they do not appear explicitly in the 
governments’ budget as subsidy.  Especially the local governments have operated a two-
tariff policy with respect to the off-budget utility companies:  (a) a lower tariff, which 
applies to the households; and (b) a higher tariff, which applies to the “budget entities” 
(e.g., schools, hospitals, other institutions).  The specific example provided was for water, 
and the relation between (b) and (a) was 5.5 times (household tariff was Lei 1.39 per 
cubic meter, while “budget entities” tariff was Lei 7.64).  Under this dual-tariff 
arrangement, the utility companies are authorized to manage the balance of their accounts 
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Economic Categories % of GDP % Expend.
Expenditure & Net Lending 8.58 100.00
 Current Expenditure 7.95 90.56
    Goods and services 6.28 71.55
         Wages and salaries (*) 3.92 43.92
         Other goods & services 2.36 27.63
                       o/w Energy 0.69 8.60
    Interest on debt (due) 0.11 1.76
    Subsidies and transfers 0.73 8.26
    Other current expenditures 0.83 9.00
Capital expenditures 0.92 9.44
Source: MOF
Table 2.3.  Moldova: Economic Structure of Local Govts. 
Budgets, Average 1999-2001
but, because of consumer price distortions introduced by this system, inefficiencies are 
been generated in the allocation of public resources anyway.  On the one hand, the 
population will not be encouraged to save; and on the other hand, the cost structure of the 
“budget entities” will not reflect the actual scarcity of resources.  Moreover, the implicit 
subsidy is not targeted to needy households, but it benefits the whole population, 
characterizing a highly regressive policy. 
 
Another area of concern in public utilities is that poor policy and management are 
allowing an implicit contingent liability to accumulate, which may spillover on the 
governments’ budget in the near future.  Two main problems have to be addressed 
urgently in this area.  The first problem refers to the ownership of the companies’ assets, 
which although administered by the local governments, still belong to the State.  This 
situation, of having the ownership at one level of government and the management at 
another, has created great confusion and perverse incentives in relation to the 
responsibilities for the maintenance, replacement and expansion of the companies’ assets.  
The consequence has been a lack of proper maintenance and a faster deterioration of the 
capital stock.  This does not augur well and tends to compromise the sustainability of the 
utility supply in the near future. 
 
 The second problem concerns the current deplorable financial situation of most of 
these off-budget utility companies.  At the root of this problem is the weak management 
and lack of a full cost recovery approach in the provision of services.  The tariff policies 
are in general lagging behind the real costs, and the rate of collection of service bills has 
been too low (as low as 30 percent in certain cases).  This means that consumers have 
been subsidized across the board (without a target mechanism to select the neediest) and 
the providers have either not always been compensated by the costs, or had to operate a 
dual-tariff scheme which is highly distorting to the rest of the economic system (as 
mentioned above).  This policy orientation has implied waste in consumption, 
deterioration of the utility supply capacity, and distortions to the rest of the economy.  
Owing to these weak policy and management procedures, and the lack of local budget 
resources to fully compensate for the subsidies, companies have seen a lack of 
maintenance and replacement and, ultimately, depletion of their capital stock. 
 
Economic Composition of Expenditures 
 As suggested by Tables 2.1 
and 2.2, the weight of General Public 
Services in the budget has been 
higher the lower the level of 
government in Moldova.  Also, the 
economic composition of local 
government spending seems to 
indicate that Moldova is operating 
with a relatively large cost of 
personnel (Tables 2.3).  The local 
governments’ expenditures only on 
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wages and salaries (including contributions) seems to be absorbing an abnormally high 
share of their budgets (an average 44 percent during the period 1999-2001).  Although 
partially explained by the concentration of their responsibilities on education and 
health—which are more labor intensive sectors25—the composition of inputs for the 
delivery of local services seems to be inefficient.  As indicated by Table 2.3, the relative 
allocation between “goods and services” and “wages and salaries” is only 0.6, away 
below the international standards.26  As the wages are considered to be low in Moldova, 
then the levels of employment by the local governments in Moldova may be too high 
relatively to spending on supplies and materials for operations and maintenance (O&M) 
of facilities and equipment.  Thus, the indications are that likely an important area for 
significant efficiency gains can be realized by reforming public wage and employment 
policies at the local government level. 
 
 Among the classified current expenditures, subsidies and transfers (addressed to 
utilities, housing, and social assistance, as commented above) are also relatively 
important expenditure items.  These are areas of probable expanding demand and 
increasing pressures on local government budgets, if the current policies of loose 
subsidies continue.  Reforms in these areas should aim at disciplining spending by: (a) 
redesigning the tariff policies and increasing the collection ratio of utility bills, in order to 
make the utility companies less dependent on the public budgets and to render these 
services self-sustainable; and (b) properly measuring affordable benefits (including on 
housing and social assistance), with clear identification of sources of finance, in order to 
avoid unfunded mandates and accumulation of arrears.   
 
Expenditure on “interest on debt” has only been of some significance for the City 
of Chisinau, since the current weak creditworthiness—for lack of revenue capacity and 
autonomy, and sound collateral basis—has prevented the other local governments to 
access borrowing, outside the scarce official financing provided by the Ministry of 
Finance itself.27 
 
 While still extremely small in absolute terms and as a share of GDP, capital 
expenditure of local governments in Moldova has actually been larger than that of central 
government, what may be explained by the severe budgetary constraints imposed by the 
urgent need of fiscal adjustments since independence.  Nevertheless, capital outlay has 
absorbed almost 10 percent of the local governments resources, and may increase in the 
                                                 
25 Though, the weight of “energy cost” in Moldova tend to be particularly high as well. 
26 For example, estimates for the “material and services” to “wages ” ratio for the middle-income and high-
income countries are in the interval 1.4-1.0, respectively.  See “Unproductive Public Expenditures”, 
IMF/FAD, Pamphlet Series, no. 48, Washington, 1995.  
27 Amendment to the 2000 Budget Law (Law no.1410-XIV, December 8th, 2000) did write-off MDL 181 
million of Local Government debt to the Ministry of Finance, which had been accumulated between 1994 
and 1998.  Apparently this bailout operation by the central government was justified in the context of the 
decentralization reform initiated in 1999, and to clean the books for the new local authorities.  However, in 
order to keep a hard budget constraint in place, and to avoid moral hazard incentives, it would be important 
to make the local authorities realize a firm commitment by the central government of not repeating these 
bailout operations in the future.  Currently, local governments are not prohibited to borrow in Moldova, 
and, for the time being, the regulation seems to be restricted enough to keep in place some discipline on the 
local government access to capital markets. 
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1999 2000 2001
executed executed executed
Local 
Total Judet 
Munic./ 
Primar.
Local 
Total Judet 
Munic./ 
Primar.
Local 
Total Judet 
Munic./ 
Primar.
Balti 244 84 160 281 138 144 367 175 192
Cahul 240 73 168 329 115 214 404 138 266
Chisinau 199 79 119 288 104 184 384 129 255
Edinet 202 95 107 282 147 135 318 132 186
Lapusina 225 86 138 312 144 168 377 169 208
Orhei 207 92 114 314 163 151 340 154 187
Soroca 191 77 114 274 145 129 343 166 176
Taraclia 268 136 132 357 162 195 413 185 227
Tighina 234 105 129 387 222 165 369 173 196
Ungheni 184 95 89 298 126 172 366 146 221
UTA Gagauzia 317 192 126 469 262 207 516 263 253
Mun. Chisinau 423 400 23 643 613 30 907 865 41
Total 264 159 105 382 248 134 486 312 175
Descriptive Statistics:
Maximum Value 423 400 168 643 613 214 907 865 266
Minimum Value 184 73 23 274 104 30 318 129 41
Average 245 126 118 353 195 158 425 225 201
Stand. Deviation 67 92 37 107 139 49 160 205 58
Coef.of Variation 0.28 0.73 0.31 0.30 0.71 0.31 0.38 0.91 0.29
Descriptive Statistics (Excl. Mun. Chisinau):
Maximum Value 317 192 168 469 262 214 516 263 266
Minimum Value 184 73 89 274 104 129 318 129 176
Average 228 101 127 327 157 169 381 166 215
Stand. Deviation 39 35 23 59 46 29 52 37 31
Coef.of Variation 0.17 0.34 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.15
Source: MIF
Judet
Table 2.4. Moldova: Total Local Gvt. Expenditure, per Judet 
(Lei per capita)
near future for three reasons: (a) the obvious need for the rehabilitation and expansion of 
basic urban infrastructures; (b) the continuation of central government budget constraints, 
that could not carry on financing local infrastructures; and (c) the need to place, for 
efficiency reason, at the same level of government the responsibilities for maintenance 
and replacement of the capital stocks. 
 
Regional disparities in Local Expenditures 
Disparities of total expenditure across local governments 
A remarkable feature of local government expenditure in Moldova is its disparity 
across territorial units, exacerbated by the concentration in the City of Chisinau.  In 2001, 
for instance, while the per capita expenditure in the City of Chisinau was Lei 907, in 
Edinet Judet it was only Lei 318.  However, excluding the City of Chisinau, the average 
per capita expenditure falls from Lei 425 to Lei 381, with a maximum of Lei 516 (UTA 
Gagauzia); and the coefficient of variation falls from 0.38 to only 0.14.   It is also 
interesting to observe that the disparities are much more concentrated at the Judets’ 
administration level (second level government) than at the municipalities/ primarias level 
of administration (first level government); and, again, with large disparities mainly 
explained by the presence of the City of Chisinau in the data set.  In 2001, the coefficient 
of variation for the Judets’ administration (the second level) was as high as 0.91, while 
for the municipalities/ primarias it was 0.29; but excluding Chisinau these coefficients 
dropped dramatically to 0.22 and 0.15, respectively. 
 
These conclusions 
are basically the same when 
the analysis is extended back 
to the years 2000 and 1999,  
showing a consistent 
regional pattern of spending, 
with most of the disparity 
highly influenced by the 
concentration of local public 
expenditures in the capital 
city (and to a certain extent 
at Judets’ administration 
level), and much less 
disparity across the rest of 
the country (particularly at 
the first level of 
administration).  Moreover, 
a similar conclusion can also 
be drawn over time, i.e., 
disparities in real per capita 
expenditure across regions 
have increased substantially 
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Figure 2.3  Moldova-Evolution of Local Gvt. (real) 
Per Capita Expenditure, 1999-2001
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over the last three years, with the concentration of spending increase in the capital city 
(Table 2.4 and Figure 2.3).   
 
Many factors can explain this pattern of concentration of local public 
expenditures across regions and overtime in Moldova; the most important being: (a) the 
differential needs for and supply costs of the services in the capital city metropolitan area 
(e.g., urban infrastructures, mass 
transportation services, pollution 
control); (b) the availability of 
larger own tax basis, and the 
distortions of the current tax-
sharing system—which, by 
being based on the derivation 
principle tend to assign most of 
the tax collection to the larger 
centers where the enterprises are 
registered rather than where the 
economic activities are 
generated (see Chapters 3 and 
4); (c) the higher 
creditworthiness of the capital 
city and its easier access to the 
capital market, which gives it the 
opportunity to incur debt in order to finance capital expenditures; (d) the political clout of 
the capital city which, apart from UTA Gagauzia, is the only territorial unit with a 
representative seat in the Parliament; and (e) the lack of formal regulation of fiscal 
relations between the second (Judets) and the first (primarias) levels of government, 
which ends up subordinating the first level to negotiate with the Judets the necessary 
resources to finance their spending priorities.  The latter tends to dissipate 
municipalities’/ primarias’ fiscal autonomy.  Therefore, if unchecked, the current system 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Moldova tends to perpetuate and even exacerbate 
the per capita local expenditures disparities across territorial units and levels of 
government in the near future.  Probably a more equitable distribution of expenditures 
across the territorial units and government levels will need a reform of the fiscal 
relations, particularly the tax-sharing and the transfer systems (see Chapters 3 anfd 4). 
 
Disparities in functional and economic composition of expenditures across local 
governments 
 Usually, disparities of per capita functional expenditures tend to reflect 
jurisdictional differentials in needs, preferences and government priorities.  Moldova is 
not an exemption to this rule.  Per capita local public expenditures vary substantially 
according to function across territorial units.  But, disparities in per capita expenditures 
are apparently bigger in functions where local governments tend to be on average less 
involved. In these areas, while the well-off judets may have had some interventions, the 
poorest judets could have not afford it.  For example, in the areas of “services related to 
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Descriptive Statistics (average 1999-2001)
Functional Classification
Maximu
m value  
(per 
capita 
Lei)
Minimu
m Value 
(per 
capita 
Lei)
Average 
Value 
(per 
capita 
Lei)
Stand. 
Deviat.
Coeff.of 
Variat.
Total Expenditure 663.3 267.3 337.2 111.7 0.33
Current Expenditures 532.6 253.6 314.0 78.1 0.25
    General Public Services 39.4 27.7 33.8 3.4 0.10
    Mantenance Publ. Order & Nat.Sec. 27.2 7.0 10.9 5.3 0.48
    Education 211.4 108.4 143.6 28.9 0.20
    Culture, art,sport & youth actions 17.9 6.3 9.6 3.5 0.36
    Health Care 117.3 51.1 72.9 18.0 0.25
    Social Assistance 25.8 5.2 10.1 5.3 0.52
    Agr., Forestry, Fish. & Water Mgt. 10.1 3.2 6.8 2.0 0.30
    Environ.prot.& Hydrometeorology 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.58
    Industry and Construction 1.8 0.0 0.5 0.6 1.36
    Transp,RoadMgt.,Com.& Inform. 13.3 0.7 3.0 3.5 1.18
    Complex for Fuel and Energy 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.2 3.37
    Public Utilities and Housing 50.8 3.9 13.2 13.7 1.03
    Serv.related to Economic activity 1.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 2.13
    Other current expenditures 28.5 2.6 9.3 7.1 0.76
Capital Expenditures 130.7 5.5 23.1 34.8 1.51
    Capital investments 130.7 5.5 23.1 34.8 1.51
Source: Ministry of Finance
Table 2.5  Moldova: Disparities on Local Expenditures, by Functional 
Categorias
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Figure 2.4  Moldova: Disparities in Expenditures Across 
Jurisdictions, by function
economic activities” and 
“industry and construction” 
only the City of Chisinau and 
UTA Gagauzia, and to a much 
lesser extent, Orhei, Taraclia, 
Tighina, Ungheni, and Soroca 
judets, have made some 
expenditures, but the rest of the 
territorial units have not 
intervened at all.  As “fuel and 
energy” are essentially 
attributions of the State, the 
data show that the autonomous 
unit Gagauzia was the only 
territorial unit to intervene in 
this function directly in the last 
three years.   
 
Disparities are also high in transportation services, utilities and housing, social 
assistance, environment, and public order (about 0.50 or higher).  And, again in these 
areas, not every judet can afford providing these services to its population on the same 
standard.  For instance, “public utility and housing” and “social assistance” are important 
activities where every local government in Moldova is involved, but with considerable 
per capita spending variations.   While on average they were, during 1999-2001, Lei 51 
and Lei 26 in City of Chisinau, respectively, they barely reached Lei 4 and Lei 5, in 
Edinet and Cahul judets.   
 
On the other hand, the coefficient of variation for the per capita local expenditures 
in “general public services,” “education,” and “health care” are the lowest (lower than 
0.25).   From the equity point of view, the smaller disparities on these priority functions 
across territorial units, are a 
highly desirable feature of the 
local governments in Moldova 
(Table 2.5 and Figure 2.4).  
Since these are labor intensive 
sectors, this result may have 
been more a consequence of the 
central government-controlled 
wage and employment policies 
across the country, rather than 
any deliberate choice of 
individual local governments in 
delivering standard services.  
Nevertheless, as observed above, 
these lower disparities in 
coefficients of variation of the 
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Figure 2.5  Moldova: Disparities in Per Capita Expenditures Across 
Jurisdictions, by Economic Categories
per capita local expenditures do not have any direct correspondence with efficiency.  On 
the contrary, one could infer that, if anything, the local governments in Moldova are 
equally inefficient in the production of those services (see below).  
 
 The interface of what was presented in the previous paragraph is reproduced in 
Figure 2.5.  The economic expenditure categories with the highest disparity are “interest 
on debt” and “capital expenditures”, where the City of Chisinau, and to some extent ATU 
Gagauzia and Balti judet, are higher than the others.  But these expenditures actually are 
minor items in the local budgets.  On the most relevant items, “other goods and services” 
and “wages and salaries”, the 
disparities are much smaller.  This 
is especially the case with per 
capita expenditures on “wages and 
salaries” (i.e., wage bill 
expenditures) because, as pointed 
out previously, they reflect a 
uniform national policy on wage 
rates and, to certain extent, the 
employment “norms”  regulated by 
the central ministries (particularly 
on education and health).  As also 
observed before, though, these 
very same “fixed coefficients” 
imposed from above to the local 
governments, may be contributing 
to less disparities in the delivery of basic public services across jurisdictions, but at the 
same time are also contributing to less technical efficiency in production of these 
services.  Affecting the latter, there is a very skewed distribution in the O&M to wages 
bill cost ratio across jurisdiction—only the city of Chisinau is actually above the national 
average (0.63, which is very low for international standards), Tighina judet is around the 
average, and all the other judets are below the average, between 0.39 and 0.58.   
 
C.   MAIN ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
 Fiscal decentralization in Moldova has been characterized as a spasmodic process; 
considerable initial effort to put in place the foundations of a sensible legislative 
framework, followed by an absence of complementary regulation and poor 
implementation, and again followed by reactions against the ineffectiveness of 
decentralization, including actions for rolling back some important aspects of the initial 
reforms.  A detachment between the intended policy  (legislation) and the actual practice 
(implementation) is an outstanding feature of fiscal decentralization in Moldova.  Lack of 
follow-up regulations and poor implementation are the critical problems related to this 
decentralization, which is reflected in the assignments of responsibilities and expenditure 
performance at  the three levels of government, and explain the confusion of functions 
and competences which rendered, to a large extent, the initial reforms ineffective. 
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 The main expenditure responsibility issues identified above include:  
 
(a)  too broad and vague assignment of responsibilities and competences both 
between the central and local governments, and especially between the second 
level (judets) and the first (municipalities/ primarias) level local governments.  
There are not yet clear-cut definitions of the delegated competence (as for 
regulation, financing and/or delivery of services) between the central and the local 
government. The lack of definition has contributed to certain reluctance from 
central bureaucracy (specially line ministries) to relinquishing powers to local 
governments.  Also shared/ concurrent responsibilities are not clearly assigned, 
especially at local level between the judet and the municipalities/ primarias.  The 
latter has led to great confusion and conflicts at local government level, 
contributing for ineffective policies and inefficient service deliveries.  Major 
misunderstandings still exist on: (i) the responsibilities for the financing of capital 
expenditures, which has been pushed to local governments, but the majority of 
Judet Councils and Mayors argues that this is impossible to implement for lack of 
corresponding local revenue capacity; (ii) social assistance has also been pushed 
downwards, but apparently without a proper reviewing of affordable 
entitlements—which has led to an unfunded mandate and accumulation of arrears; 
and (iii) education has been assigned as shared function, but specific competences 
are not entirely defined, especially between the second and first level of 
governments. 
 
(b) unequal administrative and technical capacities at the local government 
level, a factor that has contributed to the weak implementation of policies and 
prevented delivery of quality services efficiently.  While these capacities may be 
adequate at the larger urban centers, this does not seem to be the case in the large 
majority of judets, municipalities, primarias and villages. 
 
(c)  perverse incentive inducing local government to inefficient use of scarce 
public resources.  Central government still has exercised excessive and undue 
interference in areas already of exclusive responsibility of local governments, by 
retaining the power of, inter alia, controlling and approving tariff policies of 
utilities, wage rates and employment “norms”.  These interventions have distorted 
local resource allocation and created inefficiencies in the production and delivery 
of public services (social and utilities).  One possible effect of this is the 
extremely low O&M to “wage bill” expenditure ratio for the majority of territorial 
units, which may be reflecting an inefficient combination of inputs (too little 
maintenance of structures and facilities and too much employment).  Also, except 
for the autonomous territorial unit Gagauzia (which receives lump-sum 
allocations in the budget for specific purposes), the combined use by the central 
government of “expenditure norms” with “gap-fill transfers” has introduced a 
perverse incentive mechanism to local budget management.  Fixed expenditure 
norms (even if based on national average and capitation) tend to discourage local 
administration to economize on expenditures if the gain are perceived as been 
clawed back by a lower “gap-fill transfer”; 
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(d)  inefficient management of the public properties by placing the ownership 
and the responsibility for maintenance and capital replacement at different levels 
of government.  Most of the public asset ownership of both the social sectors 
(health and education) and the technical services (utility companies) has still been 
kept at the State level, while the responsibilities for maintenance and replacement 
has been shifted to the local budgets.  This is a highly inefficient management 
system, which tends to lead to low maintenance of equipment, faster depreciation 
of the capital stock, and a premature depletion of the asset basis, contributing to a 
permanent deterioration in the production capacity and the quantity and quality of 
services provided to the citizens. 
 
(e)   de-capitalization and deplorable financial situation of the local utility 
companies, which does not augur well for provision of public services in the near 
future.  The current situation is not sustainable in the long-run, since costs have 
not been recovered either owing to unrealistic tariff policies or a too low 
collection ratio of the utility bills.  In face of the local budget constraints, 
increasing compensatory subsidies for the companies can hardly be maintained, 
so that the utility companies are currently “cannibalizing” their own capital basis 
while their financial and economic situations in the long-run are unsustainable.  
The current practice of utilizing a dual-tariff system that some utility companies 
have been allowed to use in order to deal with their financial situation in the 
short-run is an artificial and inefficient policy. This policy provokes distortions in 
the allocation of resources on the rest of the economy, is non-transparent from the 
public resource management point of view, and is highly regressive from the 
equity point of view (since the beneficiaries of the implicit subsidy are not 
targeted). 
 
(f)  considerable disparities in per capita local expenditures, especially 
between the capital city and the rest of the country, which runs against nation-
building and may feed a feeling of unfairness, discontent and political instability. 
 
 To restore local government expenditure autonomy and ensure an efficient 
delivery of public services, the government of Moldova may consider reforming 
expenditure responsibilities by: 
 
(i) decentralizing adequate decision-making powers on public expenditures 
asymmetrically, by reviewing and re-assigning well specified responsibilities and 
competences to local governments, and assuring adequate financing on the delegated 
functions.  Areas of responsibility and specific competences should be properly regulated 
also for the second and first level of local governments, aiming at minimizing 
negotiations on attributions and resources.   Specific responsibilities by function and 
competences (on regulation, financing and/or delivery) to each level of local government 
should follow the principle of subsidiarity, and be assigned asymmetrically, by taking 
into consideration the local relative technical and administrative capacities.  Being of 
particular national interest, the financing of “basic education”, “public primary health 
care package” (plus some essential functions like vaccination campaigns, preventive 
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medicine, combat of contagious diseases), and “social assistance to the poor” should be 
re-assigned to the State budget, while decisions on the delivery of services should be kept 
as delegated competence to the local governments, who are better positioned for selecting 
and targeting beneficiaries. 
 
(ii)  defining a new strategic direction for the provision public services (including 
utilities) aiming at making it affordable and sustainable in the long term.  The current 
dual price/tariff mechanism practiced by some utility companies should be banned 
outright in order to eliminate  a source of inefficiency provoking distortions to the rest of 
the economy.  Any subsidy policy (including utility, housing, transportation and others) 
should be tested against affordability and directly targeted to the needy, and always 
explicitly approved in the environment of the budget.  The participation of the private 
sector both on financing and on provision of public services should be encouraged, and 
outsourcing public services to private providers should also be encouraged and become a 
common practice in Moldova.  Privatization policy should continue and be embraced by 
the public utility and social sectors to the extent possible under a reformed regulatory 
framework.  In the meantime, the utility tariff policies should be redesigned aiming at full 
cost recovery, and the existing utility companies should be administratively re-structured 
aiming at substantially increasing the ratio of collection of utility bill.  A successful 
implementation of this new strategic direction for the provision of public services will 
require the following reforms: 
-  transferring of the property rights on the assets (both social assets and of 
utilities) to the local governments aiming at placing the ownership of the service delivery 
facilities in the same level of government where the responsibility for their maintenance 
is.  This will tend to improve the maintenance of the assets, increase the necessary 
investments, and increase efficiency in the use of the capital.  Although Moldova has 
approved general rules on property rights of the local governments, in practice the 
ownership of enterprises and service facilities has not being effectively transferred by the 
State.  Identification of the assets, and their effective transfer and registration to the 
respective local governments are critical at this stage. 
- adopting utility tariff policy based on the principle of full cost recovery, 
without disregarding the social condition of the population.   This requires a separation of 
the two policy instruments: (a) the recovery of the cost of service delivered by the 
providers, on the basis of prices/tariff solely determined on technical and financial 
ground and implemented as such—which would help rationalize the consumption and the 
allocation of scarce resources, and sustain production in the long term; (b) the social 
objectives associated to the condition of the population being served, addressed by 
distinct and more adequate policy instruments at the local government budget, such as, 
explicit current “grants” to the targeted population (e.g., the poor);  
- regulating the specific sectors to facilitate and encourage cooperation among 
local government units for a joint provision of services (either public or private 
companies, or an association among them), in order to explore economies of scale (by 
merging or associating existing companies), consider externalities among jurisdictions; 
- enforcing each local public utility company to submit its annual business plan 
and previous year report for the approval of the local Council.  The companies’ Chief 
Executive Officers should be given full autonomy to perform, but be made personally 
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accountable before the law and the local representatives for the outcomes of their plans 
and actions. 
 
(iii) promoting civil service reform, including local governments, to increase 
productivity of local public sector and efficiency in the delivery of public services.  The 
reform should aim at a synchronized restructuring of careers on the basis of merit 
recruitment and promotion systems, with the promotion of improvements in the 
compensation system, and an optimization of the public employment by retrenching 
surplus labor.  Also flexibility in wage and employment policies should be pursued at the 
extent possible. 
 
(vi) reviewing the system of “expenditure norms”, the shared-tax system, and the 
“transfer mechanism” to eliminate perverse incentives and unfairness.  These reforms 
should be carried out simultaneously, since they impinge on each other.    Once removed 
the imperfections and decided upon the new criteria, these instruments should be defined 
in organic laws, only sporadically reviewed on the basis of technical reasons, treated as 
purely technical mechanisms, and immune to from bureaucratic or political influences.  
This approach would aim to restore credibility in the intergovernmental fiscal relations, 
to provide predictability to the policy makers to all levels of government, and to the 
extent possible effectively contribute to converge per capita expenditure differentials 
across jurisdictions to the needs differentials (see also Chapters 3 and 4).   
 
(v) promoting administrative and technical capacity building (including interpretation 
of the legislation and general regulation; uniform accounting procedures; monitoring and 
reporting systems; input, output and outcome indicators of performance) both for local 
government officials and also for those in the central government working in related 
areas.  The promotion of capacity building is sine qua non to proceed with a sustainable 
implementation of a decentralized fiscal system in Moldova. 
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CHAPTER 3:  REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS 
 
 
The most important step in the reform of revenue assignments has been the 
enactment of the Law on Local Public Finance (Law # 167, of 1999).  However, the 
revenue assignment scheme designed by this law is still unsatisfactory, since it falls short 
of:  
(a) disengaging from the previous system of annually negotiated revenue 
assignments, because it only sets minimum sharing rates between the 
central government and the intermediate level of government (judets) for 
the most important taxes, such as VAT, CIT, PIT, and  road taxes.  It 
leaves for the annual budget execution laws to “regulate the specific ratios 
of tax-sharing;” 
(b) providing subnational governments (judets/districts and primarias) with 
any measurable increase in formal tax autonomy; and  
(c) establishing any explicit revenue assignments, not even minimum sharing 
rates, between the intermediate level (judets/districts) and the local level 
(primarias) of governments.   
 
Therefore, Moldova has yet to put in place a stable and predictable system of 
revenue assignment for the subnational governments, including explicit regulation for the 
relations between primarias and judets/districts. 
 
 
A. CURRENT ASSIGNMENTS OF REVENUES 
 
 The 1998 Tax Code only distinguishes between the national (or state) taxes and 
the local taxes and fees.  State taxes and fees are those entirely regulated by the 
Parliament, while local taxes and fees are those over which Local Councils exercise some 
competences in conformity with the law.  Regardless whether the taxes and fees are 
finally allocated to the state or to the local budget, all taxes and fees are administered by 
two central agencies—the Customs Control Department and the State Tax Service, 
accordingly. Box 3.1 presents and overview of the tax structure and tax assignments in 
Moldova in 2001.  
 
Total revenues of the consolidated public sector have been decreasing in recent 
years, budgeted as 23 percent of GDP for 2001 as compared to 33 percent executed in 
1997 (Table 3.1) The major sources of budget revenues are tax revenues, of which the 
most productive taxes have been the VAT and excises, respectively budgeted for 2001 at 
37 percent and 19 percent of consolidated total revenues. The share of subnational 
governments in total consolidated revenues was budgeted to increase in 2001 to 33 
percent form 29 percent in 2000 (Table 3.2)  
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State Taxes and Fees 
 
 Article 6 of the Tax Code specify the following as state taxes and fees: income 
tax; value-added tax, excise tax and fees (including stamp duties); “private” tax; customs 
duty and fees; and Road Fund fees (Box 3.1). 28  Out of these state taxes and fees, revenue 
proceeds from customs duty, excises, and value added tax (VAT) on imported goods are 
entirely allocated to the state budget, while the proceeds of personal income tax (PIT), 
corporate income tax (CIT), the VAT on domestic goods, and Road Fund taxes are shared 
in varying proportions with the intermediate level of governments (judets/districts, ATU 
Gagauzia, and the municipality of Chisinau).  VAT and excise are the most important 
taxes, and in 2000 they represented about 40 percent and 20 percent of the tax revenue, 
respectively.  Since the late 1990s between three-fourths and two-thirds of the total tax 
collection has been allocated to the state budget (Table 3.2).2930 
 
Shared taxes and fees 
 
 State shared taxes and fees are the most important source of revenue of sub 
national governments in Moldova (estimated in 57 percent in the 2002 budget—see Table 
3.5).  Tax sharing in Moldova is allocated on a derivation basis, meaning that each 
territorial unit of government shares the tax collected within its respective jurisdiction.  
The revenue sharing arrangements are regulated by the 1999 organic Law on Local 
Public Finance and the annual budget execution laws.  The organic law established the 
following criteria for the tax sharing between the state budget and the judets/districts, 
ATU Gagauzia and Chisinau municipality: 
. 100 percent of the PIT; 
. At least 50 percent of the CIT; 
. At least 10 percent of the VAT on domestic transactions; 
. At least 50 percent of the Road Tax. 
 
 As a result of annual negotiations among levels of governments, the budget 
execution laws “regulates” the actual sharing ratios to prevail in a particular year.  In 
general, very broad tax capacity and needs concepts have guided the final regulating 
ratios among Chisinau municipality, ATU Gagauzia and the judets.  However, in fact the 
                                                 
28 The “private tax” is a one-time charge levied on privatization transactions (Box 3.1). 
29 See also Economic Trends, quarterly issue (Table 4.1), Moldova, January-March 2001, TACIS-European 
Union, May 2001. 
30 There are also the payroll social security contributions (for pension and social assistance) of 31% (paid 
by the employers) and 1% (paid by the employees), plus the 10% of the gross revenue of unincorporated 
businesses, but these are resources, which flow directly as revenue of the Social Insurance Fund budget. 
Together with the State budget and the Local budget, the Social Insurance Fund budget form the national 
Consolidated budget.   
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sharing ratios have been highly unpredictable and continued changing substantially in the 
recent years as they used to change in the mid-1990s.31   
 
The tax sharing rates between the central government and the judets for 2000 and 
2001 are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.32 In 2000 all judets and also the 
ATU Gagauzia and the municipality of Chisinau received a 50 percent share of the 
revenues from the road tax. The same was also true for revenues from the CIT, but with 
the exception here of the ATU Gagauzia, which got a sharing rate of 100 percent. The 
bulk of the revenue sharing “regulation” took place through the varying sharing rates for 
VAT revenues. These varying rates ranged from 10 percent for the Balti judet and the 
municipality of Chisinau to 100 percent for ATU Gagauzia. All other judets got in the 
year 2000 a sharing rate of 30 percent of VAT revenues, with the only exception of 
Edinet, whose sharing rate for VAT was only 20 percent.   
 
While the sharing rates for revenues from the road tax continue to be the same, at 
50 percent, in 2001, the sharing rates for VAT and income tax changed radically. All 
judets plus the ATU Gagauzia received the maximum sharing rate of 100 percent for 
these two taxes. The only exception was the municipality of Chisinau, which had sharing 
rates of 10 percent for VAT and 50 percent for the CIT. The sharing arrangements in the 
proposed 2002 budget are the same as those for 2001.33 Table 3.5 shows the effective 
sharing rates for all local governments by type of local revenue source in the 2002 
budget. Among shared taxes, the central government reserves for itself 35 percent of the 
income tax on entrepreneurial activities (CIT), 62 percent of the VAT, and 50 percent of 
the road tax.    
 
 There is no direct tax sharing arrangement between the central government and 
the primarias.  In principle, the above annual negotiation process on the shares of the 
“regulating taxes” (CIT and VAT) between the central government and the 
judets/districts, are supposed to be replicated at the subnational level of governments 
between the judets/districts and their respective primarias.  (Although included in the 
category of shared taxes, PIT has traditionally being allocated 100 percent directly to the 
primarias on a derivation basis.)  The outcome has been an asymmetric, unpredictable tax 
sharing system, with the primarias highly dependent on these negotiations of the 
                                                 
31 For the mid-1990, see also “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Republic of Moldova”, prepared 
by KPMG for USAID, 1994; also Monika Huppi, “Fiscal Decentralization”, background paper for PER 
(World Bank), 1996. 
32 Prior to the enactment of the Law on Public Finance, the central government also regulated its sharing 
rates with local governments. See Table A.3.1 in the Appendix for the sharing rates in 1999, as a recent 
example of past practices. 
33 Possible reasons explaining these recent changes in revenue assignments may include: (a) the unfunded 
mandates—especially the substantial responsibilities for the social protection area transferred to local 
governments with the 1999 reform—may have triggered increasing political pressures on the central 
government in the following years for the releasing of additional resources; (b) the argument (although not 
relevant in the Moldova context) that local governments would be more committed with the tax effort to 
reduce tax evasion if they were entitled to a larger share of the VAT and CIT; and (c) the special 
“concessions” made to the ATU Gagauzia on tax assignments, and the mounting political pressures by the 
other territorial units in the following years to equalize the “privileges”. 
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“regulating” sharing ratios with the judets/ districts.34  The 2002 budget estimates an 
overall 59 percent share of the state shared-taxes (PIT, CIT, VAT and Road Taxes) will 
flow into the subnational governments’ budgets, which will correspond about three-
fourths of their total tax revenue (Table 3.5). 
 
Local “own” taxes and fees 
   
Local “own” sources of revenues includes taxes and fees over which local 
governments have some discretion in setting rates, and those completely controlled by the 
center but whose proceeds have been assigned 100 percent to local governments. The 
latter has been the case with the PIT, entirely assigned to primarias, and with the local tax 
on natural resources (water, mineral and forestry), entirely assigned to the judets/ 
districts.  Nevertheless, excluding PIT, the overall contribution of the “own” taxes and 
fees to the aggregate subnational governments’ budget is estimated to be only about 24 
percent in 2002 (Table 3.5). 
 
Actually, the intermediate level governments (the judets/district), apart from taxes 
on natural resources, have not been assigned any other significant source of “own” 
revenues.  (Their revenues are fundamentally composed by shared taxes with the central 
government.)  All the other local taxes and fees (including land tax, real estate tax, and 
local fees), have been assigned exclusively to primarias, and follows the definition of 
those taxes in the Tax Code.  Differently from the shared-taxes, on the framework of 
these local taxes and fees, the Law on Local Finance protects primarias against the 
discretion by judets.  For instance, the new law on property taxes—land and real estate—
to be effective in 2004, only establishes ceiling rates for the taxes, and primarias will 
have the discretion to decide on the rate more appropriate for their own individual 
jurisdiction.35 
 
The current Tax Code still maintain the same list of the locally regulated fees 
established by the 1994 Law on Local Fees.36  This means that local governments do not 
have freedom to introduce their own taxes and fees, but the Government plans to add to 
the Tax Code a new title, which would regulate the updated list of local fees.  Local fees 
can only be imposed by primarias and not judets.37  Primarias have an option to use any 
or all of the fees in the list. They make their choices by introducing the list of fees that 
                                                 
34 These “regulating” sharing ratios are only one component of the budget “gap-fill” approach which still 
prevail in Moldova; the other being the “transfers” (see Chapter 4).  This renders the assignment system 
overdetermined and cumbersome. 
35 Though there still is a long way to go in order to properly explore the potentials of the property taxes in 
Moldova.  To start with, as a reliable cadaster of properties does not yet exist, the plans are to have one in 
place by end 2003, and shifting for market value of properties as for early 2004 (probably based on “mass 
valuation” approach).  See more on this below.  
36 This is Law No. 186-XIII of July 19, 1994.  The Law on Territorial Administration (# 191/98), the Law 
of Public Administration (# 186/98), and the Law on Local Public Finance reaffirm the right of local 
governments to choose from the list of local fees, and what rates to charge, as long as the maximum rates 
provided in the law are respected. 
37 Including municipalities, towns, communes, and village councils.  Chisinau, although having the status 
of a judet/district, can, in its authority of municipality, impose local fees. ATU Gagauzia also is 
autonomous to impose its own fees from the authorized ones. 
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will be collected the following year in their annual budget.  Primarias have discretion on 
the actual tariff rates used by choosing between maximum and minimum rates set in the 
law for each of the fees. Currently primarias are authorized to impose local fees on: 
• territorial organization  
• local auctions and lotteries  
• hotel accommodation 
• advertising  
• use of local symbols  
• business licensing and location 
• market stalls  
• car parking  
• resorts 
• domestic pets   
• right to shoot films  
• border crossing  
• right to sell in a customs zone  
• transportation services. 
 
Although marginally important, fees are not a very significant source in the 
composition of subnational governments’ revenues—less than 10 percent of the judet 
consolidate revenues. One exception is Chisinau municipality, which has been exploring 
well the potentials of this source, and where fees are already representing close to one-
fifth of all revenues.   
 
 
B. REVENUE PATTERNS38 
 
The relative importance of total  sub national government revenues, including 
grants, consolidated at the judet level has been planned at around 7 percent of GDP over 
the 2000-2002 period (Table 3.6.A). By source of revenue and leaving aside transfers, the 
PIT is most important, representing between 1.3 and 1.6 percent of GDP.39 Transfers to 
local governments represent about 2 percent of GDP in the 2000-2002 period. Other 
important sources of revenue are the land tax, and shared revenues for the VAT and the 
income tax on entrepreneurial activities (CIT). Roughly speaking, according to this 
classification of the taxes, own revenues represent a little above 3 percent of GDP, while 
shared revenues and transfers each represent around 2 percent of GDP. For 2000 at least, 
actual (or executed) sub national government revenues exceeded those planned (Table 
3.6.B). While planned total revenues represented 7.4 percent of GDP, actual revenues 
were as high as 8.9 percent of GDP. The comparison between planned and executed 
                                                 
38 This section discusses only data after 2000. This is the first year for which the territorial reform 
introducing the judets became operational. The comparable data for the three years (2000-02), are only 
“planned” or budgeted data. Actual, executed budget data for 2000 were available only in a different 
format, as reported in separate tables in this section.  
39 Although according to the Tax Code PIT is considered a “shared” tax, it is classified in Table 3-6 as  
“own” local revenue.  
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budget data for 2000 shows considerable variation across sub national governments and 
by type of revenue (Table 3.6.C). Nevertheless, in the aggregate actual revenues 
exceeded planned revenues in most categories, the only exception being land and real 
estate taxes.   
In 2000, PIT revenues amounted to 21 percent of total revenues, and the land tax 
13.5 percent (Table 3.7.)  Revenues from sharing the income tax on entrepreneurial 
activities (CIT) and the VAT were 8 percent and 7 percent, respectively. By comparison, 
planned revenues for 2002 show an increased importance of CIT and VAT shared 
revenues, with 11 and 15 percent, respectively. The planned land tax would fall to 10.6 
percent of revenues in 2002, and the PIT 18.7 percent. Planned transfers are also down 
from 33 percent in 2000 to 28 percent in 2002. These changes would reflect trends in 
revenue basis but also discretionary measures by the central government for revenue 
sharing and transfers. As discussed in the next section, under the current “regulating” 
approach to revenue assignments, the distinctions between the different sources of 
revenues are not very meaningful, especially those involving revenue sharing and 
transfers. 
 
These consolidated judet figures, however, mask significant variation among 
these jurisdictions in the relative importance of different revenue sources. These 
differences are shown for 2000 in Table 3.8.A (planned revenue) and Table 3.8.B (actual 
revenue).40  For example, the relative importance of “own” revenues varies quite 
significantly.   Seventy-two percent of planned revenues in Chisinau municipality were 
from “own” revenue sources (including PIT) and in Edinet 61 percent.  At the low end, 
Ungheni was planned to raise 30 percent in “own” revenues and Chisinau judet only 27 
percent. There is also substantial variation across judets on the relative importance of 
other revenues sources as well.  The relative importance of shared revenues also reflects 
differences in economic bases and the current rules for the apportionment of these taxes.   
On transfers, for example, Tighina and Chisinau judets , at one end, actually received  60  
and 63 percent of their revenues, respectively,  in the form of central government  grants 
in 2000. At the other end, Chisinau municipality, which was planned to receive no 
transfers in 2000, received 5 percent of its revenues in the form of transfers.  
 
There was also significant variation in per capita revenues across judets in 2000 
(Table 3.9.A and Table 3.9.B).41 The main reason for these variations are the different 
sizes of tax bases due to different levels of economic development across the national 
territory. These disparities are quite high for some revenue sources. In the case of the 
PIT, Chisinau municipality was planned to collect 196 Lei in 2000 versus 17 Lei in 
Tighina judet. In reality, Chisinau municipality collected 239 Lei per capita and Tighina 
21 Lei. The coefficient of variation for actual per capita PIT revenues was over 1.38. 
Because of the lower dispersion in other revenue sources in combination with the 
equalizing effect of transfers, overall disparities in per capita total revenues are not very 
                                                 
40 To allow comparison with 2001-02 (Tables A.3.2 and A.3.3 in the appendix) table 3.8.A also present the 
planned figures.   
41 For variation in per capita planned revenues for 2001 and 2002 see Tables A.3.4 and A.3.5 in the 
appendix 
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pronounced. The range in total per capita revenues after transfers in 2000 was planned at 
436 Lei  for Chisinau municipality and 260 Lei for Balti judet (Table 3.9.A).42 In  reality, 
the range in total per capita revenues went from 655 Lei for  Chisinau municipality  to 
284 Lei for Edinet judet (Table 3.9.B).  The coefficient of variation for per capita total 
revenues in 2000 end up being 0.3—about one-fourth of the coefficient of variation for 
per capita PIT, CIT and VAT—showing a considerable equalization impact of the 
transfers, subsidies and grants over the sub national governments’ total revenue.  
 
 
C. MAIN ISSUES IN REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS AND PATTERNS 
 
Unpredictable Revenue Assignments 
 
Moldova still lacks explicit and stable revenue assignments.  Moldova still uses a 
“regulating” approach to revenue assignments, which is intrinsically not different from 
that practiced in the former Soviet Union. The sharing rates for major taxes between the 
center and the judets and then between the judets and the local governments or primarias 
change by jurisdiction and from year to year according to what is dictated in the annual 
budget laws of the central and judet governments  
 
During the transition period, revenue assignments have been ever changing and 
individually customized for each sub national government in each year’s budget.43 The 
main feature of the approach to revenue assignments has been to use different 
combinations of the main taxes, most importantly VAT and income taxes, to “regulate” 
the revenues of sub national governments. The sharing rates of sub national governments 
in those taxes have been customized so that the sub national government has just enough 
revenues to finance its “minimum expenditure budget.”44 In this approach, the forecast of 
sub national government “own revenues” are subtracted from the minimum expenditure 
budgets to arrive at the gap to be financed with revenue sharing. For poorer jurisdictions 
with a small tax base, where the retention of 100 percent of practically all collected taxes 
                                                 
42 The final position of Balti judet, probably the second richest jurisdiction in the country, possibly reflects 
the roughness of the regulation process through sharing rates and transfers. But it also tells an important 
story about the negative incentive to revenue mobilization now in Moldova’s system.   
43 The process of revenue assignments in Moldova, for the most part,  has continued to parallel the nested 
structure of budgeting in the former Soviet Union. The center determined the revenue assignments for the 
regional governments in its budget, and in turn the regional budgets determined the revenue assignments 
for local governments. Revenue assignments for local governments also included “own revenues,” shared 
taxes with customized or “regulated” rates, and in some cases subventions from the regional governments.  
The determination of sharing rates and subventions for local governments mirrored the process followed 
between the center and the regional governments. 
44  In the early years of the transition this minimum expenditure budget was negotiated with the upper-level 
government authorities and, at least notionally, it was based on a large number of expenditure norms. Later 
in the transition, the elements of negotiation and norm-based budgeting have given way to a minimum 
expenditure budget primarily determined by the Ministry of Finance and based on very few norms. These 
norms earlier were based on previous-year expenditures adjusted for inflation, and more recently, on per 
capita expenditure norms. However, negotiation and bargaining, often around the use and the interpretation 
of the norms, continue to be basic features of Moldova’s budget process. See the discussion in Chapter VI. 
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is not enough to finance the minimum expenditure budget, the remaining gap is financed 
trough a lump-sum transfers from the upper-level government.  
 
Although considerable time and effort have been dedicated each year during 
budget preparation in Chisinau and in the judets’ (and before 1999, in the rayons’) 
capitals to bargaining the sharing rates for particular taxes, it is unclear whether this 
bargaining yielded any advantages to either side. The key variables in the bargain have 
always been the size of the minimum expenditure budget and the forecast of sub national 
government own revenues. The upper-level government always has had the last word for 
those two. It has been much less important which shared taxes or transfers are used to 
finance the budget gap. In fact, given the fact that sub national governments are to have 
just and only the amount of funding needed to cover the minimum expenditure budget, 
revenue assignments per se would have seemed irrelevant. As in other transition 
countries, the central government in Moldova has used mainly the VAT, but also the 
enterprise income tax, as the regulating instrument with the regions.  Some other taxes 
(eg, the water tax or the forestry tax), most of them representing minor sources of 
revenue, have been allocated 100 percent to judet governments.  
  
The two main advantages of the regulating approach to revenue assignments are, 
first, that it provides the central government (or the more generally upper-level 
governments) with budget flexibility, and second, that it can allow for high levels of 
equalization, which may be hard to reach with other revenue assignment approaches.  
 
However, the regulating approach also has imposed significant costs on sub 
national governments. First,, the regulating approach deprives sub national governments 
of any measure of revenue autonomy. Revenue autonomy and “regulation” of taxes are 
intrinsically contradictory concepts. The lack of tax autonomy diminishes the efficiency 
and fiscal accountability gains associated with fiscal decentralization. Second, it deprives 
sub national governments of revenue certainty and predictability, which makes budgeting 
and planning over time much less efficient. In addition, the system can be unfair since it 
is subject to the influence of both lower and upper level government officials. Third, it 
creates perverse incentives for the sub national governments to increase tax collections, 
either through their own taxes and fees or by contributing to the better enforcement of 
shared taxes with the central government.  Any increase in tax effort by local 
governments faces either a cut in the “regulated” sharing rates and/or, as the case may be, 
with a reduction in transfers. In essence the discretion (or , the lack of rules) leaves it 
open to upper level governments to claw back any increased revenues or even enhanced 
expenditure efficiency by local governments. Fourth, it has been a source of political 
friction and dissatisfaction between regional and local governments. Intermediate level 
governments, indeed, appeared to have routinely clawed back any additionally raised 
revenues by local governments. Although this practice is not supposed to happen, central 
government pronouncements have not been enough to take care of this problem. Local 
governments have reacted by lobbying against the budgetary authority of judet 
governments. Fifth, although recently less of a problem in Moldova, sub national 
governments are also given incentives to hide funds from the upper-level authorities 
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through the use of extra-budgetary funds which detracted from the transparency and 
accountability in public budgets. 
 
An alternative paradigm in revenue assignments, which by now, has been adopted 
by the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and several other former soviet 
republics and Eastern European Countries, is to establish stable and uniform sharing rates 
between the central government and the judets and between the judets and the local 
government. These sharing rates would be established in organic laws (either Law on 
Public Finance or Law Budget System), in lieu of the annual budget laws, and only 
changed when justified by objective reasons, supported by technical study and after 
intense debate and consideration by the parliament. In this way, revenue assignments 
would not be subject to change every year, but rather would remain stable for a longer 
period of time, such as three or more years. This system can improve fairness, 
predictability, and introduce the right incentives for revenue mobilization at the local 
level. It should also address one of the most contentious sources of friction among 
different levels of government. But it needs to be acknowledged that making the sharing 
rates stable for periods of three years or longer may also be a challenge in Moldova 
because of the macroeconomic instability and policy uncertainty Moldova has faced 
during most of the transition years.  It also needs to be acknowledged that establishing 
uniform rates in Moldova is made quite difficult because of the economic dominance of 
the capital Chisinau in the national economy. However, these two sources of difficulty 
are not unique to Moldova. In fact, most transitional countries have undergone 
macroeconomic uncertainty, although this may have been higher in Moldova than in 
many other transitional countries. However, the use of more rules throughout the 
economy tends to reduce uncertainties and may become a stabilizing factor. Moldova’s 
concentration of economic activity in the capital city is also problem common to other 
countries, including several transition countries, such as Estonia or Latvia.   
   
Of the two problems, lack of stability and lack of uniformity in revenue 
assignments, there is little doubt that the first carries more powerful negative 
implications. The lack of stability allows upper level governments to claw back and 
causes the negative perverse incentives. Introducing uniform revenue assignments is 
important for having a non-discriminatory and transparent revenue assignment. However, 
implementing uniform sharing rates for the major taxes such as the VAT and the 
enterprise profit tax is admittedly difficult given the unevenness in the territorial 
distribution of tax bases. Part of the solution may be the centralization of the VAT and 
the enterprise profit tax. The case for centralization is further explained below. If the 
centralization of the these majors taxes is not implemented, then uniform revenue 
assignments will require that none of the jurisdictions have higher sharing rates than 
Chisinau municipality.45 Of course, this will require also higher transfers for most 
jurisdictions.   
 
 
                                                 
45 This would follow the conventional rule that in the presence of fiscal disparities, revenue assignments in 
general and tax sharing rates in particular are to be set at a level that guarantees or nearly guarantees full 
revenue adequacy for the richest subnational jurisdiction.  
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Insufficient Local Tax Autonomy 
 
  The current system of revenue assignments provides subnational governments  
with little meaningful revenue autonomy.46 In reality, judets do not have any own 
revenues since all funding (except for the taxes on natural resources) comes from shared 
taxes with the central government and transfers.  Local governments do have their “own” 
revenues sources.47  They can set rates for some local taxes, such as the land tax and the 
real estate property tax, and can choose among a list of local fees and also set rates for 
those fees up to a maximum legislated level.  However, these sources of revenue are for 
the time being quite limited and on the whole provide local governments with only 
limited revenue autonomy.  
 
More importantly, the current system of incentives leads local governments to 
make little use of the revenue autonomy with which they are granted. This is so because 
the current budgeting system provides upper level governments (the judets vis-à-vis 
mayorias but ultimately also the central government vis-à-vis judets) with the means to 
claw back any additional revenues collected by local governments that increase their tax 
effort by exercising their tax autonomy. Local governments that choose to use higher tax 
rates for the property tax, make use of a higher number of local fees, or charge higher 
rates for those fees are faced in the next budget period with lower revenue sharing rates 
and transfers from the judet government.48 Similarly, if a higher number of local 
governments in a particular judet realize a higher tax effort in the current period, current 
budget practices imply that in the next budget period the Ministry of Finance may reduce 
transfers or even revenue sharing rates to the entire judet. Thus, the current arrangement 
for revenue assignments and transfers creates powerful negative incentives for revenue 
mobilization at the local level. Besides the fiscal pressure it imposes on the central 
government budget, the current arrangement ultimately leads to an atmosphere of soft 
budget constraints and lack of efficiency and accountability of local officials.  
 
                                                 
46 Despite the reality of a lack of financial autonomy at the local level,  the national Constitution and 
several laws protect and guarantee local government self-governance and fiscal autonomy. For example, 
the Law on Local Public Finances articles 4 and 89 develop the concept of local autonomy. However, these 
pronouncements seem to be mostly rhetorical given the reality of lack of revenue autonomy. 
47 There is still some confusion in the current legislation about what is a local government own tax and 
what is a central government tax shared at 100 percent with local governments. This is the case, for 
example, for the PIT. In substance, the PIT should be considered in its current incarnation as a central 
government tax (shared with local governments), since local governments have no authority to change rate 
or base and its collections is carried out by the central authorities. One criterion sometimes used in 
Moldova to differentiate between central and local taxes is to take as central all taxes addressed in the Tax 
Code. But clearly this criterion is not foolproof since the real estate property tax is a local tax but it is also  
regulated in title VI of the Tax Code. Even for the local fees, that are now regulated by a separate law from 
1994, the plans are to update and incorporate them eventually as Title VII of the Tax Code. In reality, the 
Tax Code does not determine the destination of taxes. This is done in the annual Budget Law, although the 
minimum sharing rates are set in the organic Law on Local Public Finance.   
48 Chisinau municipality is immune to this claw back, since it does not depend on any intermediate 
government.  Moreover, it “negotiates” its tax shares with the state independently.  Chisinau also have a 
privileged access to the central power.  The Chisinau municipality mayor is a member of the Government, 
access not shared by any other local government in the country. 
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One test of the severity of the negative incentives for revenue mobilization is to 
analyze the extent to which local governments have exercised the tax autonomy they now 
have. In particular, how much use local governments have made of the local fees that 
they are currently allowed to introduce.  Local governments currently have the right to 
use (or not) a number of fees from a list provided in the Law on Local Taxes and Fees, 
and they have as well discretion for setting rates for those fees up to a maximum 
established in the law. Aggregate information exists on the number of municipalities that 
have made use of the different fees, although no information is available on the rates 
actually used.49  Table 3.10 shows the number of municipalities using different fees as of 
January 2001.50  Only three of the 15 available fees are widely used: the fee on territorial 
development (81 percent of the municipalities use it), the business license and location 
fees (70 percent), and the market stalls fee (54 percent).51 Way down in its frequency of 
use, but fast rising, is the fees on passenger transportation services (15 percent). All other 
fees are very infrequently used. Their lack of use reflects no doubt also lack of 
opportunity; for example, not many municipalities may have the opportunity to use the 
resort fee or the fee on crossing the State border. However, overall it would appear that 
municipal governments have been less than eager to make use of their autonomous 
revenue raising powers by using local fees.52 Several reasons may explain the low use of 
local fees, including that many mayors lack previous experience in public finance issues. 
Finding low usage of local fees is not surprising given the fact that directly or indirectly 
the current budget system allows upper-level governments to claw back local revenue 
increases. The surprise may actually be that the local fees are actually used at all. The fact 
that Chisinau municipality uses local fees far more intensively than any other territorial 
unit is consistent with the fact that it is more immune to revenue claws back, since it does 
not depend on the transfers from the central government.  Nevertheless, claw back for 
Chisinau still can take the form of lower tax sharing rates.   
 
The benefits of fiscal decentralization arise only if local governments are 
accountable and able to respond to the needs of taxpayers. The most effective way to 
provide budgetary accountability and responsiveness is by granting local governments a 
meaningful degree of tax autonomy. Through local tax autonomy taxpayers become more 
aware of the costs of services and local officials’ actions are subject to closer scrutiny by 
taxpayers. 
 
One implication of the lack of explicit revenue sharing rules is that they vary from 
judet to judet. This informal approach provides judet governments with budget flexibility 
and it may even facilitate revenue equalization among local governments (municipalities 
                                                 
49 It appears,  however,  that once municipalities have decided to use a fee, the tendency is to use it at the 
maximum rate allowed. 
50 Actually, each municipality makes a decision in December each year on what fees and rates to adopt. 
Thus, it is possible for a municipality to stop using some fees that has used in the past. 
51 If we assume that any municipality making use of their right to introduce fees would first introduce the 
most popular one, the fee on territory development, then about 20 percent of the municipalities in Moldova 
still use no fees at all.   
52 Some of the fees, such as the fee on domestic pets and the fee on filming, are not used by any 
municipality. The municipality of Chisinau  has been using 11 of the 15 available fees, and it clearly has 
more opportunities to implement several of these fees. 
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and primarias) within each judet. However, the current approach deprives local 
governments of revenue autonomy and reduces intergovernmental accountability.  The 
lack of a formal assignment also reduces revenue predictability of local governments, 
diminishing their ability to plan and budget expenditures and it also provides local 
governments with negative incentives for revenue mobilization, at the same time that it 
encourages local governments to hide resources in extra-budgetary funds.  The costs 
implied by the lack of formal revenue sharing arrangements between judets and primarias 
depend on the actual policies followed by the judet governments. The more unstable and 
unpredictable the revenue assignments are, the higher the costs imposed. The practices 
appear to vary from judet to judet, some keeping arrangements more or less stable from 
year to year and others changing sharing arrangements markedly every year.  
 
There is little question that overall efficiency and equity of the system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Moldova would significantly improve with the 
adoption of open formal revenue assignments between the judets and local governments. 
The choice for the central authorities is whether to put these assignments into law 
directly, without giving judets any choice or just to legislate mandatory principles or 
guidelines for how judets need to organize revenue assignments within their jurisdictions. 
The former option is more common among unitary countries, which may by-pass entirely 
the role of intermediate level of government in structuring revenue assignments for local 
governments. But whatever approach is used, it would need to be recognized that the 
reform of revenue assignments in Moldova should be accompanied by the reform of other 
aspects of intergovernmental fiscal relations, including expenditure assignments, 
equalization transfers and conditional grants, and the budget process. 
 
Inadequate Tax Sharing Mechanism (VAT, CIT, and PIT) 
 
Revenue sharing on a derivation basis is the most important source of revenues at 
the sub national level. This continues the budgeting tradition of the former Soviet Union. 
However, the high reliance on revenue-sharing arrangements may bring potential 
problems. Revenue sharing (as opposed to the assignment of own revenues) breaks the 
link between the benefits and costs of public spending.53 This may be a factor promoting 
general fiscal irresponsibility, as local governments have incentives to under-utilize their 
own tax bases at the expense of national sharable revenues. Generalized fiscal 
irresponsibility arises because the burden of providing public goods and services can be 
exported or shared across jurisdictions, whereas the benefits of public sector spending are 
internalized and generate a political payoff to local governments. In contrast, the use of 
own revenues internalizes within the jurisdiction the costs of providing public services. In 
short, excessive reliance on tax sharing (and inter-governmental transfers) as the funding 
mechanism for local governments can discourage revenue mobilization and encourage 
overspending, leading to arrears, higher sub national deficits if they are allowed, and 
ultimately more pressure on the central government budget. 
 
                                                 
53 The same argument applies to transfers. In reality, tax sharing on a derivation basis (whereby taxes are 
actually collected) or on any other form, such as per capita, is nothing else than another form of transfers.   
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Using the principle of “derivation” for revenue sharing, that is the splitting of 
revenues between the central government and the subnational jurisdiction where revenues 
are actually collected, introduces  several additional problems. These are particularly 
acute for some taxes, such as the VAT and the enterprise profit tax (CIT). 
 
The Value Added Tax (VAT).  Even when the distribution of VAT revenues among local 
governments is fair, that is, when each level of government shares the revenues generated 
in its jurisdiction and not others, the process tends to lead to increased fiscal disparities 
across jurisdictions. This is because economic activity is unevenly distributed and the 
VAT is a large revenue producer. But in general the use of the derivation principle leads 
to an unfair distribution of resources since the VAT can be credited and debited in other 
local jurisdictions. For example, if the enterprise has production facilities (not 
independent units) in other jurisdictions, VAT in Moldova is paid exclusively in the 
jurisdiction where the headquarters of the enterprise is located. In more concrete terms, 
these problems have led the municipality of Chisinau to believe that their contribution to 
the public finances of the country may be too high and unfair when the fact may very 
well be that Chisinau actually benefits from the arbitrary results of the current sharing 
arrangements for the VAT.54 
 
The use of the derivation principle for sharing VAT revenues also can lead to 
perverse market protectionism by subnational governments. The sharing of the VAT on a 
derivation basis is in fact equivalent to a provincial VAT system on an origin basis—the 
VAT is levied where production takes place, but with completely harmonized bases and 
rates as defined in the national law. A VAT system on an origin basis will typically lead 
to protectionist policies by local jurisdictions attempting to maximize their share of the 
VAT. This should encourage local governments to get further involved in market 
activities, offer special advantages to business and create artificial barriers to internal 
domestic trade.55 
 
To make the VAT neutral with respect to the spatial allocation of production 
inputs as well as consumption, it is generally agreed that the VAT should operate 
according to the destination principle. This means that VAT should be levied and 
received by the local government where consumption takes place (destination basis), as 
opposed to where the goods are produced (origin basis). This would require the very 
undesirable introduction of internal borders to tax commodities being imported into the 
jurisdiction and zero-rate those that are being exported. These difficulties have led other 
countries to centralize VAT revenues, as most recently has been the case in Russia, 
                                                 
54 It must be noted that in recognition of the fact that VAT is paid at the place of registration, Chisinau 
municipality is, for example in 2001, allowed to retain only 10 percent of the domestic VAT while other 
judets are allowed to retain 100 percent of the collections in their territories. However, this has been called 
a “crude” method, that end up confusing the matter of revenue allocation: causing resentment both in 
Chisinau, that may feel accessing less revenue than it collects, and in other judets, that may see enterprises 
operating in their territories but paying taxes exclusively in Chisinau. 
55 For instance, as evidence for their tax-raising effort, some judets’ authorities reported that they have been 
conducting regular meetings with local businessmen (particularly local public enterprises) in order to 
discover ways and means that the judet government could help promoting local sales (that pay shared VAT 
locally) as opposed to exports (that does not bring to them any tax revenue!).  
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Ukraine and Kazakhstan. These countries now distribute VAT and other central 
government revenues through a formula-based system of equalization transfers and other 
grants (see Chapter 4). Other countries have used instead a direct formulary approach to 
the sharing of VAT with local governments, as in Germany, on a per capita basis, and in 
Canada with the Maritime Provinces, on the basis of statistical estimates of the final 
consumption of taxed items in each jurisdiction.56  
 
The Corporate Income Tax.  Similarly, the sharing of the CIT on a derivation basis also 
presents several problems. But,  there are several reasons why the CIT is less than an 
ideal tax to share with local governments. The CIT tends to be an unstable source of 
revenue and for that reason less suitable for local governments, since local governments 
have less ability to borrow and are (quite appropriately) not supposed to run budget 
deficits. The tax burdens from the CIT are also more likely to be exported to taxpayers in 
other communities, a feature which detracts from political accountability and responsible 
local governance. The tax base of the CIT is also less evenly distributed than are most 
other taxes, which tends to increase horizontal fiscal disparities at the local level. Besides 
these concerns, the sharing of the CIT with local governments is further complicated by 
how apportionment of the revenues is carried out in practice.  
 
Until last year, the effective sharing of the CIT by the central government with 
judets was by the place of registration or the headquarters of the enterprise.57 This has 
been a source of relative unfairness since enterprise activities, and consequently the 
consumption of local public services, many times take place in jurisdictions other than 
the one where the enterprise is registered. However, finding a remedy to this unfairness is 
not an easy task.  
 
A first best solution to the problem is simply the centralization of all revenues 
from the CIT. This may not be politically feasible, so a second best solution is to share 
the revenues from the CIT proportionally across local governments where the business 
operates.  An acceptable approach to the sharing of the CIT among all jurisdictions in 
which the enterprise operates is to use an apportionment formula. The formulas used in 
other countries typically approximate the share of the enterprise income in a locality by a 
weighted average of several factors, which include the enterprise’s share of labor, sales, 
and even assets in that locality vis-à-vis the entire country. Giving heavier weights to 
origin-based factors, such as labor and capital, favors producing jurisdictions while 
giving more weight to destination-based factors, such as sales, favors consuming 
jurisdictions. There is no exact way to arrive at an apportionment formula and practically 
the final choice is the result of a political compromise.  
 
                                                 
56 A third alternative is the creation of regional VATs. Long thought to be unworkable, several approaches  
have now been suggested in the public finance literature which in theory would allow for the functioning of 
subnational VATs.  The introduction of regional VATs in Moldova, however would not be advisable, given 
the many difficulties still present with the administration of the central VAT.  Thus, this alternative will not 
be discussed any further in the report.  
57 The Tax Code does not address the issue of apportionment of the EPT.  Article 87 states that the place of 
payment shall be regulated by the State Tax Service through instructions. Some regulations on 
apportionment have been approved recently, and they are just starting to be used.   
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Recently (2000-2001) the State Tax Service introduced two formulary approaches 
to the apportionment of CIT revenues: according to the number of employees, and in 
proportion to the profits derived. Enterprises can decide which approach to use. Not 
surprisingly, given the inherent difficulties of dividing profits, the apportionment 
approach that appears to be used is the number of employees. It must be noted that as a 
national agency, the State Tax Service will have little interest in seeing that the right 
apportionment between jurisdictions is produced. For this to happen it would be 
necessary to let subnational jurisdictions claim with the State Tax Service and in the 
courts, if necessary, their right share by using clear and homogenous (across 
subnatational jurisdictions) nexus rules issued by the State Tax Service. Thus if the 
Government of Moldova decides to keep sharing CIT revenues with local governments, 
there is still room for improving how these revenues are actually shared. 
 
The Personal Income Tax.  Although the personal income tax (PIT) is a much more 
appropriate tax to be shared with local governments, the apportionment of the PIT at the 
local level also presents problems. This is because the PIT withheld by enterprises on 
wage income is paid at the place of work rather than at the place of residence of 
taxpayers where consumption of local public services occurs.  
 
Weak property tax system  
 
A modern improved real estate property tax is one of the most promising 
alternatives to introduce revenue autonomy at the subnational level and to promote local 
revenue mobilization in Moldova. The new Title VI of the Tax Code, “Tax on 
Immovable Property “ was approved in June of 2000 and came into effect January 1, 
2001. The reformed tax is based on territorial cadastres for registration and a mass 
appraisal approach for property valuations. It has a ceiling tax rate of 0.5 percent of the 
property assessed value and the actual tax rate is set by the local governments. The actual 
rate cannot be lower than 50 percent of the ceiling tax rate (or 0.25 percent). The 
reformed tax shall be computed on an annual basis by tax collectors within the mayor’s 
office based on the assessed value of the property on January 1 of that year.  
 
The problem is that the fiscal cadastre is not scheduled to be completed until the 
end of 2003, thus the complete property tax reform will not be in place until 2004. Until 
then, the valuation and rates will be annually determined by the Councils of 
municipalities and primarias (including communes, village, and town) in the process of 
adopting their annual budgets and in compliance with the limits in Law no 1056-XIV of 
June 16, 2000 on Implementation of Chapter VI of the Tax Code.  As of the fall of 2001 
serious doubts have arisen that the fiscal cadastre will be completed by the end of 2003. 
According to the Office of the Cadastre, so far only half of the properties have been 
registered, mostly for agricultural land. Registration in urban areas has been going much 
more slowly. One alleged reason is the lack of adequate financing of the cadastre activity. 
Several pilot projects are supposed to be introducing, in the interim, mass-appraisal 
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techniques.58  The process of land (only) assessment has started, but obtaining market 
values has proved to be quite difficult.  
 
These developments threaten the effective implementation of the property tax 
reform. For as long as the assessment basis remains the old arbitrary criteria—based on 
unadjusted book values, location, “quality” and use of the assets—the property tax will 
remain without much relevance as a source of revenue autonomy for local governments. 
The Government needs to accelerate the implementation of the fiscal cadastres and the 
introduction of market-based assessment. If indeed the main obstacle to achieving these 
goals is the lack of adequate financing, increased funds should be allocated to this 
activity.  
 
Outdated local fees user charges 
 
One of the strengths of Moldova’s intergovernmental finance system is the 
existence of a law on local fees, which regulates this important aspect of local revenue 
mobilization and also provides municipalities with some degree of revenue autonomy. 
The government is in the process of reforming the structure of local fees, which will 
become part of the Tax Code (the new Title VII).  The thrust of the reform is to provide 
local governments with more discretion on rates, and better means also to enforce 
compliance.  Some of the new fees being proposed have noticeable revenue potential. 
This is a worthwhile initiative, which will contribute to the strengthening of revenue 
assignments in Moldova.  However, there is a potential problem in the proposed reforms. 
This is the introduction of a new sanitation fee, based on business turnover as the base 
and  with rates between zero and 0.5 percent. Although it has a very small rate, this 
particular proposal for a sales tax equivalent needs to be evaluated carefully, since in the 
presence of a national VAT, it could increase business tax compliance costs quite 
significantly.  In addition, since this will be a tax on business turnover, it will have also 
undesirable cascading effects. 
 
A different aspect of revenue mobilization at the local level is the need to 
normalize user charges at the local level. Local spending agencies, including those 
involved in providing health and education services, have been making increased use of 
cost recovery charges for the services they provide. The growth in the use of cost 
recovery fees in fields such as health and education needs to be interpreted as a rational 
response from subnational authorities to cope with severe budget under-funding and 
limited revenue autonomy. In addition, revenues from fees are likely the only revenues 
protected from claw-back by upper level governments. Even though the extensive and 
unregulated use of these fees may have undermined accountability and efficient budget 
and expenditure management and carried negative equity implications for the poor, the 
practice also has contributed to increasing revenue mobilization at the local level. These 
additional revenues have helped to varying degrees fund the delivery of basic services 
that otherwise may have never been provided in Moldova’s communities. In addition, the 
use of fees also has fostered cost recovery practices in some areas of public services, 
                                                 
58 These activities are being supported by technical assistance projects from USAID and the World Bank. 
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which has the potential to improve the overall efficiency of local government 
expenditures.  
 
The rationalization of user charges will need to be accompanied by the reform of 
revenue assignments at the local level to increase tax autonomy. This rationalization 
needs to separate between necessary and desirable fees and those that are not. In 
particular, cost recovery practices, i.e., fees that are charged to users of public services 
and which are commensurate with the cost of providing these services, should be kept. In 
fact, local governments need to increase their reliance on user charges to finance public 
utility services such as water and sewerage services, and in particular, public housing.  
 
Peculiarities of the Autonomous Jurisdictions 
 
The ATU of Gagauzia is currently demanding from the Moldovan government a 
special treatment in revenue assignment, which amounts essentially to a “single channel” 
arrangement whereby all taxes, levies, and payments would go to the budget of Gagauzia. 
These payments would include those paid on the border of the Republic of Moldova by 
business entities, which are registered in the territory of Gagauzia. 
 
These claims are similar to—and actually go beyond what concerns border 
taxes—those demanded by some ethnic regions in other countries, such as in the case of 
the Russian Federation by Tatarstan and Bashkiria during the early years of the 
transition.59  Gagauzia has based these claims on what appear to be a stretched 
interpretation of article 18 of the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia. 
Regardless of the validity of those claims, what is clear is that Gaguazia is demanding an 
asymmetric treatment within the system of intergovernmental fiscal relation in Moldova. 
The need and merits of those demands can be interpreted only from a political 
perspective.60  It may be feasible to adopt certain concessions in revenue assignments to 
Gagauzia, but those should also be accompanied by increased expenditure responsibilities 
and/or exclusion from other types of central government transfers. Over time these 
demands may settle, as has been mostly the case in other countries, such as Russia.  
 
There has also been some debate in Moldova regarding the appropriate treatment 
of the municipality of Chisinau in its special role as the capital of the country. This 
                                                 
59 These demands for a single channel in Russia involved a claim to retain all revenues raised in the 
territory of the region, and were similar in one way and distinct in another from those being raised by 
Gagauzia.  They included an agreement for a single payment from the region to the federal government to 
contribute to national expenditures at the federal level, such as defense, the judicial system or the 
repayment of the national debt. But, the demands of certain regions in the Russian Federation did not 
include border taxes, as is the case for Gagauzia. Even in the few countries where the constitution allows 
for an asymmetric assignment of revenues, such as for the Basque Country in Spain, these arrangements do 
not include border taxes. Some other national taxes such as excises are also excluded.     
60 From a technical or efficiency point of view, an asymmetric treatment could be justified if for example 
Gagauzia were a more institutionally developed region, ready to assume more fiscal responsibilities than 
other regions. But clearly this is not an applicable argument to Gagauzia. At any rate, asymmetric treatment 
based on an efficiency argument can only be temporary until other regions also reached an adequate level 
of institutional development.  
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debate has been complicated by the fact that a high level of economic activity and the 
headquarters of most Moldovan enterprises are concentrated in Chisinau. The 
concentration of tax revenues in Chisinau has led the government to “regulate” tax 
sharing for Chisinau at lower rates than those used for other subnational governments. In 
response, the municipality of Chisinau has continued to decry this “discrimination” and 
asked for more funding. In a reformed revenue assignment regime, as is being proposed 
here, the municipality of Chisinau would be treated on an equal basis with all other 
subnational governments. That is, own taxes and tax sharing rates would be the same as 
those of other local governments. In that reformed framework of revenue assignments, 
the city of Chisinau may be entitled to a specific grant from the central government to 
help with the costs imposed on the municipality that are associated with playing its role 
of capital city.     
 
Deficient Tax Administration  
Tax administration and enforcement is entrusted in Moldova to the State Tax 
Service, which has deconcentrated offices or tax inspectorates throughout the national 
territory. Each judet has a tax inspectorate office in the judet capital and several 
additional offices within the judet territory. For example, Balty judet has four other 
offices besides the one in Balty itself. Current arrangements are that the local tax 
inspectorates of the national tax administration are in charge of also collecting all local 
taxes and fees. The only exception is for the land tax and the property tax to be paid by 
physical persons, which are collected by local tax collectors.61 These local tax collectors 
are hired and fully paid by the local governments and are not subordinated to state tax 
inspectorate authorities.62 
  
Some potential problems exist with current arrangements. First, the allegiance of 
tax inspectors (who are employees of the national tax administration) with local 
authorities may compromise tax collections and enforcement objectives. The evidence is 
that  tax inspectors of the national State Tax Service, even though appointed by the 
central authorities, receive some kinds of fringe benefit payments from the local 
authorities, such as housing and other amenities. Because of the importance for some 
municipalities of the economic viability of enterprises, the danger in Moldova is, as 
experienced in other countries in transition with similar institutional arrangements, that 
local authorities may put pressure on tax inspectors to go easy with particular taxpayers, 
especially for taxes that are mostly assigned to the central government.  However, this 
issue may play a smaller role in Moldova because under current arrangements most local 
governments are allowed to retain most of the taxes collected in their territories. A 
second issue is whether tax inspectors, who are in charge of collecting all national taxes 
and practically the totality of local taxes and fees, are always going to exercise the same 
effort in collecting national and local taxes.  
 
                                                 
61 Depending on their population size, some locality may not have their own tax collectors. 
62 The only exception if for procedures and general methodology. 
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There appears to be significant consensus in Moldova that in the future it would 
be desirable to convert the role of the local collectors into local tax administrations. 
Before designing  a strategy to develop local tax administrations it may be wise to 
strengthen the central tax administration.63 The role of any future local tax 
administrations should be significant in the administration of the new real estate property 
tax and all local fees. Other taxes possibly assigned to the local level, such as a piggyback 
personal income tax, still could be more efficiently administered by the state tax 
administration, which will have comparative advantages in audit and enforcement of 
these taxes.    
 
 
D.  OPTIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Reforming Revenue Assignments 
 
The reform of revenue assignments needs to be compatible in terms of vertical 
balance or overall level of funding for judets and primarias with the reform in 
expenditure assignments, transfers, and budgeting institutions. For example, it must be 
realized that with the budgeting system still in use based on minimum expenditure 
budgets, negotiation and gap-filling transfers, it would not be effective just to reform 
revenue assignments. Evidence that just the reform of revenue assignments will not do is 
provided by the spotty use of fees by local governments, even though local governments 
need the additional revenues.  
 
The reform in revenue assignments also needs to be coordinated with tax policy 
and tax administration reform. For example, introducing more revenue autonomy at the 
local level would need to be done without increasing overall tax burdens in the economy. 
Until quite recently tax burdens in Moldova were as high as one-third of GDP, but tax 
effort has decreased significantly in the last years (Table 3.1).  
 
Four major reform thrusts summarize the more detailed recommendations that 
will follow below:  
(a) Providing judets/districts with a proportional rate of PIT 
piggybacking the nation PIT.  In order to increase genuine revenue 
autonomy of local governments judets should be provided with 
proportional PIT piggybacking the national PIT, with maximum and 
minimum rates specified in the law; 
(b) Accelerating the implementation of the real estate property tax at the 
primarias level. The property tax would still provide primarias with 
                                                 
63 There is a significant agenda for reform in tax administration at the national level. In July 2001, 
Parliament approved the tax administration chapter of the Tax Code. The goal of this legislation is to 
improve tax and customs administration. Current plans include the establishment of a large taxpayer unit, 
the integration of the financial guard in the regular tax administration. In addition, the State Tax Service has 
continued to work on eliminating tax offsets, in-kind collections of current taxes and arrears. 
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discretion for setting rates within a band also fixed in the national law. 
Providing local governments with the ability to increase revenues at 
the margin by using their own taxes—as in (a) and (b)—would 
increase accountability and efficiency of judets and primarias.  
(c) Centralizing the VAT and the CIT.  In order to adequately fund 
equalization grants, conditional grants for education and health (if so 
decided), and other types of grants (for capital infrastructure and social 
assistance, for example), the VAT and the CIT would be retained by 
the central government, thus discontinuing the sharing of these taxes 
on a derivation basis as is now the case.64 This reform would also 
address the current inequities inherent in the poor apportionment of 
these taxes among local governments.  
(d) Sharing the progressive national PIT:  There are several feasible 
options for  sharing revenues from the progressive PIT. The sharing 
could be by formula (e.g. per capita), or by using the funds as part of 
an equalization pool, or on a derivation basis; depending on whether 
the government intends to strengthen the equalization process or leave 
more revenues where they are produced. If revenue sharing on a 
derivation basis is the selected option, then it would appropriate to use 
uniform (or identical) sharing ratios across local governments. In 
addition, these sharing ratios should be made stable for a period of 
time, say three or more years.65  
 
Increasing revenue autonomy 
 
One of the first priorities in the reform of revenue assignments in Moldova should 
be granting local governments a higher degree of tax autonomy. This will be the best way 
to address existing vertical imbalances and to increase efficiency and accountability of 
local budgets.  Tax autonomy at the local level can take the form of having discretion to 
introduce new taxes, discretion to define and change the tax base of existing taxes, or 
discretion to vary the rates for existing taxes.  The least costly of these options, in terms 
of compliance and administration costs and interference with the central government’s 
ability to maintain macroeconomic stability, is to confine local tax autonomy to choosing 
the tax rate levels of a closed list of local taxes with common tax bases throughout the 
national territory.66  In this regard the taxes assigned to the local level should exhibit 
                                                 
64 This policy option is often considered in Moldova as one that would reduce the autonomy of local 
governments. Revenue sharing on a derivation basis is just another form of transfer, since local 
governments have no control over their amounts. Its substitution for equalization transfers would not 
reduce the autonomy of local governments since both transfers are unconditional. However, this 
substitution would have an impact on the territorial distribution.  If conditional grants are used in 
substitution of revenue sharing there would be some reduction in local autonomy. This may be considered 
as the cost of ensuring the national priorities pursued with the conditional grants. (Chapter 4) 
65 One way to help stabilizing the sharing tax revenue for the local governments is to adopt a new 
methodology for the computation of the revenue allocation which is based on moving averages of tax 
collection, instead of the actual current collection.  
66 In the case of Moldova, increased local tax autonomy should be made revenue neutral by reducing the 
rates of existing taxes or eliminating some of the existing taxes.  
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several properties. First, local taxes should encourage the link between payment and 
benefits received in order to improve political accountability and help match the demand 
and supply for public services at the local level. Second, local taxes should tend to be 
more equally distributed geographically to avoid creating large horizontal disparities. 
Third, they should not be exportable, in order to encourage responsible fiscal behavior. 
They should have immobile bases in order to minimize the distortions created by their 
impact on factor location. Finally, local taxes should be quite stable over time and in 
particular exhibit low sensitivity to the business cycle because of the lower ability of 
local governments to finance deficits.  
 
There are probably no taxes that can completely exhibit this list of desirable 
characteristics and at the same time provide adequate revenue for local governments. But 
it needs to be clear that not all taxes are created equal for their assignment to local 
governments. There are better and worse choices that can be made in the assignment of 
local taxes in the face of these desirable features. In the actual international experience, 
the PIT and property taxes are the two most frequently used taxes to provide revenue 
autonomy to local governments. Some countries also rely, but much less so, on the 
taxation of consumption at the local level in the form of sales and excise taxes.   
 
A Piggyback Personal Income Tax: The most obvious choice to provide judet 
governments with some degree of tax autonomy is to develop a piggyback flat rate PIT. 
Larger local governments could also be allowed to join in with a piggyback rate of their 
own. However, the current progressive PIT is wrongly assigned at the local level of 
government on a derivation basis. The main justification for a progressive rate structure is 
to redistribute income. But if the tax is shared with local governments at 100 percent on a 
derivation basis, all redistribution would be localized and richer jurisdictions will get 
more funds, and the allocation scheme would be regressive instead. A reformed PIT 
could be split into two different taxes. First, a progressive PIT would be assigned to the 
central government. This progressive part could be shared with local governments in 
different ways, including using the revenues to partly fund equalization grants. Second, a 
proportional flat rate PIT piggybacking the national (progressive) PIT would be assigned 
to the local level. This tax would be (eventually) paid by the place of residence and 
would give local governments discretion to set rates between minimum and maximum 
bands legislated by the Parliament. Also as just mentioned, the flat rate PIT can be 
assigned to one single level of government (say, judets) or can be split in a pre-arranged 
legislated way among different subnational levels of government (say, among judets and 
primarias).  
 
A Real Estate Property Tax:  The best choice to develop local tax autonomy in Moldova 
is to give full financial support and accelerate the introduction of a modern real estate 
property tax. However, from the viewpoint of revenue yield, the property tax will take 
some time to produce noticeable results. The key to the successful introduction of the 
new property tax will be the completion of the fiscal cadastre, the introduction of 
efficient market-based mass appraisal methods, and a fair and transparent administration 
of the tax, including efficient appeals procedures. Given the difficulties involved in 
completing the cadastre and introducing mass appraisal, the government may consider 
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assessment procedures, for an interim period, that are less complex and sophisticated. 
Updating some of the presumptive methods now used for the land and property tax could 
yield significant improvements in tax revenues. Another way to enhance local tax 
autonomy associated with the real estate tax is to regulate the voluntary introduction by 
municipalities of “betterment” or improvement levies. These are surcharges to the 
property tax that municipalities may approve within their jurisdictions, as one time or 
multi-year charges, for improvement directly benefiting certain homeowners, such as 
improvements in street lighting, sidewalks and so on. These levies have become common 
in many developing countries and in some cases represent a significant source of revenue.  
 
Other options:  Other less obvious options exist for enhancing revenue autonomy at the 
local level in Moldova. One of these options is to allow large municipalities to introduce 
local surcharges on the central government excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco and 
petroleum products. This may not be a feasible innovation given the small size of 
jurisdictions and therefore small distances to other jurisdictions’ borders in Moldova. 
This raises the possibility of “smuggling” the taxed products from other jurisdictions. 
This policy would also require the strict use of stamps at the factory or point of 
importation for the product to be sold in each jurisdiction. Another possibility for 
increasing local tax autonomy is the introduction of a surcharge in the VAT as a final 
local sales tax. This tax would have the same base and structure as the VAT and would be 
paid exclusively on final sales.67  A conceptually superior choice would be the 
introduction of a destination-based regional VAT, with discretion to set rates, and 
implemented side by side with the national VAT.  In practice, there is little international 
experience with this type of tax and it requires a very well developed tax administration 
and enforcement apparatus of the VAT. The regional VAT is also much better suited for 
large federative countries than for small countries like Moldova.  
 
Introducing predictable revenue assignments 
 
The lack of stable revenue assignments (from year to year) not only contributes to 
the lack of revenue autonomy at both the judet and the primaria levels68, but it also 
deprives these local governments of any minimum degree of budgetary certainty to plan 
their expenditure programs over time. Local governments’ inability to predict their 
revenues leads to poor planning, rushed decisions, and the inefficiency of public 
expenditures.  
 
One of the most important steps to improve revenue assignments in Moldova is to 
introduce uniform and stable revenue assignment (for a period of three years or more), 
including sharing rates at the judet and primaria levels.  There is a clear need to move the 
                                                 
67 The weakness of this proposal is that it may lead to avoidance and evasion by final consumers 
representing themselves as intermediate producers and the latter making purchases for final consumers. The 
advantage of this option of a surcharge over a separate local final sales tax is that the latter is more likely to 
increase compliance costs among merchants and make enforcement much harder for the tax authorities.  
68 Without stability of revenue assignments upper level governments can always change revenue 
assignments next year to claw back any additional revenues raised by lower level governments.  
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entire system of revenue assignments to a system that is stable over time and that is 
uniform, to the largest extent possible. Explicit and stable revenue sharing rules between 
the judets and primarias should be directly stated in central government legislation.69 
Revenue assignments, including sharing rates between different levels of government 
should be established in the organic laws—e.g., the Law on Local Public Finance (instead 
of annual budget laws as is currently done)—which should be changed less frequently 
and only under technical, sound justification.  
 
The provision of stable and uniform revenue assignments at the judet and primaria 
levels is crucial for an accountable and efficient system of decentralized government. 
However, the establishment of stable revenue assignments will require a careful exercise 
quantifying the expenditure responsibilities of different levels of government. Given the 
significant disparities in revenue basis between Chisinau and the rest of the country, the 
establishment of uniform assignments may require a more extensive use of direct 
transfers and less use of revenue sharing on a derivation basis, as it is now the case.  
Although difficult to implement, these tasks are doable, as has been shown by other 
countries in transition in similar circumstances to Moldova, such as Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania.    
 
Nevertheless, revenue uncertainty and the negative incentives toward revenue 
mobilization will not be simply eliminated by introducing stable and uniform revenue 
assignments. These goals will also require neutralizing other avenues upper-level 
governments can use to claw-back lower-level governments’ revenues. This will require, 
among other things, a system of transfers based on formulas and objective and 
predictable criteria and the adherence to a hard budget constraint culture for all dealings 
between different levels of government. Getting rid off the current negotiated “gap-fill” 
transfer mechanism and putting in its place a more effective, properly funded, formula-
driven system of transfers is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Apportioning Shared Taxes Adequately 
 
There are two possible solutions to problem of sharing the VAT. The first is to 
completely centralize revenues from the VAT. This is the solution adopted in recent years 
by many other transition countries, including Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The 
centralized revenues could be used by the central government to finance conditional 
grants for education and health or to increase the pool funds available for equalization 
under a new formula-driven approach. The second solution is to apportion the VAT 
revenues, now shared with local governments on a derivation basis, by using one of 
several fairer and more transparent alternatives. These include the sharing on an equal per 
                                                 
69 An alternative approach is to legislate general principles of revenue assignments that the intermediate 
levels of government must follow vis-à-vis municipal governments. These principles would spell out how 
to structure revenue assignments at the sub-judet level and would need to be fixed for a period of several 
years. This latter approach may be less relevant to Moldova, as a unitary country of rather small size. 
However, the approach may help Moldova deal its subnational complexities, such as ATU Gagauzia and 
Transnistria. 
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capita basis or the sharing in proportion to estimates of final consumption in each 
jurisdiction.  In any cases these significant changes in policy should be carried out in the 
context of a wider set of reforms, to insure horizontal fairness and an adequate vertical 
balance among the different levels of government. 
 
Revenue allocations of CIT were often unrelated to where actually economic 
activity took place, leading to a mismatch between the demand for public services and the 
availability of budget resources. In response to this problem, the government recently 
introduced a formulary approach to the apportionment of CIT revenues based on the 
geographical distribution of the enterprise’s payroll. If this formula is in effect applied in 
the future, the apportionment of CIT revenues will become better balanced and fairer. 
However, the use of an apportionment formula only mitigates rather than resolving the 
problem of an arbitrary distribution of revenues. For example, CIT revenues could also 
be apportioned according to the geographical distribution of assets or sales.  Actually 
there is no perfect formula to distribute CIT revenues fairly. The use of a formula is a 
second best approach. The best solution to this issue is to centralize the revenues from the 
CIT and use these revenues to fund either conditional or equalization transfers to local 
governments. 
 
Whether the PIT is reformed along the lines recommended above or it continues 
to be shared (without structure changes) with local governments, the government should 
consider adopting the principle of sharing PIT with local government according to the 
place of residence of workers. The proper sharing of the PIT is an issue only for those 
situations where individuals may live and work in different local jurisdictions. In these 
cases, the residence criterion tends to yield a fairer distribution because individuals tend 
to consume more services in their places of residence.   
 
Rationalizing the Current System of Fees 
The government should proceed with the reform of the system of local fees and 
make it part of the Tax Code (the new Title VII). This initiative will contribute to 
promoting local revenue autonomy in Moldova. However, it is not desirable to introduce 
a turnover sales tax by the back door with these measures. This is a tax with many 
problems and one that will conflict in terms of administration and compliance with the 
current VAT.  
   
There is a need to normalize user charges at the local level. These practices may 
be quite justified for some services as desirable cost recovery and they may be further 
justified in an era of budget stringency, when local budgets are not providing sufficient 
funding for basic services. However, there are two main concerns that need to be 
addressed by the government. First, the use of user charges may exclude from service 
consumption the poorest groups of citizens. This would be counter productive and could 
severely undermine the government objectives for income redistribution and fighting 
poverty. One solution is to use, where feasible, lower fees for the poor. A more general 
and preferable solution is to rely in income support programs for the poor that include 
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need arising from higher services fees.  Second, these user charges need to be brought 
into the open, made official and be regulated and controlled. 
 
Streamlining Tax Administration 
 
The first priority in this area is for the government to continue the modernization 
and strengthening of the national tax administration, the State Tax Service. In the 
medium term at least, local governments need to continue to rely on the state tax 
administration to collect their taxes. There are, however, three issues that need to be 
tended to.  
 
First, the de facto subordination of tax administrators to local authorities can still 
create conflicts of interest now or in the future. It would be desirable to make it illegal for 
local authorities to provide any direct or indirect compensation or payments to state tax 
inspectorate employees, including housing, bonuses.  For this measure to be effective, the 
central government needs to fund adequately the budget needs of the state tax 
administration.  
 
Second, central government tax administrators may not have as a priority now, or 
in the future, collecting local taxes and fees.  The best way to address this problem is to 
arrange for a formal payment from the local governments to the central tax 
administration, by drawing incentive compatible contracts between the two parties. For 
example, the payment may be a small percentage of collections, with increased payments 
for increased collections.  
 
Third, now is the time to start thinking about and preparing for the creation of 
local tax administrations in the future. The objective should be to develop the role played 
now by the tax collectors into full fledged local tax administrations in charge of 
collections of all local taxes and fees, with the exception of those that piggyback on 
national taxes. This could be done on a pilot basis in some larger primarias. There will 
also be a need to address the problem of inefficient scale of operations in the case of 
small local governments. Where local governments are too small to operate their own tax 
administration at a minimum level of efficient scale, the option would be for those local 
governments to contract with an upper level government for the administration and 
collection of their taxes. These contracts need to be incentive compatible so that the 
upper level tax administrators have an interest and responsibility to collect local 
government taxes. 
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Table 3.1:  Consolidated Fiscal Revenues By Major Source (Annual) 
 
  Nominal, Lei million 
  1997 1998 1999 2000bdgt 2000 prel 2001bdgt
Tax Revenues 2,298.5 2,205.8 2,422.8 2,976.9 3,065.8 3,700.8
o/w  Profit Tax 244.1 178.6 233.4 262.2 275.2 348.4
       Income Tax 281.9 234.0 218.7 234.5 264.6 271.0
       VAT 948.9 1,124.0 940.2 1,293.3 1,332.6 1,627.0
       Excises 401.1 374.6 444.5 612.4 657.6 834.0
       External economic activity 127.4 109.4 230.8 216.0 222.4 263.0
Non-Tax Revenues 643.2 516.1 566.0 958.3 866.0 739.0
Profits from National Bank 131.1 187.8 159.7 384.0 387.3 250.0
Grants   111.5 128.0 132.4   
Total Revenues 2,941.7 2,721.9 3,100.3 4,063.2 4,064.2 4,440.0
  % of Total Revenue 
Tax Revenues 78.1 81.0 78.1 73.3 75.4 83.4
o/w  Profit Tax 8.3 6.6 7.5 6.5 6.8 7.8
       Income Tax 9.6 8.6 7.1 5.8 6.5 6.1
       VAT 32.3 41.3 30.3 31.8 32.8 36.6
       Excises 13.6 13.8 14.3 15.1 16.2 18.8
       External economic activity 4.3 4.0 7.4 5.3 5.5 5.9
Non-Tax Revenues 21.9 19.0 18.3 23.6 21.3 16.6
Profits from National Bank 4.5 6.9 5.2 9.5 9.5 5.6
Grants   3.6 3.2 3.3   
Total Revenues 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
  % of GDP 
Tax Revenues 25.8 24.2 19.7 18.7 19.2 19.2
o/w  Profit Tax 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.8
       Income Tax 3.2 2.6 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.4
       VAT 10.6 12.3 7.6 8.1 8.3 8.4
       Excises 4.5 4.1 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.3
       External economic activity 1.4 1.2 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.4
Non-Tax Revenues 7.2 5.7 4.6 6.0 5.4 3.8
Profits from National Bank 1.5 2.1 1.3 2.4 2.4 1.3
Grants 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.0
Total Revenues 33.0 29.8 25.2 25.6 25.4 23.0
GDP, lei million 8917 9122.1 12321.6 15900 15980 19300
Source: World Bank Resident Mission,  Ministry of Finance    
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Table 3.2 
Share of Subnational Revenues in the Consolidated Total Revenues 
(Budgeted figures. Nominal Lei million) 
 
 2000 2001 
Consolidated Fiscal Revenues in the public sector 
 
Total Revenues at the Subnational Level 
 
Subnational Revenues as a Percent of total 
4,063 
 
1,182 
 
29.1% 
4,440 
 
1,477 
 
33.3% 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 
Tax sharing rates between the Central and Judet Governments for 2000 
 
Administrative territorial unit Sharing rates in percent 
 
 
 
 
 
Judets 
 
 
 
Income tax on 
entrepreneurial 
activity 
 
 
 
VAT on 
domestically 
produced goods 
Fee for travel on 
roads of Moldova 
by vehicles 
registered in the 
Republic of 
Moldova 
  
 Balti 
  Cahul 
  Chisinau 
  Edinet 
  Lapusna 
  Orhei 
  Soroca 
  Taraclia 
  Tighina 
  Ungheni 
Autonomous territorial unit 
  Gagauzia 
  Municipality Chisinau 
 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
 
100 
50 
 
10 
30 
30 
20 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
 
100 
10 
 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
 
50 
50 
Source: Ministry of Finance    
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Table 3.4 
Tax sharing rates between the Central and Judet Governments for 2000 
 
Administrative territorial unit Shared revenues, in percent 
 
 
 
 
 
Judets 
 
 
from the 
income tax on 
entrepreneurial 
activity 
 
 
from the VAT on 
domestically 
produced  
goods* 
from the fee for the 
use of roads, levied 
on owners of 
vehicles registered 
in the Republic of 
Moldova 
  
 Balti 
  Cahul 
  Chisinau 
  Edinet 
  Lapusna 
  Orhei 
  Soroca 
  Taraclia 
  Tighina 
  Ungheni 
Autonomous territorial unit 
  Gagauzia 
  Municipality Chisinau 
 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
 
100 
50 
 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
 
100 
10 
 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
 
50 
50 
*Except for VAT on phytotechnical products, cattle breeding and horticulture in 
kind, alive and slaughtered cattle delivered by its producers. 
**The amount of VAT on goods produced and services provided on the territory of 
Chisinau municipality to be collected in the year 2001 above the sum of 319.7 million lei 
shall be distributed equally between the state budget of Chisinau municipality. 
Source: Ministry of Finance    
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Table 3.5 
Local Government Revenue Sharing in Total Collections in the 2002 Budget 
 
Total 
Collections 
 Sub-national 
Share 
 
Sub-
national 
Budgets 
 
CIT 326 100 65% 211 100
VAT 760 300 38% 292 300
Road Tax 28 946 50% 14 473
SHARED TAXES 1 115 346 46% 517 873
PIT 356 250 100% 356 250
Land Tax 201 949 100% 201 949
Subsoil Tax 10 301 100% 10 301
State Duty 11 670 100% 11 670
Property Tax 28 759 100% 28 759
Revenues from Privatization 20 359 100% 20 359
Local Taxes 67 402 100% 67 402
Fees 109 914 100% 109 914
Other Taxes 45168 100% 45 168
Revenues, pre-transfers 1 967 118   1 369 645
Transfers   540 300
Total Revenues, post-transfers   1 909 945
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Table 3.6.A 
PLANNED REVENUES OF JUDETS’ CONSOLIDATED BUDGETS 
(Share of GDP, 2000-2002) 
 2000 2001 2002 
 Million Lei 
As Share 
of GDP, % Million Lei 
As Share  
of GDP, % Million Lei 
As Share 
of GDP, % 
PIT 249 1.6 270 1.3 356 1.3 
Land Tax 160 1.0 202 1.0 202 0.8 
Subsoil Tax 12 0.1 12 0.1 10 0.0 
State Duty 12 0.1 12 0.1 12 0.0 
Property Tax 35 0.2 33 0.2 29 0.1 
Privatization Revenue 17 0.1 20 0.1 20 0.1 
Other Local Taxes 111 0.7 92 0.4 222 0.8 
Total Own Revenues 596 3.7 640 3.1 852 3.2 
CIT 96 0.6 181 0.9 211 0.8 
VAT 84 0.5 239 1.2 292 1.1 
Road Tax 17 0.1 17 0.1 14 0.1 
Total Shared Revenues 197 1.2 437 2.1 518 1.9 
Transfers 388 2.4 401 1.9 540 2.0 
Total Revenues after Transfers 1 182 7.4 1 477 7.1 1 910 7.1 
GDP Estimate 15 980 100.0 20 724 100.0 26 876 100.0 
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Table 3.6.B 
Revenue of Judets’ Consolidated Budgets as Share of GDP 
(Executed 20002) 
 
 Revenue Source Million Lei Share of GDP
 Total Revenues before Transfers, Subsidies and Grants 944.8 5.9
PIT 263.9 1.7
Of Which Property Tax (Land & Real Est.) 186.9 1.2
CIT 139.6 0.9
Of Which VAT 98.3 0.6
 Transfers, Subsidies and Domestic Grants 484.1 3.0
 Total Revenues after Transfers, Subsidies and Domestic Grants 1 428.9 8.9
 GDP Estimate 15 980.0 100.0
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Table 3.6.C 
Executed Data for Year 2000 as a percent of Planned 2000 Data for Judets’ Consolidated Budgets 
  CIT VAT PIT 
Property Tax 
(Land & Real 
Est.) Total 
Other Revenues 
before Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Grants 
Total Revenues 
before Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Grants 
Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Domestic Grants
Total Revenues 
after Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Domestic Grants 
 1. Balti 102.0 74.1 87.3 117.4 99.7 176.1 115.0 117.5 115.8 
 2. Cahul 174.4 95.9 93.0 107.0 106.2 205.3 122.2 113.7 117.4 
 3. Chisinau 170.8 67.7 107.0 101.2 101.3 169.7 113.2 106.8 109.0 
 4. Edinet 167.0 42.8 49.4 96.3 80.1 113.6 85.5 168.4 107.7 
 5. Lapusna 149.2 118.9 74.9 83.6 88.5 200.1 104.9 109.8 107.4 
 6. Orhei 80.2 49.1 114.7 78.9 79.1 149.6 90.0 107.8 99.9 
 7. Soroca 95.3 124.0 61.7 91.3 85.9 173.1 95.5 114.6 103.1 
 8. Taraclia  320.8 131.2 136.7 64.9 99.3 215.2 113.2 123.6 117.9 
 9. Tighina 186.2 143.7 117.7 95.7 108.5 178.6 118.6 111.6 114.3 
10. Ungheni 131.1 58.1 76.3 88.7 84.5 206.4 100.2 106.1 103.6 
11. UTA Gagauzia 97.1 183.2 59.4 106.9 121.5 146.2 125.0 359.2 159.4 
12. Mun. Chisinau 158.7 160.8 121.8 97.1 132.4 253.1 153.9 - 162.0 
 TOTAL 145.0 117.1 105.8 95.8 110.3 206.5 126.2 124.7 125.7 
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Table 3.7 
Structure of Judets’ Consolidated Budget 
(Planned 2000-2002) 
 2 000 2 001 2 002 
 Thousand Lei 
Share of Total 
Revenues after 
Transfers, % Thousand Lei 
Share of Total 
Revenues after 
Transfers, % Thousand Lei 
Share of Total 
Revenues after 
Transfers, % 
PIT 249 400 21.1 269 850 18.3 356 250 18.7 
Land Tax 160 000 13.5 202 485 13.7 201 949 10.6 
Subsoil Tax 12 000 1.0 11 645 0.8 10 301 0.5 
State Duty 11 640 1.0 11 500 0.8 11 670 0.6 
Property Tax 35 000 3.0 32 775 2.2 28 759 1.5 
Revenues from 
Privatization 17 330 1.5 19 960 1.4 20 359 1.1 
Other Local Taxes 110 750 9.4 91 725 6.2 222 484 11.6 
Total Own Revenues 596 120 50.5 639 940 43.3 851 772 44.6 
CIT 96 250 8.1 180 985 12.2 211 100 11.1 
VAT 83 968 7.1 239 270 16.2 292 300 15.3 
Road Tax 17 000 1.4 16 755 1.1 14 473 0.8 
Total Shared Revenues 197 218 16.7 437 010 29.6 517 873 27.1 
Transfers 388 200 32.9 400 548 27.1 540 300 28.3 
Total Revenues after Transfers 1 181 538 100.0 1 477 498 100.0 1 909 945 100.0 
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TABLE 3.8.A 
Planned 2000 Composition of Local Revenues by Judet 
(as % of Total Revenues after Transfer) 
 
 PIT 
Land 
Tax 
Subsoil 
Tax 
State 
Duty 
Property 
Tax 
Revenues 
from 
Privatization
Other 
Local 
Taxes 
Total Own 
Revenues CIT VAT 
Road 
Tax 
Total 
Shared 
Revenues Transfers
Total 
Revenues 
After 
Transfers 
  1.  Balti 18.1 15.5 1.5 1.8 3.4 1.5 10.3 52.2 7.4 5.0 1.4 13.8 34.0 100.0 
  2.  Cahul 9.2 17.6 0.6 0.2 2.0 0.5 7.4 37.5 2.3 4.9 1.3 8.5 54.0 100.0 
  3.  Chisinau 7.1 11.7 0.5 0.8 1.7 0.7 4.1 26.6 2.4 6.1 1.1 9.6 63.8 100.0 
  4.  Edinet 14.8 27.9 1.7 1.4 4.7 2.2 8.0 60.8 2.9 8.8 1.8 13.5 25.8 100.0 
  5.  Lapusna 9.9 21.7 0.3 0.9 2.6 0.8 6.4 42.6 2.4 3.6 1.2 7.2 50.2 100.0 
  6.  Orhei 6.7 14.8 0.7 0.5 3.5 0.8 5.4 32.5 4.0 7.9 0.7 12.7 54.8 100.0 
  7.  Soroca 15.9 24.1 1.2 0.4 2.7 1.1 4.7 50.2 4.4 5.2 1.1 10.8 38.9 100.0 
  8.  Taraclia 9.2 28.6 0.8 0.3 2.6 0.4 6.2 48.1 2.8 3.3 1.2 7.3 44.6 100.0 
  9.  Tighina 4.9 20.7 0.5 0.2 2.0 0.5 4.8 33.7 1.5 3.6 0.7 5.8 60.5 100.0 
10.  Ungheni 9.2 12.4 0.8 0.7 2.8 0.7 3.8 30.3 4.3 7.2 0.9 12.4 57.3 100.0 
11.  ATU   
Gagauzia 17.9 16.2 0.5 0.4 2.3 0.6 11.6 49.6 9.1 26.0 1.0 36.1 14.4 
 
100.0 
12.  mun. 
Chisinau 45.0 2.5 1.3 1.4 3.3 2.6 16.2 72.4 18.1 7.3 2.2 27.6 0.0 
 
100.0 
Coefficient 
of Variation 0.766 0.414 0.502 0.681 0.299 0.708 0.497 0.303 0.906 0.826 0.34 0.655 0.476 
 
0.00 
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TABLE 3.8.B 
 
  Some Own Revenues Some Shared Revenues 
  PIT 
Property 
Tax (Land 
& Real Est.) CIT VAT 
Total Some Own 
Revenues and 
Some Shared 
Revenues 
Other Revenues 
before Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Grants 
Total Revenues 
before Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Grants 
Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Domestic Grants
Total Revenues 
after Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Domestic Grants
1. Balti 14.2 20.0 6.8 3.3 44.4 19.6 64.0 36.0 100.0 
2. Cahul 7.5 18.4 3.5 4.1 33.5 12.5 46.0 54.0 100.0 
3. Chisinau 7.1 12.5 3.8 3.8 27.2 9.6 36.8 63.2 100.0 
4. Edinet 7.0 30.2 4.6 3.6 45.5 12.6 58.2 41.8 100.0 
5. Lapusina 7.1 19.4 3.4 4.1 34.1 13.2 47.2 52.8 100.0 
6. Orhei 7.8 14.7 3.3 3.9 29.7 10.3 40.0 60.0 100.0 
7. Soroca 9.7 24.3 4.2 6.4 44.7 11.1 55.8 44.2 100.0 
8. Taraclia  11.0 17.6 7.9 3.7 40.1 11.9 52.0 48.0 100.0 
9. Tighina 5.2 19.2 2.5 4.6 31.4 8.8 40.2 59.8 100.0 
10. Unghei 6.9 13.2 5.5 4.1 29.6 10.8 40.4 59.6 100.0 
11. UTA Gagauzia 6.8 12.7 5.7 30.5 55.7 11.3 66.9 33.1 100.0 
12. Mun. Chisinau 36.5 3.8 19.1 7.9 67.2 27.8 95.0 5.0 100.0 
 Average 10.6 17.2 5.9 6.7 40.3 13.3 53.5 46.5 100.0 
 
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.805 0.386 0.762 1.141 0.298 0.400 0.306 0.352 0.000 
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Table 3.9.A 
Planned 2000 Per Capita Local Revenues 
 
 PIT 
Land 
Tax 
Subsoil 
Tax 
State 
Duty 
Property 
Tax 
Revenues 
from 
Privatization
Other Local 
Taxes 
Total Own 
Revenues CIT VAT 
Road 
Tax 
Total 
Shared 
Revenues Transfers
Total 
Revenues 
After 
Transfers
  1. Balti 47.1 40.4 3.8 4.8 8.9 4.0 26.9 135.9 19.3 12.9 3.7 35.9 88.6 260.4 
  2. Cahul 27.5 52.6 1.8 0.7 5.8 1.4 22.3 112.1 6.8 14.7 3.9 25.5 161.8 299.4 
  3. Chisinau 20.7 33.9 1.4 2.2 5.0 2.0 12.0 77.1 6.9 17.7 3.3 27.9 185.5 290.5 
  4. Edinet 40.5 76.3 4.6 3.9 12.8 6.1 21.9 166.2 7.9 24.0 4.9 36.8 70.5 273.5 
  5. Lapusna 30.0 65.6 1.0 2.6 7.8 2.6 19.2 128.8 7.3 10.9 3.5 21.7 151.9 302.4 
  6. Orhei 22.0 48.9 2.5 1.8 11.7 2.6 17.7 107.2 13.3 26.1 2.5 41.9 180.9 330.0 
  7. Soroca 45.1 68.3 3.5 1.2 7.7 3.2 13.2 142.2 12.6 14.8 3.2 30.7 110.2 283.1 
  8. Taraclia 28.2 87.6 2.5 1.1 7.9 1.1 19.1 147.4 8.6 10.0 3.7 22.3 136.6 306.4 
  9. Tighina 17.5 73.3 1.8 0.9 7.0 1.8 17.1 119.2 5.3 12.8 2.4 20.5 214.3 354.1 
10. Ungheni 26.9 36.2 2.5 1.9 8.1 1.9 11.0 88.5 12.6 21.0 2.7 36.2 167.6 292.4 
11. ATU 
Gagauzia 55.0 49.7 1.7 1.3 7.0 1.9 35.6 152.2 27.9 79.7 3.1 110.8 44.1 307.0 
12. Mun. 
Chisinau 196.1 11.1 5.8 5.9 14.4 11.5 70.7 315.6 79.0 32.0 9.4 120.4 0.0 435.9 
 
Average 
68.5 43.9 3.3 3.2 9.6 4.8 30.4 163.6 26.4 23.0 4.7 54.1 106.5 
 
 
324.3 
 
Coefficient of 
Variation  1.047 0.402 0.527 0.704 0.327 0.876 0.679 0.431 1.183 0.827 0.484 0.771 0.510 
 
 
 
0.149 
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Table 3.9.B 
 Executed 2000 Per Capita Local Revenues  
(Lei per capita) 
 
  Some Own Revenues Some Shared Revenues 
  PIT 
Property 
Tax (Land 
& Real Est.) CIT VAT 
Total Some Own 
Revenues and 
Some Shared 
Revenues 
Other Revenues 
before Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Grants 
Total Revenues 
before Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Grants 
Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Domestic Grants
Total Revenues 
after Transfers, 
Subsidies and 
Domestic Grants
1. Balti 41.2 57.9 19.7 9.6 128.3 56.5 184.8 104.1 288.8 
2. Cahul 25.6 62.5 11.9 14.1 114.1 42.5 156.6 183.9 340.5 
3. Chisinau 22.1 39.3 11.8 12.0 85.2 30.0 115.2 198.0 313.3 
4. Edinet 20.0 85.8 13.2 10.3 129.2 35.8 165.1 118.7 283.8 
5. Lapusna 22.5 61.4 10.8 13.0 107.7 41.7 149.4 166.8 316.2 
6. Orhei 25.2 47.8 10.7 12.8 96.6 33.5 130.0 195.0 325.1 
7. Soroca 27.8 69.4 12.0 18.4 127.6 31.8 159.4 126.3 285.7 
8. Taraclia 38.6 61.9 27.7 13.1 141.3 41.7 183.0 168.9 351.9 
9. Tighina 20.6 76.8 9.9 18.4 125.7 35.2 160.8 239.1 400.0 
10. Ungheni 20.5 39.3 16.5 12.2 88.4 32.1 120.5 177.9 298.4 
11. UTA Gagauzia 32.7 60.6 27.1 146.1 266.5 53.9 320.4 158.3 478.7 
12. Mun. Chisinau 238.9 24.7 125.3 51.5 440.4 182.1 622.5 32.8 655.3 
 Average 44.6 57.3 24.7 27.6 154.2 51.4 205.6 155.8 361.5 
 
Coefficient of 
Variation 1.379 0.298 1.306 1.411 0.659 0.818 0.688 0.346 0.299 
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TABLE 3.10:  Application by Local Governments of the 1994 Law on Local Taxes and Levies 
 
Judet 
No. of 
municipalities 
per judet 
Fee on 
territory 
Development 
Fee on the right to 
organize 
local auctions 
Hotel 
fee 
Fee on 
advertising 
placement 
Fee on the right 
to apply the local 
symbolism 
Fee on the 
placement on 
commercial units 
Market fee 
Chisinau 
municipality 
Balti 
Cahul 
Chisinau 
Edinet 
Lapusna 
Orhei 
Soroca 
Tighina 
Ungheni 
UTA Gagauzia 
22 
 
82 
54 
91 
73 
64 
72 
62 
47 
55 
26 
22 
 
68 
34 
87 
41 
52 
46 
53 
42 
53 
26 
1 
 
12 
2 
1 
 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
4 
 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
 
 
15 
5 
10 
3 
5 
1 
5 
3 
3 
2 
5 
 
13 
4 
11 
 
4 
 
2 
3 
5 
1 
1 
 
59 
26 
83 
32 
50 
43 
53 
35 
53 
20 
11 
 
37 
20 
52 
38 
40 
36 
40 
27 
29 
17 
Total 648 524 25 22 52 48 455 347 
Percent  80.86% 3.86% 3.40% 8.02% 7.41% 70.22% 53.55% 
 
Judet 
Fee on vehicle 
parking 
Resort fee Fee on 
 dog owners 
Fee on 
filming 
Fee on 
crossing the 
State Border 
Fee on the right 
to sell in the 
customs area 
Fee on the right to provide 
transportation 
services for passengers 
Chisinau 
municipality  
Balti 
Cahul 
Chisinau 
Edinet 
Lapusna 
Orhei 
Soroca 
Tighina 
Ungheni 
UTA Gagauzia 
 
 
4 
2 
4 
6 
5 
4 
3 
4 
4 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
2 
1 
2 
 
 
1 
3 
1 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
1 
2 
 
8 
 
 
1 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
2 
2 
1 
 
19 
6 
14 
5 
4 
1 
12 
11 
17 
7 
 
Total 37 2 12 8 15 9 97  
Percent 5.71% 0.31% 1.85% 1.23% 2.31% 1.39% 14.97%  
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Table A.3.1 
Tax Sharing rates between the central and local governments in 1999 
Administrative territorial unit Sharing rates  (in percent) 
 
 
DISTRICT 
From the income 
tax on business 
activity 
from the value added 
tax on domestically 
produced goods 
from the land tax 
on legal entities 
Anenii Noi 
Basarabeasca 
Briceni 
Cahul 
Camenca 
Cantemir 
Cainari 
Calarasi 
Causeni 
Cimislia 
Criuleni 
Donduseni 
Drochia 
Dubasari 
Edinet 
Falesti 
Floresti 
Glodeni 
Hincesti 
Ialoveni 
Leova 
Nisporeni 
Ocnita 
Orhei 
Rezina 
Riscani 
Singerei 
Soroca 
Straseni 
Soldanesti 
Stefan-Voda 
Taraclia 
Telenesti 
Ungheni 
Vulcanesti 
ATU Gagauzia 
           Municipalities 
Chisinau 
Balti 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
70 
 
40 
40 
30 
30 
20 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
20 
20 
30 
20 
20 
20 
20 
30 
30 
30 
30 
20 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
 
10 
10 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
 
100 
100 
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Table A.3.2 
Plan 2001 Composition of Local Revenues by Judet 
(as % of Total Revenues after Transfers and Withdrawals) 
 
 PIT 
Land 
Tax 
Subsoil 
Tax 
State 
Duty 
Property 
Tax 
Revenues 
from 
Privatization
Other 
Local 
Taxes 
Total Own 
Revenues CIT VAT 
Road 
Tax 
Total 
Shared 
Revenues Transfers
Total 
Revenues 
After 
Transfers
  1. Balti 11.9 14.6 2.2 0.7 2.0 1.2 5.5 38.0 10.5 39.5 1.1 51.0 10.9 100.0 
  2. Cahul 6.0 20.1 0.4 0.5 1.8 0.7 5.1 34.6 4.8 14.5 1.0 20.3 45.2 100.0 
  3. Chisinau 6.4 12.5 0.3 0.7 1.6 0.6 2.3 24.3 4.8 12.7 0.8 18.4 57.3 100.0 
  4. Edinet 6.8 27.7 0.6 0.6 2.8 0.6 5.3 44.3 6.8 19.2 0.9 26.9 28.7 100.0 
  5. Lapusna 5.4 21.2 0.2 0.7 2.2 0.5 4.6 34.7 5.1 13.4 0.8 19.3 46.0 100.0 
  6. Orhei 6.2 22.2 0.3 0.5 2.0 0.6 3.0 34.8 8.2 12.5 0.8 21.5 43.7 100.0 
  7. Soroca 11.1 25.8 0.5 0.5 1.8 0.4 4.1 44.2 8.5 19.4 1.2 29.1 26.7 100.0 
  8. Taraclia 8.7 29.5 0.5 0.4 2.4 0.6 4.0 46.0 13.2 12.4 1.1 26.6 27.3 100.0 
  9. Tighina 4.3 27.7 0.2 0.3 2.3 0.5 3.6 38.8 4.6 13.0 0.8 18.4 42.7 100.0 
10. Ungheni 6.3 12.9 0.3 0.7 1.9 0.3 3.1 25.7 8.4 11.7 0.7 20.8 53.5 100.0 
11. UTA    
Gagauzia 10.1 20.3 0.4 0.8 2.1 1.0 9.9 44.5 10.1 32.6 0.9 43.7 11.7 
 
100.0 
12. Mun. 
Chisinau 39.3 1.9 0.9 1.1 2.6 2.7 9.7 58.2 21.7 6.6 1.6 29.9 11.9 
 
100.0 
 Coefficient of 
Variation 0.928 0.409 0.980 0.310 0.165 0.804 0.487 0.239 0.546 0.548 0.242 0.383 0.489 
 
0.00 
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Table A.3.3 
Plan 2002 Composition of Local Revenues by Judet 
(as % of Total Revenues after Transfers and Withdrawals) 
 
 PIT 
Land 
Tax 
Subsoil 
Tax 
State 
Duty
Property 
Tax 
Revenues 
from 
Privatization
Other 
Local 
Taxes and 
Fees 
Total Own 
Revenues CIT VAT 
Road 
Tax 
Total 
Shared 
Revenues Transfers
Total 
Revenues 
After 
Transfers 
  1. Balti 12.9 14.3 1.9 0.4 1.6 0.7 10.8 42.5 11.1 35.5 0.9 47.4 10.0 100.0 
  2. Cahul 5.9 15.7 0.2 0.6 1.2 0.4 11.9 35.7 6.9 11.7 0.5 19.1 45.2 100.0 
  3. Chisinau 6.6 9.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.1 5.3 22.7 7.5 12.7 0.5 20.8 56.5 100.0 
  4. Edinet 6.2 20.7 0.5 0.4 1.8 0.4 7.0 37.0 6.7 16.9 0.6 24.2 38.7 100.0 
  5. Lapusna 5.0 14.9 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.2 9.4 31.3 5.1 11.6 0.5 17.2 51.5 100.0 
  6. Orhei 6.1 14.7 0.2 0.4 1.3 0.6 6.8 30.0 5.9 11.8 0.6 18.3 51.7 100.0 
  7. Soroca 7.7 18.6 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.4 8.3 36.9 6.9 20.2 0.9 27.9 35.2 100.0 
  8. Taraclia 8.0 21.4 0.2 0.3 1.3 0.3 9.1 40.6 10.7 8.0 0.8 19.4 40.0 100.0 
  9. Tighina 4.4 18.7 0.1 0.4 1.4 0.3 7.6 32.8 5.1 12.2 0.5 17.8 49.3 100.0 
10. Ungheni 4.8 9.3 0.2 0.6 1.3 0.3 6.8 23.2 6.0 12.1 0.4 18.6 58.2 100.0 
11. UTA 
Gagauzia 8.4 14.2 0.2 0.7 1.2 0.6 7.7 33.1 7.2 28.3 0.8 36.3 30.6 100.0 
12. Mun. 
Chisinau 44.1 1.4 0.6 0.9 1.9 2.5 19.3 70.7 19.5 8.8 1.0 29.3 0.0 100.0 
                
Coefficient of 
Variation 1.097 0.393 1.315 0.349 0.197 1.139 0.401 0.340 0.489 0.525 0.293 0.374 0.464 0.000 
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Table A.3.4 
Planned for 2001 Per Capita Local Revenues 
(Lei Per Capita) 
 
 PIT 
Land 
Tax 
Subsoil 
Tax 
State 
Duty 
Property 
Tax 
Revenues 
from 
Privatization
Other 
Local 
Taxes 
Total Own 
Revenues CIT VAT 
Road 
Tax 
Total Shared 
Revenues Transfers
Total 
Revenues 
After 
Transfers
 1. Balti 49.5 60.7 9.1 3.0 8.3 4.9 22.7 158.3 43.6 164.1 4.5 212.2 45.5 416.0 
 2. Cahul 21.0 70.6 1.5 1.8 6.3 2.4 17.8 121.5 16.8 50.8 3.6 71.3 158.8 351.5 
 3. Chisinau 20.9 40.4 0.8 2.2 5.2 1.8 7.3 78.8 15.7 41.2 2.7 59.7 186.2 324.7 
 4. Edinet 21.1 86.0 1.9 1.8 8.6 1.8 16.4 137.5 21.1 59.6 2.8 83.5 89.1 310.1 
 5. Lapusna 18.4 72.5 0.6 2.5 7.4 1.8 15.8 119.0 17.4 46.1 2.7 66.1 157.7 342.9 
 6. Orhei 19.8 71.2 1.0 1.7 6.4 1.8 9.6 111.5 26.4 40.0 2.5 68.9 139.8 320.2 
 7. Soroca 37.2 86.5 1.8 1.8 5.9 1.4 13.8 148.5 28.4 65.1 4.0 97.6 89.6 335.8 
 8. Taraclia 30.2 102.8 1.7 1.5 8.3 2.2 13.8 160.5 46.0 43.1 3.8 92.9 95.3 348.6 
 9. Tighina 14.1 90.3 0.7 1.0 7.4 1.5 11.8 126.8 15.0 42.4 2.7 60.2 139.6 326.6 
10. Ungheni 21.2 43.3 1.0 2.5 6.4 1.2 10.4 86.0 28.2 39.4 2.3 69.9 179.4 335.3 
11. ATU 
Gagauzia 37.2 74.4 1.3 2.8 7.7 3.7 36.3 163.5 37.2 119.8 3.4 160.5 43.1 367.0 
12. Mun. 
Chisinau 243.4 11.5 5.4 6.7 16.3 16.8 60.1 360.2 134.5 41.0 9.6 185.1 73.5 618.7 
Average 
74.1 55.6 3.2 3.2 9.0 5.5 25.2 175.6 49.7 65.7 4.6 119.9 109.9 405.5 
Coefficient of 
Variation 1.43 0.38 1.12 0.59 0.36 1.26 0.75 0.49 0.92 0.62 0.53 0.52 0.43 0.23 
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Table A.3.5 
Planned for 2002 Per Capita Local Revenues 
(Lei Per Capita) 
 
 PIT Land Tax 
Subsoil 
Tax 
State 
Duty 
Property 
Tax 
Revenues 
from 
Privatization
Other 
Local 
Taxes
Total 
Own 
Revenues CIT VAT 
Road 
Tax 
Total Shared 
Revenues Transfers
Total 
Revenues 
After 
Transfers
 1. Balti 57.4 63.8 8.6 1.6 7.1 3.2 48.3 190.1 49.5 158.4 4.0 211.9 44.8 446.8 
 2. Cahul 28.8 77.3 0.8 2.8 5.8 1.8 58.6 176.1 34.1 57.7 2.4 94.1 222.5 492.7 
 3. Chisinau 29.8 40.6 1.0 2.4 4.6 0.5 24.0 102.8 34.0 57.6 2.4 93.9 255.7 452.5 
 4. Edinet 25.6 86.1 2.1 1.8 7.6 1.7 29.1 154.0 28.1 70.2 2.6 100.9 161.2 416.1 
 5. Lapusna 24.5 72.7 0.6 2.5 6.0 1.1 45.8 153.1 24.8 56.7 2.5 84.0 252.2 489.2 
 6. Orhei 27.0 65.5 0.8 2.0 5.6 2.7 30.1 133.7 26.4 52.7 2.5 81.6 230.1 445.4 
 7. Soroca 34.4 83.0 1.4 1.8 5.4 1.6 37.2 164.8 30.6 89.9 4.0 124.5 156.8 446.0 
 8. Taraclia 38.8 103.9 0.9 1.3 6.4 1.5 44.3 197.0 51.7 38.8 3.9 94.4 194.0 485.4 
 9. Tighina 21.2 90.1 0.5 1.8 6.6 1.6 36.9 158.7 24.7 58.9 2.5 86.2 238.2 483.1 
10. Ungheni 23.2 44.4 0.8 2.9 6.2 1.2 32.5 111.2 29.0 57.9 2.1 89.0 278.6 478.8 
11. ATU 
Gagauzia 43.5 73.3 0.9 3.7 6.4 3.0 39.9 170.7 37.2 145.9 4.0 187.2 157.7 515.5 
12. Mun. 
Chisinau 333.0 10.3 4.6 6.9 14.4 19.2 145.8 534.2 147.3 66.6 7.7 221.6 0.0 755.8 
 
Average 97.8 55.4 2.8 3.2 7.9 5.6 61.1 233.8 57.9 80.2 4.0 142.1 148.3 524.2 
Coefficient of 
Variation 1.53 0.38 1.25 0.58 0.37 1.56 0.68 0.60 0.79 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.18 
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CHAPTER 4:  THE SYSTEM OF TRANSFERS 
   
 
This chapter examines vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances in Moldova, how the current 
system of transfers has worked so far, and suggests options for improving the design and 
performance of the transfer system. 
 
A.   FISCAL IMBALANCES 
 Fiscal imbalances are a common feature in most fiscally decentralized countries, and 
Moldova is not an exception.  These imbalances are a consequence of the local economic conditions, 
the low mobility of population and production factors among regions, and inadequate 
intergovernmental fiscal relations.  The latter, when properly designed, can help compensate for 
financial insufficiencies and disparities between expenditure responsibilities and revenue sources at 
different levels of governments and across jurisdictions.   
 
Vertical imbalances 
 
There is no unique definition of vertical imbalances.  Broadly, a vertical imbalance exists 
when the revenue sources assigned to each level of government do not correspond to their 
expenditure responsibilities.  Several approaches have been used to measure the existence and the 
size of vertical imbalances.  Although this is not a trivial exercise, the two most frequently used 
practical measures are: (i) the existence of structural (i.e., persistent) budget deficits at a particular 
level of government, and (ii) the ability of different levels of government to finance expenditures 
from their own sources of revenues.  
 
Usually the actual budget deficit measure tends to indicate an imbalance against the central 
government, since budget deficits have been consistently higher at the central level than among 
subnational governments over the transition years.  In many countries, as is the case also in Moldova, 
subnational governments are not as free as the central government to run budget deficits and borrow 
to finance their expenditures.  Particularly, the central government is the only one allowed to borrow 
from abroad (which usually requires sovereign guarantee), although they may on-lend or transfer to 
lower tiers afterwards.  In any case, even though the central government has control over the most 
important sources of revenue—ultimately because it shares some of those revenues with subnational 
governments and because it spends on many central government responsibilities—the central 
government may only be able to get by borrowing against future tax revenues.  Apart from borrowing 
directly from the central government (particularly the Ministry of Finance—see Chapter 5) and 
incurring in arrears on wages, subnational governments in Moldova do not have enough 
creditworthiness to access commercial borrowing.70  
 
Typically all levels of government appear to have expenditure responsibilities and needs that 
exceed their financing means (Box 4.1).  In this regard, the measurement of vertical imbalances is 
                                                 
70 Although off-budget public utility (and other) companies have had access to different forms of commercial 
borrowing, including foreign. 
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made difficult by the ambiguity of the expenditure levels (quantity and quality of services) that can 
be associated with the assignment of responsibilities at each level of government. One way to dealing 
with this ambiguity is to prepare an exhaustive listing of standards (or norms) for provision, and 
conduct an accounting of the expenditures required for explicitly stated and agreed upon levels and 
quality of public services and, finally, compare them to available resources for each level of 
government. This is a very costly and time-consuming exercise, and requires a great deal of 
intergovernmental consensus and communication.  Nevertheless, without the latter, the listing and 
costing of expenditure norms can lead to intergovernmental friction and poor budgeting practice.  
 
 A simpler and more effective guarantee against vertical imbalance is to provide each level of 
government with enough revenue autonomy so that they can make their own decisions regarding 
what services to cover and at what level. In practice, this approach to measuring vertical fiscal 
imbalance is to compute the share of local government expenditures that cannot be financed with 
sources of revenues over which local governments have discretion or autonomy 71: 
 
 
  
 This coefficient quantifies the share of the subnational government expenditures that are not 
financed from sources of revenues that are controlled by the subnational government—i.e., the share 
that the subnational government does not have revenue raising powers—i.e., they do not have 
discretion or authority to change tax rates, tax bases, or even to use or not particular taxes. By 
construction, the coefficients of vertical imbalance take values between zero and one, with values 
closer to zero indicating a smaller vertical imbalance, and values closer to one indicating larger 
vertical fiscal imbalance.  There is typically disagreement on the definition of the concepts applied to 
the formula. Total subnational expenditures include exclusive, shared and delegated expenditures, 
but the concepts of revenues that are controlled and revenues that are not controlled by subnational 
governments are subject to more controversy. For example, lump sum or unconditional transfers may 
also be interpreted as resources controlled by subnational governments, although, in any case, 
conditional transfers would be resources not controlled by subnational governments.  In this respect, 
extra care has to be exercised in comparing measures of vertical imbalances across countries, because 
the level of central government control and the definition of subnational “own revenues” may varies 
from country to country.   
 
 By this definition, there is a vertical imbalance in Moldova against local governments. As 
we saw in the previous two Chapters, subnational governments in Moldova have little tax autonomy. 
Local own revenues, excluding the personal income tax and other shared revenues, finance a little 
above one-fourth of the subnational budgets.72  Thus, the lack of revenue autonomy at the 
subnational level is a main cause of the existence of vertical imbalances against subnational 
governments in Moldova.  
 
                                                 
71 By autonomy it is meant the ability to adopt or not certain taxes, or change their structure, base and rate. 
72 Own revenues (excluding PIT) represented 29 percent of total revenues in 2000 and 25.9 percent in 2002 (Table 3.7). 
Note, however, that the importance on own revenues varies significantly across subnational jurisdictions. For example, for 
2002, Soroca judet was budgeted to raise 32 percent of its total revenues from own sources (excluding PIT) while 
Chisinau judet was budgeted at half that or 16 percent (See Table A.3.3).  
Coefficient of vertical imbalance = 1 - (total subnational resources under subnational 
control / total subnational expenditures) 
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Box 4.1 
Vertical Imbalances and Revenue Adequacy 
 
          One common problem when a decentralization policy is implemented is determining the level 
of resources that is “adequate” for the delivery of subnational government services.  Determining the 
adequate level of funding is often a cause for contention between the central and subnational levels 
of government.  
  
          Given the scarcity of economic resources, revenue adequacy and vertical balance should be 
interpreted within the context of the overall public sector budget constraint.  Therefore, it is advisable 
to define what constitutes ”adequate resources” on the bases of a national dialogue with participation 
of all stakeholders.  Although perfect consensus is unlikely to be reached, the dialogue can protect 
subnational governments from the central governments using decentralization as a way to push down 
responsibilities just to solve its own fiscal shortcomings, and also as a way to facilitate the role of the 
central authorities by increasing solidarity and making subnational governments more aware of the 
existing national, overall fiscal constraints.  
 
 
 
Horizontal imbalances  
 
Horizontal imbalances arise from existing fiscal disparities across subnational jurisdictions. 
Subnational governments generally have different tax capacities or abilities to raise revenues through 
their assigned taxes at standard rates because they differ in their economic bases. Differences in 
economic base across regions are a common and natural occurrence. Regional variations in economic 
conditions tend to encourage labor and capital to move from less productive regions towards more 
productive regions. Some of this migration enhance the more productive use of national resources 
and, therefore, excessive fiscal equalization may thwart overall economic growth in the country. 
 
In Moldova there exist substantial disparities in tax collections per capita across judets 
(Chapter 3).  Tables 4.1 to 4.3 show planned tax collections per capita for different taxes for 2000 
trough 2002, respectively.73 Total per capita collections from shared revenues in Chisinau 
municipality in 2002 was planned to be 11.5 times larger than in Orhei judet and, for PIT per capita 
revenues, the difference between Chisinau municipality and Tighina judet was 15.7 fold (Table 3.3). 
Notice that the existence of fiscal disparities in Moldova is largely caused by the differences between 
Chisinau municipality and the rest of the country. However, excluding Chisinau municipality some 
disparities, although in a much lesser extent, still remain. For example,  in 2002, total per capita 
collections from shared revenues in Balti judets were planned at over 2.5 times those in Orhei judet, 
and per capita PIT revenues in Balti judet were planned at 2.7 times those in Tighina judet.74 Tax 
disparities may arise for reasons other than economic differences. For instance, differences in the 
density of population in combination with value assessments—still not based on market prices—may 
lead to disparities in per capita property tax and land tax revenues. 
                                                 
73 Note that the column heading in these tables referring to “collections” (the first four columns) includes all revenues 
collected on that tax in the judet regardless of the level of government that eventually got the tax revenues. All the other 
columns in these tables refer to revenues actually appropriated by the local governments.  
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Horizontal fiscal imbalances may also exist because of disparities across subnational 
jurisdictions in expenditure needs. The differences in needs may arise from either different prices or 
costs of service provision or different shares of the population with special needs. For example, it is 
likely that the unit costs of provision are higher in the larger cities than in rural areas. In 2000, the 20 
percent share of elderly population in Edinet judet was twice the level in Chisinau municipality; the 
infant mortality rate in Cahul judet is twice that ATU Gagauzia; and the average monthly salary is 
2.4 times that in Tighina judet (Table A.4.1 in the Statistical Appendix). The most recently available 
data for 2000 shows that there are still significant disparities in needs, infrastructure and expenditures 
per capita across judets in education and health, the two most important expenditure categories at the 
subnational level. . See Graphs 1 and 2.  
 
 In summary, there are both vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances in Moldova. Although 
the direction of the vertical fiscal imbalance seems uncertain (if against the central or the subnational 
governments)— because it depends on the measurement criterion utilized—it is clear however that 
the inadequate level of revenue autonomy can leave local governments unable to fulfill all the 
expenditure responsibilities (on the quantity and standard) that they are assigned with. The need to 
improve revenue assignments in Moldova to provide subnational governments with more tax 
autonomy was discussed in the previous Chapter. There are multiple sources of horizontal 
imbalances in Moldova.  The paragraphs below, concentrate on how the current system of fiscal 
decentralization addresses the problem of horizontal imbalances through equalization transfers, how 
effective these have been, and how they can be reformed to improve the system.  
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Graph 2 Healthcare Regional Profiles
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Table 4.1 
Equalization Effect of Revenue Sharing and Transfers Distribution, 
Per Capita Collections and Revenues According to Plan 2000 
Collections from Shared Revenues
 CIT VAT Road Tax
Total Collections 
from Shared 
Revenues 
Local Budget 
Revenues from 
Shared Taxes PIT 
Other Local Own 
Revenues 
Local Budget 
Revenues from 
Transfers 
Revenues of 
Local Budgets 
after Transfers
  1. Balti 38.6 129.1 7.3 175.0 35.9 47.1 88.7 88.6 260.4 
  2. Cahul 13.6 49.0 7.9 70.6 25.5 27.5 84.6 161.8 299.4 
  3. Chisinau 13.9 59.0 6.5 79.4 27.9 20.7 56.5 185.5 290.5 
  4. Edinet 15.8 119.9 9.8 145.6 36.8 40.5 125.7 70.5 273.5 
  5. Lapusna 14.5 36.4 7.1 58.0 21.7 30.0 98.7 151.9 302.4 
  6. Orhei 26.7 87.0 4.9 118.6 41.9 22.0 85.2 180.9 330.0 
  7. Soroca 25.2 49.5 6.5 81.1 30.7 45.1 97.1 110.2 283.1 
  8. Taraclia 17.2 33.3 7.5 58.0 22.3 28.2 119.2 136.6 306.4 
  9. Tighina 10.6 42.7 4.8 58.1 20.5 17.5 101.7 214.3 354.1 
 10. Ungheni 25.1 69.9 5.4 100.4 36.2 26.9 61.7 167.6 292.4 
 11. UTA Gagauzia 27.9 79.7 6.2 113.9 110.8 55.0 97.2 44.1 307.0 
 12. Mun. Chisinau 157.9 320.2 18.8 496.9 120.4 196.1 119.4 0.0 435.9 
Average 32.3 89.6 7.7 129.6 44.2 46.4 94.6 126.0 311.3 
Coefficient of Variation 1.252 0.881 0.484 0.937 0.771 1.047 0.226 0.510 0.149 
Correlation with per 
Capita Total Collections 
from Shared Revenues 0.978* 0.994* 0.916* 1.000* 0.750* 0.966* 0.357 -0.730* 0.717* 
Correlation with per 
Capita Local Own 
Revenues, Excluding PIT 0.328 0.356 0.512 0.357 0.267 0.426 1.000 -0.555 0.334 
Correlation with per 
Capita Local Revenues 
from PIT 0.981* 0.939* 0.935* 0.966* 0.795* 1.000 0.426* -0.780* 0.748* 
* Correlation is statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
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Table 4.2 
Equalization Effect of Revenue Sharing and Transfers Distribution, 
Per Capita Collections and Revenues According to Plan 2001 
Collections from Shared Revenues
 CIT VAT Road Tax
Total Collections 
from Shared 
Revenues 
Local Budget 
Revenues from 
Shared Taxes PIT 
Other Local Own 
Revenues 
Local Budget 
Revenues from 
Transfers 
Revenues of Local 
Budgets after 
Transfers 
  1. Balti 43.6 164.1 9.0 216.7 212.2 49.5 108.8 45.5 416.0 
  2. Cahul 16.8 50.8 7.3 74.9 71.3 21.0 100.5 158.8 351.5 
  3. Chisinau 15.7 41.2 5.5 62.4 59.7 20.9 57.9 186.2 324.7 
  4. Edinet 21.1 59.6 5.6 86.3 83.5 21.1 116.4 89.1 310.1 
  5. Lapusna 17.4 46.1 5.4 68.9 66.1 18.4 100.6 157.7 342.9 
  6. Orhei 26.4 40.0 4.9 71.4 68.9 19.8 91.8 139.8 320.2 
  7. Soroca 28.4 65.1 8.1 101.6 97.6 37.2 111.3 89.6 335.8 
  8. Taraclia 46.0 43.1 7.5 96.7 92.9 30.2 130.3 95.3 348.6 
  9. Tighina 15.0 42.4 5.4 62.9 60.2 14.1 112.6 139.6 326.6 
 10. Ungheni 28.2 39.4 4.6 72.2 69.9 21.2 64.8 179.4 335.3 
 11. UTA Gagauzia 37.2 119.8 6.8 163.9 160.5 37.2 126.2 43.1 367.0 
 12. mun. Chisinau 269.0 409.5 19.2 697.7 185.1 243.4 116.8 73.5 618.7 
Average 47.1 93.4 7.5 148.0 102.3 44.5 103.2 116.5 366.5 
Coefficient of Variation 1.502 1.142 0.529 1.212 0.517 1.426 0.216 0.430 0.229 
Correlation with per 
Capita Total Collections 
from Shared Revenues 0.983* 0.993* 0.972* 1.000 0.702* 0.992* 0.294 -0.471 0.988* 
Correlation with per 
Capita Local Own 
Revenues, Excluding PIT 0.259 0.308 0.361 0.294 0.452 0.250 1.000 -0.787* 0.271 
Correlation with per 
Capita Local Revenues 
from PIT 0.995* 0.971* 0.973* 0.992* 0.615* 1.000 0.250 -0.392 0.975* 
* Correlation is statistically significant at 5 percent level 
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Table 4.3 
Equalization Effect of Revenue Sharing and Transfers Distribution, 
Per Capita Collections and Revenues According to Plan 2002 
Collections from Shared 
Revenues 
 CIT VAT Road Tax
Total Collections 
from Shared 
Revenues 
Local Budget 
Revenues from 
Shared Taxes PIT 
Other Local Own 
Revenues 
Local Budget 
Revenues from 
Transfers 
Revenues of Local 
Budgets after 
Transfers 
  1. Balti 49.5 158.4 8.0 215.9 211.9 57.4 132.6 44.8 446.8 
  2. Cahul 34.1 57.7 4.7 96.4 94.1 28.8 147.2 222.5 492.7 
  3. Chisinau 34.0 57.6 4.7 96.3 93.9 29.8 73.0 255.7 452.5 
  4. Edinet 28.1 70.2 5.3 103.5 100.9 25.6 128.4 161.2 416.1 
  5. Lapusna 24.8 56.7 4.9 86.4 84.0 24.5 128.6 252.2 489.2 
  6. Orhei 26.4 52.7 4.9 84.0 81.6 27.0 106.7 230.1 445.4 
  7. Soroca 30.6 89.9 7.9 128.4 124.5 34.4 130.4 156.8 446.0 
  8. Taraclia 51.7 38.8 7.8 98.3 94.4 38.8 158.2 194.0 485.4 
  9. Tighina 24.7 58.9 5.0 88.7 86.2 21.2 137.4 238.2 483.1 
 10. Ungheni 29.0 57.9 4.2 91.2 89.0 23.2 88.0 278.6 478.8 
 11. UTA Gagauzia 37.2 145.9 8.1 191.2 187.2 43.5 127.3 157.7 515.5 
 12. mun. Chisinau 294.6 666.1 15.4 976.0 221.6 333.0 201.2 0.0 755.8 
Average 55.4 125.9 6.7 188.0 122.4 57.3 129.9 182.7 492.3 
Coefficient of Variation 1.369 1.384 0.461 1.339 0.430 1.527 0.252 0.469 0.178 
Correlation with per 
Capita Total Collections 
from Shared Revenues 0.990* 0.998* 0.924* 1.000 0.722* 0.997* 0.698* -0.771* 0.938* 
Correlation with per 
Capita Local Own 
Revenues, Excluding PIT 0.712* 0.685* 0.770* 0.698* 0.508 0.704* 1.000* -0.689* 0.710* 
Correlation with per 
Capita Local Revenues 
from PIT 0.998* 0.990* 0.915* 0.997* 0.674* 1.000 0.704* -0.742* 0.943* 
* Correlation is statistically significant at 5 percent level 
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B.   THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF EQUALIZATION TRANSFERS 
 
Gap-filling transfers  
 
After independence, Moldova has continued to use a version of the gap-filling transfers in 
combination with “regulating” tax revenues that were used in the former Soviet Union to address 
horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances. This system, as most recently incorporated in the Law on 
Public Finance, is used for the financial relationships between the central and the intermediate level 
governments (i.e., judets, or districts), and between these latter and local governments (i.e., 
municipalities/primarias). The essence of this approach is to provide gap-filling transfers to those 
lower-level jurisdictions which show a budget gap between estimated expenditures and forecasted 
revenues from own and shared sources.75 The planned transfers for 2000 and 2001 are shown in 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. All intermediate level governments, except Chisinau municipality, 
receive an equalization transfer.  As there are significant fiscal disparities between  Chisinau 
municipality and the rest of the country, fiscal equalization in Moldova means shifting collected 
resources from Chisinau  municipality towards the other jurisdictions.  
Table 4.4 
Transfers from the State Budget to Judet Budgets in 2000 (planned) 
 
Administrative territorial unit thousand lei 
Balti 
Cahul 
Chisinau 
Edinet 
Lapusna 
Orhei 
Soroca 
Taraclia 
Tighina 
Ungheni 
ATU Gagauzia 
Total 
44,760 
30,870 
70,880 
27,100 
42,860 
54,890 
30,630 
6,340 
36,370 
43,400 
7,100 
388,200 
    Source: 2000 Budget Law, Ministry of Finance 
                                                 
75 For the computation of transfers, the Ministry of Finance develops expenditure estimates for each judet based on an 
explicit methodology that incorporates expenditures per capita and demographic information, such as the number of 
students. On the revenue side, the Ministry of Finance also makes estimates of shared taxes and own revenues, and 
discusses them with the judets governments. When revenue estimates exceed expenditure estimates, the Ministry of 
Finance regulates (ex-ante) revenue sharing by providing  subnational governments with a smaller share of  state taxes. 
(This has been the case of Chisinau municipality over the last several years.)  Also, ex-post, territorial units whose actual 
per capita revenue exceeds by 20% the per capita expenditure average norm, looses the excess in favor of the “Fund for 
the Financial Support of the Territories.” (Law on Local Public Finance, # 491/99, Arts. 8a. and 9.1.b)  When estimated 
revenues are less than estimated expenditures, the subnational government gets a transfer from the state budget. Judets are 
supposed to follow the same methodology with their municipalities/primarias.  
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     Table 4.5 
Transfers from the Fund for Financial Support of Territories 
to the Budgets of Administrative-Territorial Units in 2001 (planned) 
 
Administrative territorial unit thousand lei 
Cahul 
Chisinau 
Edinet 
Lapusna 
Orhei 
Soroca 
Taraclia 
Tighina 
Ungheni 
ATU Gagauzia 
 
Total 
30,300 
71,160 
25,400 
44,510 
42,410 
24,920 
4,420 
23,690 
46,450 
6,940 
 
320,200 
  Source: 2001 Budget Law, Ministry of Finance 
 
 
 The main problem with the system of gap-filling subventions, also shared by the 
“regulating” approach to revenue sharing, is the potential negative incentives created for subnational 
revenue mobilization. Clearly, if any subnational government increases its effort to mobilize 
revenues, the result is reduced gap-filling transfers or reduced tax sharing rates in future years.  
Similarly, if any subnational government makes an effort to reduce the costs of delivering public 
services, thereby reducing expenditures and the budget gap, in the future the budget would likely 
include reduced transfers or reduced revenue sharing. In either case, the benefits of higher tax effort 
or the frugality and efficiency on the expenditure side of the budget would not be entirely 
internalized by those territorial units that exercised those efforts, but instead shared with the 
inefficient ones. Clearly, the system of incentives provided by the current system of equalization 
transfers in Moldova is inadequate and should be reformed. The government and the rest of the 
stakeholders are quite aware of the problem. For example, the methodology employed by the 
Ministry of Finance leaves out collections from local fees in the computation of the fiscal gap. This is 
an explicit acknowledgement of the negative incentive effects of the system. But this is not enough, 
since collections from local taxes are indeed included in those computations. Moldova needs an 
objective, formula-driven transfer system to go with the reform of revenue assignments that address 
horizontal and vertical imbalances, and at the same time does not discourage local optimization of 
expenditure and mobilization of revenue. 
 
It must be noted that the norms used nowadays in the calculation of expenditure needs are 
structured mostly on a per client basis—number of students, population etc. (See Chapter 2). This 
methodological approach avoids, for the most part, the inefficient incentives caused in the past by the 
use of norms based on capacity, such as number of schools or number of hospital beds. 
 
Another problem with the gap filling equalization transfers in Moldova is that they have not 
been used as lump sum or unconditional grants, as is the rule with all equalization grants in 
decentralized systems and, it appears, is the nature of these transfers in Moldova’s organic laws. 
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Rather, these transfers have been used as conditional grants. For example, the Budget Law for 2001 
clearly states that the “fund for financial support of territories to the budgets of administrative-
territorial units,” i.e., the equalization grants shall be used “…70 percent for the payment of salaries 
in the area of education, health care and culture, and transfers into the social security budget and  30 
percent for the payment of used energy resources and other expenses made by financial institutions 
from the corresponding budgets.” It would appear that many subnational governments did not respect 
the conditionality imposed on these funds on the basis of the general principle that these transfers 
should be unconditional. These conflictive views of the transfers led to friction between the 
parliament and the central authorities with judet councils and were ultimately behind the removal of 
budget execution authority for the judet councils in 2001 (Law 496, June 2001) and, quite likely, 
behind the elimination of the judets and re-introduction of the rayons in 2002.    
 
Performance of the Equalization Transfers  
 
At least on the basis of planned data, it seems that the intentions of the Ministry of Finance 
have been to use the gap-filling transfers to equalize expenditures per capita across judets (Tables 4.1 
to 4.3).  Disparities in the availability of fiscal resources in 2000, 2001 and 2002 would have been 
significantly reduced via transfers and “regulation” in revenue sharing.  The first four columns in 
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 present per capita tax collection by judet for the CIT, VAT and roads and their sum, 
regardless of the level of government to which they will be appropriate. Therefore, these figures 
represent the potential extent of fiscal disparities coming from these tax sources. The coefficients of 
variation are relatively high for VAT, CIT and “total collections from shared revenues,” at, for 
example, 1.3 in 2002. The fifth column (“local budget revenues from shared taxes”) shows the 
impact of the tax assignment policy.  During the period, there was a significant drop in the 
coefficients of variation for local revenues from shared taxes (from 0.77 to 0.43) vis-à-vis that for the 
CIT or VAT. This means that the regulation of taxes in Moldova has had an equalizing effect. 
  More interesting to us here is the equalizing impact of the gap-filling transfers. First, as 
shown in Tables 4.1 to 4.3, the correlation coefficient between planned transfers to the judets 
from 2000 to 2002 and shared revenues, own revenues, and separately PIT revenues is in all 
three cases negative, quite large, and most of the time statistically significant. The larger the 
availability of other sources of revenue the smaller the size of the equalization transfer. This 
means that there is a policy of trying to equalize the availability of funds across local 
governments Second, the coefficient of variation for subnational revenues after transfers is much 
smaller, for example, 0.15 in 2000 or 0.18 in 2002, than the coefficient of variation for all other 
sources of revenues, including PIT revenues, at 1.5 in 2002, and shared revenues, at 0.43 also in 
2002. This means that the government equalizing intentions should be effective in achieving 
results. At least on the bases of planned data, and despite the negotiations involved and the risk 
that the central authorities may be influenced or swayed by the politically more powerful 
jurisdictions, the impact of the gap filling transfers appears to be equalizing. Therefore, even 
though the current system of transfers faults on several accounts, it is not failing to equalize per 
capita revenues and expenditures across territorial units.    
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C.   MAIN ISSUES 
 
The current transfer system in Moldova tends to be ineffective, since it lacks a simple, sound 
paradigm to encourage local tax effort and efficiency in public expenditures.  The current mechanism 
still embodies undesirable features, such as negotiation and discretion in the determination of the size 
and distribution of transfer funds, negative incentives represented by the claw-back of “excess” 
revenue, a “fraternal” approach that generates dissatisfaction among territorial units, confusing 
conditionality attached to the equalization grants, absence of complementary regular special purpose 
transfer mechanism, and unregulated transfers from judet to the primarias.  
 
Negotiation and discretion 
 
Despite the methodology expanded in the Law on Local Public Finance, in practice, as 
expected from the actual financial constraints, the system has worked in a discretionary manner, with 
the Ministry of Finance indirectly limiting transfers by “regulating” the expenditure norms and tax 
sharing rates and “negotiating” individually with each judet the “gap-fill” transfer. Consequently, the 
system of transfers has lacked transparency and objectivity. It should be emphasized that the problem 
does not necessarily lie in the amount of funds available for transfers, but rather in the manner in 
which this amount is adjusted and distributed. The entire process should rest on rules, both for the 
determination of the overall pool of funds to be distributed and for how the funds will be distributed.  
Admittedly, better data availability, and macroeconomic and overall budget balance conditions may 
demand sporadic adjustments to the level of funding and in the distribution formula.      
 
Negative incentives remain 
 
Although the methodology currently used — the difference between expenditure needs based 
on per capita norms and forecasted revenues for shared and own taxes—is an improvement over past 
practices, it has not eliminated the negative incentives to revenue mobilization.  Also, it has been 
argued that the negative incentives toward revenue mobilization are minimized because subnational 
governments, except for Chisinau municipality, share since 2001 all the major taxes (VAT, CIT and 
PIT) at 100 percent. However, this argument ignores that if the territorial unit collects more in shared 
or own taxes, then it may get less than the 100 percent of revenue sharing (and of transfers) in the 
future.   Also the exclusion of local fees in the computation of the budget gap only partially deals 
with negative incentives, since those local governments that undertake a bigger effort to collect fees 
may end up receiving less transfers in future.76 
 
Dissatisfaction  with the “fraternal” system 
 
Besides being subject to negotiation and entailing negative incentives to revenue 
mobilization, the current system of gap-filling equalization grants has had serious perception 
problems among subnational governments, such as:  
                                                 
76 The evidence available appears to indicate that the higher the own local revenues per capita (excluding PIT) the lower 
the transfers per capita received by the judet budget. (See correlation coefficients for these two variables in Tables 4.1 to 
4.3).  
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(i) Transfers are perceived as being too unstable from year to year, discouraging efficient 
planning by subnational governments;  
(ii) The formal “fraternal” approach77 to funding the pool of equalization funds has created 
political friction and lack of national solidarity. Fraternal funding may also have a 
negative impact on the overall collection effort because of the discontent it tends to 
generate among donor jurisdictions, from which revenues are explicitly taken away.  
(iii) There continues to be a perception among subnational governments that the “virtual” 
expenditure norms used in the computation of the fiscal gap ought to be norms that are 
adequate for funding the expenditure responsibilities of the subnational governments. 
However, quite clearly the expenditure norms used by the Ministry of Finance could not 
under the present economic circumstances be anywhere near the level that subnational 
governments would consider adequate or else there would be a very significant budget 
deficit at the central level. Thus, the approach to determination of transfers based on 
expenditure norms continues to create a sense of insensitivity and injustice toward 
subnational governments.  
(iv) There has been little clarity on whether amounts specified in the state budget for transfers 
to subnational governments are actually guaranteed to subnational governments. In 
reality, the actual transfer amounts are changed during budget execution according to the 
actual performance of the state budget. But it appears that subnational governments often 
have perceived these adjustments as cheating by the central authorities.78   
 
Conditionality in equalization transfers 
 
 If equalization transfers in Moldova could be correctly conceived as unconditional (general 
funding) grants, their final use should conceptually be left to the discretion of local governments.79 
However, in practice, this principle has not been respected and /or its exercise by local governments 
has led to political problems. The use of expenditure norms in the computation of the transfers 
appears to have created the expectation at the central level that local governments (judets) would 
need to use the transferred funds to finance the expenditures represented in the expenditure norms. In 
recent years the annual state budget law has imposed priorities on judets for how to use the funds 
from equalization grants. However, there is little question that the best practice, and also the most 
common, is to ensure that equalization grants are general purpose or unconditional grants—i.e., 
grants provided to subnational governments without strings attached.  
 
 A formula is often used to allocate unconditional block grants among local governments. One 
main problem is that the central authorities may want to pursue multiple objectives with the current 
equalization grants. It will be more effective to use the equalization grants exclusively for equalizing 
fiscal disparities across regions, making it explicit what is to be equalized and how.  The objective of 
                                                 
77 This has also been called the Robin Hood approach to funding transfers. The current methodology in Moldova explicitly 
takes from the richer judets, any amount that exceeds 20 percent of the difference between “normed” expenditure needs 
and forecasted revenues, and gives the funds to the poorer judets. This practice has meant that Chisinau municipality has 
contributed to practically all the rest of the other territorial units in the country.  
78 This is a common problem in decentralized systems. In some countries, for example Russia, the central authorities 
guarantee subnational governments the budgeted amounts for equalization transfers. More often, central authorities change 
actual amounts for transfers according to the actual performance of the executed budget. For example, the central 
government will distribute a fixed percentage of actually collected revenues as opposed to budgeted revenues. At any rate, 
it is important that subnational governments understand the rules and plan their own budgets accordingly.    
79  The Law on Local Public Finance seems ambiguous in this case.  See, for instance, Arts. 8 and 9. 
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closing vertical imbalances in resources and responsibilities between different levels of governments 
should be pursued via improved revenue assignments. Although revenue sharing and other forms of 
transfers can be used to reduce vertical imbalances (Chapter 3), the most effective way to address 
vertical imbalances is by providing subnational governments with an adequate measure of tax 
autonomy. The special status of some regions, such as ATU Gagauzia, should continue to be 
addressed outside the general framework of equalization grants. The same is true for any special 
treatment due to Chisinau municipality as capital city. 
 
Absence of other transfer instruments  
 
A significant feature of Moldova’s system of transfers is the dominance played by the gap-
filling equalization transfers and the practically non-existence of other types of transfers. Some 
special budget allocations, which could be considered conditional transfers, do exist. For example, 
some judets assign budget resources to isolated local governments on an individual basis for public 
work projects, such as water services. The central government may also assign sporadically similar 
funds to the judets. However, in practically all cases these are small and typically done on an ad hoc 
basis. An important task ahead for the system of transfers in Moldova is the development of 
conditional matching and non-matching grants for both recurrent and capital expenditures. The 
introduction of a selective system of conditional grants—combined with an (on) lending window 
(Chapter 5)—can be quite effective to promote the financing of national priorities at local level. 
Funding for these conditional grants would have to come from the re-centralization of some taxes, 
but they could also come from funds now allocated to line ministries for development programs in 
the territory. 
 
Unregulated transfers from judet to the primarias 
 
This segment of the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has not worked properly for 
the same reasons that the system of transfers between the center and the judets has flawed. But there 
is an additional element of complexity added here because of the history of mistrust and sometimes 
abuse between middle level and local governments. As discussed in Chapter 1, Moldova has 
preserved a highly hierarchical arrangement between the middle and lower level governments. As 
discussed in more detail in the next section, there are two possible approaches for addressing this 
issue. One approach would be to bypass the intermediate level government from any type of fiscal 
authority over local governments, and put in place direct revenue sharing rules and formula driven 
transfers from the central government to the local governments as well. Besides the obvious 
advantages in transparency and predictability, this approach (of direct sharing rules and formula) 
would avoid the nonsense of reintroducing a system that would involve negotiation between the 
Ministry of Finance officials and the over 600 local governments in the country. A second approach 
would keep the current hierarchical relationship between the intermediate level and local 
governments, but this relationship would be fully structured or mandated in the law with explicit 
revenue sharing rules and formula driven transfers.   
  
In summary, although the current gap-filling system of transfers may have some 
advantages (flexibility and macroeconomic stability) it does not compensate for the flaws. The 
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design of a system of equalization transfers, besides allowing for the central government policy 
flexibility and macroeconomic stability, should at the same time improve the incentives, 
predictability, transparency and objectivity for the adequate fiscal management of local 
governments.  This will require a re-examination of current equalization transfers, and the 
government should consider developing a complementary system of conditional grants as well.  
 
 
D. OPTIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THE TRANSFER SYSTEM 
 
The thrust of the reform 
 
The reform of the system of transfers should involve the following two fundamental thrusts.  
a. The current system of gap-filling and negotiated equalization transfers should be 
abandoned for a formula-driven system of equalization grants. The latter would 
comprise an explicit and stable rule to establish the pool of equalization funds and a 
stable and explicit formula used to distribute those funds. The formula will equalize 
fiscal disparities among judets and primarias on the basis of differences in 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The pool of funds available for equalization 
purposes will depend on whether or not, and the extent to which the central 
government introduces a system of conditional grants.  
b. The introduction of conditional grants, especially for education and heath. The 
government should also consider the introduction of other conditional grants, with 
and without matching provisions, in other functional areas and to pursue other central 
government objectives. The latter would include the funding of programs of social 
assistance at the local level, grants for capital infrastructure, and others. The use of 
matching arrangements, whereby the central and local governments jointly participate 
in the financing of the program, are more conducive to the efficient use of resources 
because they introduce the right incentives for the local ownership of programs.  
 
Unconditional equalization grants.  
 
The government should give serious consideration to creating a Regional Equalization Fund, 
based on the set aside of the CIT and VAT revenues, as indicated in chapter 3. The fundamental steps 
the government would need to take to reform the system of transfers are summarized in Box 4.2. An 
advantage of a Regional Equalization Fund, based on effectively collected taxes, is that it would 
objectively establish a sustainable limit for the total amount of transfers to be distributed.80  With 
regard to the distribution formula itself, it should be designed carefully, so that efficiency and equity 
are guaranteed in the system. 
 
The essence of an equalization transfer system is to compensate for fiscal disparities across 
local governments. Fiscal disparities arise from differences in fiscal capacity and/or expenditure 
needs. On the one hand, tax capacity should ideally be measured by the size of the tax bases available 
                                                 
80 In this case the determination of the degree of equalization would be automatically embodied in the system.  At the 
beginning of the system’s implementation, the desirable degree of equalization can also be calibrated by adjusting the 
ratios of the shared taxes entering the Fund, or by adding new sources of resources to the Fund. 
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to subnational governments or the revenue that these tax bases would yield under standard tax rates. 
A variety of methods are used around the world to measure fiscal capacity of subnational 
governments. These include per capita income, gross regional product, and statistical methods to 
calculate the amount of revenue that a local government would collect if it were to exert average 
fiscal effort by applying the average tax rate for the entire country to the respective standard tax base 
of the local government.  On the other hand, the expenditure needs of a local government can be 
defined as the funding necessary to cover all expenditure responsibilities assigned to the region at a 
standard level of service provision. In practice, this can be measured from the bottom up with norms, 
but this method presents an array of problems. A simpler and more commonly used approach is to 
estimate some type of index of relative expenditure need as the weighted sum of demographic factors 
including population, special needs of the young and the elderly, the level of poverty and 
unemployment, and differences in the price level or cost of living. 
 
In any case, simplicity and objectivity should guide the formulation of a feasible and lasting 
Equalization Transfer Mechanism.  Thereby, the central government may consider discontinuing the 
current micromanagement and avoiding being intrusive in local matters.  In this sense, equalization 
transfers should be made unconditional.   This would allow the central government to use its scarce 
technical capacity more rationally for the macroeconomic management and the overall control of the 
system, and would give the opportunity to make the local authorities accountable (before the law and 
the citizens) for local issues.  In this regard, the regular equalization transfer mechanism should be 
seen exclusively as an instrument for fiscal equalization, instead of being seen as an instrument to 
solve all sorts of intergovernmental fiscal issues.  Indeed, even the size of the Regional Equalization 
Fund will essentially reflect the desired level of horizontal equalization across regions.  Beyond that, 
issues related to vertical imbalances in general, sporadic regional fiscal problems, or delegation of 
specific central government competences to specific subnational governments should be managed 
through other special transfer/grants instruments. 
 
All in all, the regular equalization transfer should always be treated as a general purpose 
grant, and be made on a non-conditional basis, leaving the final use of funds to be decided by the 
local authorities. Over time, under proper legislation and transparency rules, this criterion tends to 
encourage local authorities to be accountable to the local population. Other specific needs, in some 
ways reflecting national interest—e.g., special programs for encouraging expenditures in basic 
education, combating contagious diseases, for reducing absolute poverty, for assisting in local 
emergencies and calamities—should be treated by the central government complementarily, through 
different instruments such as matching or non-matching conditional grants.  The remaining vertical 
imbalances issue should be resolved in the context of a  sufficient degree local revenue autonomy. 
 
 
 
Box 4.2 
Fundamental Steps for Reforming the System of Transfers 
 
 
The reform of the system of transfers in Moldova may require a series of steps, including to: 
 
• Make clear that equalization transfers are unconditional grants, and that conditional grants 
will be used to pursue defined objectives of the central government, such as financing 
minimum levels of education and health services. 
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• Decide whether local governments should depend for their transfers on the intermediate level 
government, or if the transfers to local governments should be administered directly by the 
central authorities.81   
• Explicitly identify how much equalization should be pursued. Should differences in 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity be closed fully or should the system encourage revenue 
mobilization and keep some additional resources in faster growing regions?  
• Determine the funding mechanism for conditional grants and equalization transfers 
separately, avoiding a “fraternal” mechanism (funded among the judets themselves).  The 
Regional Equalization Fund and the funding for the conditional grants can be financed by 
centralizing (or setting aside) the proceeds (or a percentage) of several major taxes, including 
the VAT and the CIT.    
• Consider the introduction of rules for the determination of the conditional grants and the 
equalization pool at both the judet and primaria levels. This can be done in an objective and 
stable basis as, for example, a percentage of central government tax revenue, or of certain 
taxes, with this percentage regulated by organic law and/or being computed as some moving 
average of actual collection of a number of years.  
• Use formulas explicitly stated in the organic law for the division of the equalization funds 
among intermediate level and local governments. Equalization formulas should support a fair 
allocation of resources by providing more resources to local governments with lower tax 
capacity and greater fiscal needs. Equalization formulas should be stable over a period of 
years to promote revenue predictability, should be simple and transparent, should be 
understandable to all stakeholders, should be impermeable to political manipulation or 
negotiation in any of its aspects, and should provide the right incentives for revenue 
mobilization by local governments 
• Consider whether to introduce reforms “cold turkey”, or whether to introduce some sort of 
“hold harmless” provision.  This is fundamentally a political choice, the former usually being 
a harder strategy to sell and sustain.  Alternatively, a “hold harmless” provision would phase-
in the new transfer system over a number of years to smooth out the transition to the new 
regime and typically make the changes in regional funding more politically acceptable.  The 
international experience has shown that a “hold harmless” provision can smooth out the most 
significant political opposition to the reforms.  
 
 
Special purpose conditional grants 
 
A source of friction in the system of intergovernmental finances of Moldova in the recent 
past has been the different priority given to social sector expenditures by the central and sub national 
governments. Apparently, the central authorities have wished that judets and primarias had channeled 
more funds to the education and health sectors. Subnational governments have countered that they 
simply have exercised their constitutional rights to make their own decisions. Ultimately this has 
been a conflict between two important objectives: preserving local autonomy and giving (more) 
expenditure priority to areas of national importance. The creation of a system of special purpose 
                                                 
81  While the former (i.e., the current system) simplifies tasks for the Ministry of Finance, its recent 
history of disappointments would suggest that an alternative direct system of transfers to the local 
governments, bypassing the intermediate level of government, may better ensure that the central 
government objectives are met. 
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conditional grants for health, education—and possibly other areas as well—from the central to sub 
national governments, may be a reasonable compromising solution between those two objectives.   
 
These conditional grants should be computed on a “capitation basis” (i.e., per student and per 
inhabitant).82 The use of per-client conditional grants for education and health would offer several 
other advantages. First, these grants would be inherently equalizing, thus addressing another major 
goal of the decentralization system. Second, because these would be block grants, local authorities 
still would be able to exercise budgetary autonomy in terms of expenditure priorities (within 
education and health) and the most efficient method of service delivery.83 Given the massive 
importance of education and health expenditures in local budgets, the adoption of this system of 
conditional grants would have drastic implications for the rest of the system of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. Therefore, this decision would need to be carefully weighted.  Assuming the same 
overall allocation for social service provision, it will imply that revenue sharing of State taxes with 
local governments (and the equalization transfers) should be significantly reduced. This scenario is 
illustrated below in a series of simulations.  
 
The use of conditional grants for education and health on a per client basis will not actually 
be a radical departure from current budgetary practices. Every year the Ministry of Finance already 
determines expenditure norms for education and health for the purpose of figuring out the level of 
equalization transfers to judet governments, and that the latter, in principle, should repeat the process 
with the primarias. Judets and primarias share most expenditure responsibilities for public education 
and health services (Chapter 2).  However, the government should preserve the conceptual distinction 
between the expenditure norms and the conditional grants.  Mixing them up invariably leads to 
major disagreements and disputes.  The former are only virtual devices used to measures total needs 
on the basis of average “per client” expenditures, but should not be confused with the fact that the 
local governments are free to decide where and how to spend the funds that they are legally entitled 
to. Conditional grants, on the other hand, would conceptually obligate subnational governments to 
spend the funds in the areas designed by the central authorities, but contractually or legally delegated 
to local authorities to implement.  
 
Administration of the new transfer system 
 
The government is now facing a fundamental decision on the administrative organization of 
the intergovernmental fiscal relations: whether the reformed equalization transfers and the new 
                                                 
82 The per-capita basis could be modified, if needed, by some adjustment coefficient to reflect different costs of provision 
or needs, but only as long as these adjustments can be made by formula and do not involve negotiation among central and 
local authorities. Preferably, the difference in needs arising, for example, from different levels and/or quality of 
infrastructure, would  be addressed by sectoral ministries using separate grants disbursed using a formula or objective 
criteria.  It should be emphasized that the presence of better and more modern facilities cannot be an acceptable argument 
to fund Chisinau municipality or other richer jurisdictions more than other poorer jurisdictions. Otherwise,  the system 
would be adding the inequity of providing less operating funds to those jurisdictions with already more inadequate 
physical facilities.  
83 It is important to emphasize that the conditional grants should not be made for economic categories of expenditure, such 
as wages and salaries. This approach would eliminate any of the advantages of a decentralized delivery and 
implementation system and the full centralization of those services would produce the same results. Naturally, for local 
governments to be able to increase efficiency in the delivery of services, it would also be necessary to reduce, if not 
eliminate, central government norms and mandates that interfere with their choices.  
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conditional grants will flow directly from the State budget to the local governments’ budgets 
(primarias and municipalities) or will still go through the judet budgets. 
 
This decision should be congruent with the choice made on the overall approach to 
organizing intergovernmental fiscal relation in Moldova. The choice (see Chapter 3) is between: (i) a 
hierarchical approach where the central government continues dealing exclusively with the 
territorial units (i.e., judets, Chisinau municipality, and ATU Gagauzia), and these latter with local 
governments (municipalities and primarias), and (ii) a bifurcated system where the central 
government deals simultaneously with both territorial units and local governments(see illustration in 
Figure 4.3).84  
                                                 
84  Actually, the role of the territorial units’ governments changes when the administrative organization of the 
transfers changes from a hierarchical to a bifurcated transfer system.  The justification for their controlling/ 
coordinating role tends to vanish in the latter system, while the justification for their very existence becomes more 
dependent on efficiency grounds, i.e. whether they can perform some functions (e.g., delivery of intermediate level 
of public goods and services) that require larger scale in operation. 
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E.  ILLUSTRATION OF A NEW SYSTEM OF TRANSFERS 
 
Assuming the reforms are in the direction of those suggested above, this section illustrates 
how a reformed system of transfers would look like.   Given the data limitations and the still tentative 
assumptions, the results of the simulations presented in this Section are, for the time being,  to be 
taken only as illustration of impacts of possible changes. Because of the lack of data for individual 
local governments at this point, the fiscal data are aggregated by subnational governments (territorial 
unit budgets and local budgets together).  
 
Two basic scenarios 
 
The simulations cover two basic scenarios and compare the results to those that would be 
obtained under the status quo (i.e., the “counterfactual”). The main assumptions behind the 
counterfactual and the two scenarios are summarized in Table 4.7. The counterfactual is simply the 
projection of how resources would be allocated in 2002 in Moldova using the policy rules proposed 
in the 2002 state budget law.  
 
The first scenario (Simulation 1) assumes that revenue sharing for the VAT, CIT and road tax 
are completely eliminated and the revenues from those taxes set aside into a  “Regional Transfer 
Fund.”  The rest of the revenue assignments stay the same as in the counterfactual, including 100 
Figure 4.3 
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percent sharing of the PIT by local governments. Expenditure assignments stay the same as in the 
counterfactual. The money in the “Regional Transfer Fund” is used for two purposes: first, to 
introduce a system of conditional grants for education and health, and second to fund a reformed 
equalization system. The level of funding dedicated to the conditional grants in education and health 
(the Education account and the Health account, respectively) are chosen so that the conditional grants 
can finance 50 percent of the expenditures in education and health programmed for 2000 as local 
budget expenditures on these items in the counterfactual. The level of funding available to implement 
the reformed equalization transfers (the Equalization account) is equal to the remaining funds left 
from the previously shared revenues after the conditional grants  (or The Regional Transfer Fund 
minus the Education and Health accounts) plus the funds already programmed for transfers in 2000 
the counterfactual.  
 
 
TABLE 4.7 
Simulating Different Systems of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: 
Assumptions of the different scenarios 
 
 Counterfactual Simulation 1 Simulation 2 
Own Source 
Revenues 
• PIT, Land Tax, 
Subsoil Tax, State Duty, 
Property Tax, Revenues 
from Privatization, Other 
Taxes 
• Same • Same 
Revenue Sharing • CIT –  100 % 
• VAT – 100 % 
• Road Tax – 50 % 
• Mun. Chisinau gets 
50% of CIT and 10% of 
VAT  
• None • CIT –  100 % 
(including for Chisinau 
Municipality) 
• VAT – 0 % 
• Road Tax – 50 % 
 
Conditional 
Transfers 
• None • Education Account 
and Health Account 
provides 50% of 
aggregate sectoral need 
• None 
Equalization 
Transfers 
• Negotiated Transfers  • Distributing the 
remaining funds on an 
equalizing basis  
• Distributing the 
Regional Fund on an 
equalizing basis 
 
The second scenario (Simulation 2) is quite similar to the first scenario except for a few 
additional assumptions. First, the only shared tax that is centralized is the VAT, with its revenues 
going into the “Regional Transfer Fund.”  The CIT and the road tax continue to be shared as in the 
counterfactual.  However, the sharing rates for the CIT are assumed homogenous, i.e. identical across 
all territorial units, so that Chisinau municipality does not get singled out or “regulated” with a lower 
sharing rate for the CIT.85 Second, the government decides not to introduce conditional transfers, but 
rather concentrates its efforts on a stronger equalization system. The size of the Equalization account 
(which now coincides with the size of the whole Regional Transfer Fund) in Simulation 2 is 
determined as the level of counterfactual VAT revenues plus the counterfactual transfers as 
programmed in the 2002 budget. 
 
                                                 
85 Chisinau municipality does not get discriminated against or regulated in terms of the VAT in simulation 1 or 2, since in 
both cases the VAT is assumed to be not shared.  
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Allocations and sources of funding under alternative scenarios 
 
The simulations are run under the assumption that the total level of funding for subnational 
governments remains the same in the two simulations and identical to the funding envelope in the 
counterfactual.  The different scenarios have different implications on the vertical fiscal imbalance 
and on the control of revenues. Table 4.8 shows how much own source revenues, shared revenues, 
conditional transfers and equalization transfers contribute in each scenario (Counterfactual, 
Simulation 1, and Simulation 2). 
 
 
 
The counterfactual estimates 
 
The first step in the simulations is to state the base case (i.e., the counterfactual values).  In 
the absence of the 2000 and 2001 executed budgets, the projected/ planned 2002 subnational 
revenues and expenditures were used as the counterfactual.  This offers the advantage of giving more 
contemporary relevance to the analysis, but the disadvantage of using planned budget data as 
opposed to actual data. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 give a detailed breakdown of the estimated counterfactual 
revenue and expenditures by source for each judet, in total and in per capita terms, respectively.  
They show the breakdown of the counterfactual budgets by main revenues sources and main 
expenditure function/ categories, and also provide basic descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Counter-
factual Sim 1 Sim 2
Counter-
factual Sim 1 Sim 2
Own Source Revenues 674456 674456 674456 35.3 35.3 35.3
Revenue Sharing 517873 0 340573 27.1 0.0 17.8
Conditional Transfers 0 665000 0 0.0 34.8 0.0
Equalization Transfers 540300 393173 717600 28.3 20.6 37.6
Current Transfers 177316 177316 177316 9.3 9.3 9.3
Total revenues 1909945 1909945 1909945 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  World Bank Staff estimates (see simulations below in this Section) based on budget data (Ministry of Finance)
In millions of Lei In percent of total
Table 4.8
 Allocations under Alternative Scenarios
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Table 4.9:  2002 Sub national Budgets 
Projection of counterfactual sources and allocation of resources 
(in millions of Lei) 
 
Territorial 
Unit 
Own 
Revenues 
of which 
PIT 
Shared 
Revenues 
of which 
VAT (*) 
Total 
Revenues
Intergov. 
Transfers 
Local 
Taxes Fees 
Total 
Revenues 
(incl. 
transfers) 
Total 
Expend. 
of which 
education
of which 
health 
Budget 
Balance
Balti 77 202 29 000 107 025 80 000 184 227 22 630 6 485 12 314 225 656 206 849 113 110 50 442 18 807 
Cahul 24145 5500 17950 11000 42095 42460 2438 7010 94003 84555.7 49 984 18666 9 447 
Chisinau 31816 11400 35900 22000 67716 97730 1520 5963 172929 165437.7 97 090 37118.5 7 491 
Edinet 38030 7300 28750 20000 66780 45950 3015 2850 118595 112726.3 56 680 29598 5 869 
Lapusna 32404 6900 23693 16000 56097 71160 3739 7059 138055 127252.2 73 968 27287.9 10 803 
Orhei 33108 8200 24750 16000 57858 69820 2517 4953 135148 127676.6 72 894 29891.2 7 471 
Soroca 37037 9550 34600 25000 71637 43590 3040 5730 123997 115225.9 61 760 28429.2 8 771 
Taraclia 7356 1800 4380 1800 11736 9000 462 1324 22522 20736.4 11 511.2 4567.3 1 786 
Tighina 22057 3600 14625 10000 36682 40430 1476 3390 81978 77105.9 42 975 16 717 4 872 
Ungheni 22548 6000 23050 15000 45598 72130 2355 3884 123967 117729.9 69 564.2 25784.1 6 237 
Gagauzia 
UTA 22635 7000 30150 23500 52785 25400 1365 3500 83050 78186.2 43 825.4 15 878.2 4 864 
Mun.Chisinau 326118 260000 173000 52000 499118 0 38990 51937 590045 499118 223 077.6 120 788.9 90 927 
Total 674 456 356 250 517 873 292 300 1 192 329 540 300 67 402 109 914 1 909 945 1 732 600 916 439 405 168 177 345 
 
Source: Consolidated budget projections for 2002, Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 4.10:  2002 Sub national Budgets 
Projection of counterfactual sources and allocation of resources 
(In Per Capita Terms, Thousands Lei) 
 
Judets or 
municipalities 
Own 
Revenues 
of which 
PIT 
Shared 
Revenues
of which 
VAT (*) 
Total 
Revenues
Intergov. 
Transfers
Local 
Taxes Fees 
Total 
Revenues 
(incl transf.)
Total 
Expend. 
of which 
education
of which 
health 
Budget 
Balance 
Balti 152.97 57.46 212.07 158.52 365.04 44.84 12.85 24.40 447.13 409.87 224.13 99.95 37.27 
Cahul 125.71 28.64 93.46 57.27 219.17 221.07 12.69 36.50 489.43 440.25 260.25 97.19 49.19 
Chisinau 82.86 29.69 93.50 57.30 176.36 254.53 3.96 15.53 450.37 430.86 252.86 96.67 19.51 
Edinet 134.08 25.74 101.36 70.51 235.45 162.01 10.63 10.05 418.13 397.44 199.84 104.35 20.69 
Lapusna 114.40 24.36 83.65 56.49 198.05 251.23 13.20 24.92 487.40 449.26 261.14 96.34 38.14 
Orhei 108.93 26.98 81.43 52.64 190.36 229.71 8.28 16.30 444.65 420.06 239.83 98.34 24.58 
Soroca 132.27 34.11 123.56 89.28 255.83 155.67 10.86 20.46 442.82 411.50 220.56 101.53 31.32 
Taraclia 157.50 38.54 93.78 38.54 251.27 192.69 9.89 28.35 482.21 443.98 246.46 97.79 38.23 
Tighina 129.49 21.13 85.86 58.71 215.35 237.36 8.67 19.90 481.28 452.67 252.30 98.14 28.60 
Ungheni 87.20 23.20 89.15 58.01 176.35 278.96 9.11 15.02 479.44 455.32 269.04 99.72 24.12 
Gagauzia UTA 137.87 42.64 183.64 143.13 321.50 154.71 8.31 21.32 505.84 476.22 266.93 96.71 29.62 
Mun.Chisinau 422.03 336.47 223.88 67.29 645.91 0.00 50.46 67.21 763.58 645.91 288.68 156.31 117.67 
Average 148.78 57.41 122.11 75.64 270.89 181.90 13.24 25.00 491.02 452.78 248.50 103.59 38.25 
CoVariation 0.60 1.54 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.91 0.60 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.69 
Minimum 82.86 21.13 81.43 38.54 176.35 0.00 3.96 10.05 418.13 397.44 199.84 96.34 19.51 
Maximum 422.03 336.47 223.88 158.52 645.91 278.96 50.46 67.21 763.58 645.91 288.68 156.31 117.67 
 
Source: Consolidated budget projections for 2002, Ministry of Finance. 
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The conditional transfers 
 
The first policy move in Scenario 1 is the introduction of conditional transfers for education 
and health. Table 4.11 shows the formula used for the simulation of the allocation of the conditional 
funds available in the Education and Health accounts of the Regional Transfer Fund. These 
conditional grants use the most basic transfer formula since funds are allocated in proportion to one 
factor. Education transfers are allocated based on the number of school-aged children (using the 
number of pupils as a proxy), while health transfers are allocated based on the relative size of the 
“aging population” (using pension-aged population as a proxy).  In the case of health total population 
size could have been used as an alternative indicator—the choice between the total and aging 
population depend on which indicator is a better proxy for expenditure needs in the health sector. 
There may not be much difference between the two approaches if the population pyramid looks 
approximately the same across jurisdictions. Also, for simplicity and lack of data, it was not 
investigated whether there would be a need to adjust the per student or per inhabitant transfers for 
differences in cost of provision. Here caution needs to be exercised to avoid taking better 
infrastructure for standard services as higher cost needs. 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 
Allocation of conditional transfers 
 
 
 
 
where X  = Σ x i  
x i = the number of school-aged children (for education), or the number of pensioners (for 
health), in judet i. 
Y  =  the size of the Education (or Health) account in the Regional Transfer Fund 
 
 
 
The equalization transfers 
 
The measurement of expenditure needs.  The main paradigm behind the proposed equalization 
system is to equalize across sub national jurisdictions in proportion to the fiscal imbalance between 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity (i.e., potential resources). There exist several approaches to the 
measurement of expenditure needs in practice (Box 4.3).   
Conditional Transfer i = ( x i / X )  · Y
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Box 4.3 
Approaches to Measuring Expenditure Needs 
 
 The expenditure needs of a sub national government may be defined as the funding necessary 
to cover all expenditure responsibilities assigned to the region at a standard level of service 
provision. In practice, there are several options to measure differences in expenditure needs across 
sub national governments.  
 First, expenditure needs can be measured from the bottom up, by costing the current 
expenditure obligations of local governments or costing a standardized basket of subnational 
government services. However, this approach is quite demanding of all sorts of information and it 
requires very explicit procedures for how to cost all aspects of the expenditure responsibilities of sub 
national governments. Another disadvantage of this approach is that there is no guarantee that the 
expenditure needs so derived are affordable within the overall budget resource envelope.  The 
insufficiency of funds will require a downward adjustment of the computed budgets. This often can 
become a source of frustration for subnational government officials, if not cause voters’ protests.  
 Second, a way to establish the expenditure needs of local governments is to rely on historical 
expenditure patterns.  In this regard, expenditure levels would have to be adjusted over time for 
inflation and possible changes in expenditure responsibilities.  But, in any case, it is not guaranteed 
that even the “adjusted historical expenditure patterns” would properly reflect the “actual” needs, 
since each jurisdiction may have exerted distinct efforts in terms of expenditure efficiency in the 
recent past. 
 Third, a more commonly used approach is to estimate some type of index of relative 
expenditure need. Implicitly, this is what is done when a weighted-factor mechanism is used for the 
purpose of allocating equalization grants.  These indexes attempt to capture, from the simplest to 
more complex ways,  the factors that determine cost differences in delivering a standard package of 
local government services. These factors include demographic variables reflecting, for example, the 
special needs of the young and the elderly, other factors such as the level of poverty and 
unemployment, and differences in the price level or cost of living. The list of criteria entering the 
index and the weight used need to be carefully assessed and also thoroughly discussed with all 
stakeholders to ensure that the main causes for substantial differences in the costs of public service 
delivery across jurisdictions are captured in the index.   
            Ultimately, the selection of factors and the weights are a political choice. However, the 
distribution formulas used to distribute equalization grants should be based on a relatively limited 
number of factors.  Inclusion of too many variables reduces the transparency of the allocation 
scheme.  It is also more costly and difficult to update a larger number of variables on a regular basis, 
and the use of many variables introduces more opportunities for political manipulation. Therefore, a 
balance has to be struck between simplicity and transparency, and the necessity to find factors that 
equitably reflect the true fiscal need of local governments. Variables used as factors should 
accurately reflect needs, come from an independent source, and be free of manipulation by either 
central government or sub national governments. For example, the use of “outputs” such as school 
buildings and hospital beds as allocation factors causes inefficiency by providing an incentive that 
could distort the preferred allocation of resources. 
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Here a four-step procedure to determine the expenditure needs of each region is used (Table 4.12):  
(a) The 2002 counterfactual aggregate level of sub national expenditures is assumed to reflect 
the aggregate expenditure needs of all sub national governments.   
(b) The factors that will be included in the computation of expenditure— population, school-
aged population (as proxied by number of pupils) and the number of “aging population” 
(as proxied by pension-aged people)—are selected. (c)  
It is computed, for each factor, the relative need of each jurisdiction. For instance, if 
jurisdiction A has 10 school-aged children out of a national total of 200, the relative need 
of jurisdiction A based on this factor is 10/200=0.05.  
(d) Weights are assigned to the different factors according to the size distribution of the 
different categories of expenditure.86 In the counterfactual, 53 percent of subnational 
expenditures is for education, so a relative weight of 0.53 is assigned to the factor 
“school-aged children.” Likewise, health expenditures are 23 percent of the 
counterfactual budget, and thus “pension-aged pop” is weighted 0.23. The remainder 
(0.24) is assigned in proportion to population.87   
(e) The weighted sum of relative needs is computed to determine a region’s overall fiscal 
need.  
 
 
Table 4.12 
Computing a basic index of expenditure needs 
 
Step 1. Determine the aggregate level of sub national expenditure needs (SEN) 
This may be based on historical data on sub national government expenditures
 
Step 2. Select expenditure needs factors  
Expenditure needs factors may include population, land area, number of 
school-aged children, etc.  
 
Step 3. Compute each region’s relative need for each factor  (xji / Xj) 
For instance, if a region has 10 school-aged children out of a national total of 
200, the relative need of this region for this factor is 10/200=0.05. (xji  is the 
size of factor  j  in jurisdiction i, and Xj is the size of  factor  j in all 
jurisdictions.  I.e., ∑j xji = Xj ) 
 
Step 4. Determine the relative importance of each needs factor  (aj) 
For instance, if education is 25 percent of the aggregate local budget, the 
factor “school-aged children” may be assigned a weight of 0.25 in the 
expenditure needs formula. (aj is the weight assigned to factor  j, where ∑j aj 
=1)  
 
                                                 
86 Lithuania used this approach.  
87 It is important to emphasize the illustrative purposes of this exercise. Clearly, there are other potential factors that could 
be used, such as poverty indexes or infant mortality rates, and the weights attached can also be selected in different ways. 
Regression analysis is sometimes used to derive the weights, but this approach assumes a high degree of local autonomy, 
which Moldova lacks at the present time. 
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Table 4.12 
Computing a basic index of expenditure needs 
 
Step 5. 
 
 
 
Determine the expenditure need for jurisdiction i as:  
 
 
 
 
 
where SEN = aggregate Sub national Expenditure Needs 
 
 
 
 
The measurement of fiscal capacity. The next step in the computation of equalization transfers is to 
determine the level of fiscal capacity, i.e., the ability of each region to collect own source revenues. 
As in the case of expenditure needs, several approaches can be used to estimate fiscal capacity (Box 
4.4).  
 
 
Box 4.4 
Approaches to Measuring Fiscal Capacity 
 Fiscal capacity of a sub national government may be defined as the potential revenues that 
can be obtained from the tax bases assigned to the sub national government if an average level of 
effort (by national standards) is applied to those tax bases. Thus, ideally, tax capacity should be 
measured by the size of the tax bases available to sub national governments or the revenue that these 
tax bases would yield under standard tax rates. Using the actual amount of revenue collections in a 
region as a measure of fiscal capacity should be avoided if local authorities can control tax rates, tax 
base, or administrative enforcement effort.  
 A variety of methods are used around the world to measure a state or region’s fiscal capacity. 
First, a measure of fiscal capacity is the jurisdiction’s lagged level of revenue collections, for 
example the revenues collected last year. Using past collections does not satisfactorily address the 
problem of negative incentives.  Sooner or later sub national governments will “learn” that higher 
collections translate into lower transfers.  
 Second, a widely used measure is the per capita level of personal income. This tends to be a 
good proxy, which tends to be widely available and it is simple. Another widely used proxy measure 
is gross regional product (GRP), which is the sub national equivalent of Gross Domestic Product at 
the national level (GDP), can also be used as measure of fiscal capacity. GRP is a more 
comprehensive measure of the fiscal capacity than per capita income because GRP includes income 
generated within a region irrespective of the location of residence of the worker or producer. 
 Third is the Total Taxable Resources (TTR), a modified version of GRP, which excludes 
certain items such as central taxes and transfers from the measure of fiscal capacity since they do not 
provide a potential tax base. 
 Fourth, some countries (for example, Canada, Untied States, and more recently Russia) have 
Need i =  ∑j (xji / Xj) . aj . SEN 
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used a multi-dimensional measure of fiscal capacity known as the Representative Revenue System 
(RRS).  The basic idea underlying the RRS is to calculate the amount of revenue that a region would 
collect if it were to exert average fiscal effort.  This is done by collecting data on revenue collections 
and tax bases for each of the taxes under consideration for every sub national region.  Based upon 
information on all tax bases for every region as well as the national average fiscal effort for each of 
the taxes, one can compute the amount of revenues that each jurisdiction would collect under average 
fiscal effort.  This amount is then considered to quantify the fiscal capacity of each jurisdiction.  The 
main benefit of RRS is that computations are made at a disaggregated level and based on detailed 
knowledge of (proxies for) the statutory tax bases. 
 Overall, the RRS is a thorough and complete method to accurately measure the fiscal 
capacity of a region.  It is based on disaggregated data and takes into account variations in effective 
tax rates among various tax components and non-tax revenue sources.  As a result, fiscal capacity as 
measured by the RRS can be considered a more accurate representation of a region’s true fiscal 
capacity. However, by the disaggregated nature of the computations, the measure is data intensive 
and, therefore, it is not always possible to use it. 
 
For the purpose of the simulation, a simplified Representative Revenue System (RRS) 
approach was used. One of the most important objectives in measuring fiscal capacity is to avoid 
creating negative incentives to revenue mobilization. In this regard, a distinction between shared 
revenues and own revenues of sub national governments in Moldova needs to be made. First, shared 
revenues come from national taxes for which only central authorities can change rate or base. In 
addition, these national taxes are collected by a central government agency, the State Tax 
Inspectorate. In theory therefore there is nothing sub national governments can do to change the 
amount of revenue sharing they enjoy.88  Thus, in the case of revenue sharing the actual revenues can 
be directly used in the measurement of fiscal capacity. Second, regarding to own revenues, sub 
national governments can impact the overall level of collections by either using or not some levies, 
by choosing higher or lower rates, and by exercising higher or lower diligence in collecting some of 
the levies.  Therefore, in the case of own revenues, actual tax/fee collection cannot be used as a 
measure of fiscal capacity, since it can vary according to the effort exerted by the local authorities. 
Thus the “potential” own revenue has to be estimated. The simplified RRS approach can be 
instrumental for this.   
 
The first step in the simplified RRS approach is to compute an average effective tax rate 
(AETR) as the sum of all own source revenue collections across all jurisdictions divided by a proxy 
for personal income; the latter being a measure of the tax base.89 The AETR is computed to equal 
0.198.  The relatively high coefficient suggests that personal income may have been 
underestimated.90 The second step is to define the fiscal capacity for each jurisdiction as the money 
                                                 
88 However, there are in reality two potential sources of influence by subnational governments on collections from shared 
revenues. First, subnational governments may have some influence on the actual behavior of local tax officials because 
local governments cover some of the tax inspector expenses. Second, over the longer term, local officials may affect the 
level of economic development and therefore the tax bases for shared taxes.    
89 Since data on personal income were not available, the average monthly wages for 2000 and the number of employees 
across judets were used to come up with an estimate of personal income by judet. (This shows the priority the Moldovan 
government must give to developing reliable sources of data.) 
90 Because, in order to estimate personal income, only information on wages was possible to obtain. However, the 
underestimate will not have a serious consequence  if the underestimate is proportionally constant across jurisdictions. 
This is likely the case across all judets. But, for Chisinau municipality the underestimate is likely to be larger than 
proportionally due to the higher occurrence of other sources of income, such as interest and profits. This means that the 
fiscal capacity measure for Chisinau municipality is likely to be biased downward or be less proportionally than those of 
other jurisdictions.   
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that it would collect if it were to apply a level of fiscal effort equal to the national AETR. In other 
words, Fiscal Capacity of a specific jurisdiction (i) equals the computed AETR multiplied by the 
Personal Income of the respective jurisdiction, or Fiscal Capacity in jurisdiction (i) = 0.198 * 
Personal Income in jurisdiction (i) (Table 4.13). 
 
 
Table 4.13 
Computing a measure of fiscal capacity based on the idea of a 
Representative Revenue System (RRS) 
 
Step 1. Select proxy measures for the tax base (T) 
Select measures of a jurisdiction’s own sources revenues (i.e., regional 
revenue collections) and a proxy for the region’s tax base, such as 
aggregate personal income or gross regional product. 
 
Step 2. Define the Average Effective Tax Rate  (AETR) 
The average effective tax rate can be defined as: 
 
AETR  =   (∑i Own source revenuei) / (∑i Tax Basei)  
 
This coefficient reflects the average share of the own tax (in relation to 
the tax base) that is collected across all jurisdictions. 
 
Step 3. Compute Fiscal Capacity 
Fiscal capacity for jurisdiction i equals: 
 
 
 
This amount reflects the amount of collections that each jurisdiction 
would have if it would exert an average level of fiscal effort in 
collecting own source revenues. 
 
 
 
The measurement of the fiscal limbalance. Having defined expenditure needs and fiscal capacity for 
each jurisdiction, now the fiscal imbalance for each jurisdiction can be computed. The methodology 
can be summarized in three simple steps. First, define the fiscal imbalance as the difference between 
expenditure needs and the potentially available resources. These latter include own fiscal capacity, 
shared revenues, and other transfers. Jurisdictions that do not have a positive fiscal imbalance—i.e., 
those where potential available resources exceed expenditure needs—are dropped from the process 
entirely, since they do not qualify for an equalization grant.  
 
The second step is to define the “relative fiscal imbalance” for each jurisdiction that has pre-
qualified for an equalization grant. The relative fiscal imbalance is simply the relative size of each 
jurisdiction’s fiscal imbalance as a share of the aggregate fiscal imbalance (summed over all 
jurisdictions with a positive fiscal imbalance). The third step is the assignment of equalization 
transfers in proportion to each jurisdiction’s relative fiscal imbalance (i.e., assign equalization 
transfers directly to each jurisdiction’s “relative fiscal imbalance” (Table 4.14). 
Fiscal capacity i  =  AETR  * Tax Base i 
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TABLE 4.14 
Assigning equalization transfers: compensating for the fiscal imbalance 
 
Step 1. Define Fiscal Imbalance 
 Fiscal 
Imbalance91 
= Expenditure Needs – Potential Available Resources 
= Expenditure Needs – Own Fiscal Capacity  
– Shared Revenues – Other Transfers 
 For every region that does not have a positive fiscal gap, set : 
Fiscal Imbalance = 0 
 
Step 2. Define Relative Fiscal Imbalance 
The relative fiscal imbalance is the relative size of each region’s fiscal 
imbalance as a share of the aggregate fiscal imbalances of all jurisdictions. 
 
Step 3. Assign Equalization Transfer 
Define the equalization transfer to local government i as: 
Where: 
 
 
 
The simulation results 
 
The empirical results from the simulations are presented in two sets of tables.  The 
simulation results for Scenario 1 are presented in Tables 4.15 to 4.17 and the simulation results 
for Scenario 2 are presented in Tables 4.18 to 4.20.  The results for the intermediate steps of the 
computation of conditional and equalization transfers in Scenario 1 are shown in Table 4.15. The 
first four columns show the estimation of expenditure needs for each jurisdiction on the bases of 
                                                 
91 This work measures fiscal imbalance from an additive perspective, by subtracting the potential fiscal capacity 
from the expenditure needs.  An alternative approach could be to measure the fiscal imbalance from a multiplicative 
perspective, where the transfers would be affected by the inverse of the fiscal capacity index.  In both cases fiscal 
capacity is “discounted” from the expenditure needs.  Depending on design of the measurement model, both 
methods can lead to similar results, the former being in general less sensitive to changing assumptions on parameters 
and easier to understand the results.   
Relative Fiscal Imbalance i  = Fiscal Imbalance i  /   ∑i Fiscal Imbalance i  
Transfer to Jurisdiction i = Relative Fiscal Imbalance i *  Equalization
Account 
Equalization Account = Regional Transfer Fund – ∑i Conditional 
Transfers i
 111
the factors and weights discussed above. Table 4.15 also shows the estimates for fiscal capacity 
and conditional grants, and the absolute and relative fiscal imbalances for each jurisdiction. The 
overall simulation results for Scenario 1 are shown in Table 4.16 in total amounts and in Table 
4.17 in per capita terms. These two tables show the simulated assignment of budget revenues by 
source, conditional transfers and equalization transfers for each of the jurisdictions, and provide 
descriptive statistics.  
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Table 4.15 
Scenario 1: Simulated allocation of resources for 2002 
Determining the allocation of equalization transfers 
(in millions of Lei) 
 
Factor 1: 
Population 
Factor 2: 
School-aged 
pop 
Factor 3: 
Pension-age 
pop 
Expenditure 
Need 
 Own Fiscal 
Capacity 
Shared 
Revenue 
Conditional 
grants 
Fiscal 
Imbalance(FI>0)
Relative Fiscal 
Imbalance   
(coefficient) 
weight 0.24 0.53 0.23       
Judets/municip.    
Balti 57 588 111 735 62 961 232 284 90820 0 88 361 53 103 0.11 
Cahul 21 916 47 027 18 278 87 222 22436 0 32961 31 825 0.06 
Chisinau 43 814 106 569 35 926 186 310 39105 0 71867 75 338 0.15 
Edinet 32 365 76 405 45 365 154 135 32711 0 61611 59 813 0.12 
Lapusna 32 321 62 953 30 353 125 627 30847 0 47150 47 630 0.09 
Orhei 34 683 85 735 34 759 155 177 30801 0 60829 63 547 0.13 
Soroca 31 952 74 502 36 725 143 179 35865 0 56213 51 101 0.10 
Taraclia 5 330 11 346 4 856 21 531 9609 0 8182 3 740 0.01 
Tighina 19 437 44 104 17 164 80 705 17454 0 30922 32 329 0.06 
Ungheni 29 505 75 728 30 604 135 836 22328 0 53678 59 830 0.12 
Gagauzia UTA 18 735 51 088 17 857 87 680 26843 0 34778 26 059 0.05 
Mun.Chisinau 88 177 171 086 63 651 322 914 315637 0 118447 0 0.00 
Total 415 824 918 278 398 498 1 732 600 674 456 0 664 999 504 315 1.00 
Source:  World Bank Staff estimates based on budget data (Ministry of Finance) and Department Statistical and Social Analysis. 
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Table 4.16 
Scenario 1: Simulated allocation of resources for 2002 
(in millions of Lei) 
 
Transfers from: 
 
 
Judets or 
municipalities 
Own 
Revenues 
Shared 
Revenues 
Local Taxes 
and Fees 
Total 
Revenues 
(excl. 
transfers) 
Education 
Acc. 
Health     
Acc. 
Equaliz. 
Acc. 
Total 
Intergov. 
Transfers 
Simulated 
Revenues 
(incl. 
transfers) 
Total 
Projected 
Expend. 
Projected 
Budget 
Balance 
Balti 77 202 0 18 799 96 001 55 972 32 389 41 066 129 427 225 428 206 849 18 579 
Cahul 24 145 0 9 448 33593 23 558 9 403 24 611 57 572 91165 84 556 6 609 
Chisinau 31 816 0 7 483 39299 53 385 18 482 58 261 130 128 169427 165 438 3 989 
Edinet 38 030 0 5 865 43895 38 274 23 337 46 255 107 866 151761 112 726 39 035 
Lapusna 32 404 0 10 798 43202 31 535 15 615 36 834 83 984 127186 127 252 -66 
Orhei 33 108 0 7 470 40578 42 948 17 881 49 143 109 972 150550 127 677 22 873 
Soroca 37 037 0 8 770 45807 37 321 18 892 39 518 95 731 141538 115 226 26 312 
Taraclia 7 356 0 1 786 9142 5 684 2 498 2 892 11 074 20216 20 736 -520 
Tighina 22 057 0 4 866 26923 22 093 8 829 25 001 55 923 82846 77 106 5 740 
Ungheni 22 548 0 6 239 28787 37 935 15 743 46 268 99 946 128733 117 730 11 003 
Gagauzia UTA 22 635 0 4 865 27500 25 592 9 186 20 152 54 930 82430 78 186 4 244 
Mun. Chisinau 326 118 0 90 927 417045 85 703 32 744 0 118 447 535492 499 118 36 374 
Total 674 456 0 177 316 851 772 460 000 205 000 390 000 1 055 000 1 906 772 1 732 600 174 172 
Per Capita (L '000) 185.08 0.00 48.66 233.74 126.23 56.26 107.02 289.51 523.25 475.46 47.80 
Source:  World Bank Staff estimates based on budget data (Ministry of Finance) and Department Statistical and Social Analysis. 
Note: See text for a description of the assumptions underlying the simulation. 
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Table 4.17 
Scenario 1: Simulated allocation of resources for 2002 
(In Per Capita Terms, Thousands Lei) 
 
Judets or 
municipalities 
Own 
Revenues 
Shared 
Revenues 
Local Taxes 
and Fees 
Total 
Revenues 
(excl. transf.)
Education 
Fund 
Health 
Fund 
Equalization 
Fund 
Intergov. 
Transfers 
Simulated 
Revenues 
(incl transf.)
Total 
Projected 
Expenditures
Projected 
Budget 
Balance 
Balti 152.97 0.00 37.25 190.22 110.91 64.18 81.37 256.46 446.68 409.87 36.81 
Cahul 125.71 0.00 49.19 174.90 122.66 48.96 128.14 299.75 474.66 440.25 34.41 
Chisinau 82.86 0.00 19.49 102.35 139.04 48.13 151.73 338.90 441.25 430.86 10.39 
Edinet 134.08 0.00 20.68 154.76 134.94 82.28 163.08 380.30 535.06 397.44 137.62 
Lapusna 114.40 0.00 38.12 152.52 111.33 55.13 130.04 296.50 449.03 449.26 -0.23 
Orhei 108.93 0.00 24.58 133.50 141.30 58.83 161.68 361.82 495.32 420.06 75.26 
Soroca 132.27 0.00 31.32 163.59 133.28 67.47 141.13 341.88 505.47 411.50 93.97 
Taraclia 157.50 0.00 38.24 195.74 121.70 53.48 61.92 237.10 432.84 443.98 -11.14 
Tighina 129.49 0.00 28.57 158.06 129.70 51.83 146.78 328.31 486.37 452.67 33.70 
Ungheni 87.20 0.00 24.13 111.33 146.71 60.89 178.94 386.54 497.87 455.32 42.55 
Gagauzia UTA 137.87 0.00 29.63 167.50 155.88 55.95 122.74 334.57 502.06 476.22 25.85 
Mun. Chisinau 422.03 0.00 117.67 539.70 110.91 42.37 0.00 153.28 692.98 645.91 47.07 
Average 148.78 0.00 38.24 187.01 129.86 57.46 122.30 309.62 496.63 452.78 43.85 
CoV 0.60 - 0.69 0.61 0.11 0.18 0.42 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.95 
Minimum 82.86 0.00 19.49 102.35 110.91 42.37 0.00 153.28 432.84 397.44 -11.14 
Maximum 422.03 0.00 117.67 539.70 155.88 82.28 178.94 386.54 692.98 645.91 137.62 
Source:  World Bank Staff estimates based on budget data (Ministry of Finance) and Department Statistical and Social Analysis. 
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The same order of presentation is followed for the results for Scenario 2. The results from the 
intermediate computations are presented in Table 4.18. In this scenario some of the revenue sharing 
is retained but the assumption is that there are no conditional transfers.  The overall results for 
Scenario 2 are presented in Table 4.19 in total amounts and Table 4.20 in per capita terms; showing 
the simulated assignment of budget revenues by source, conditional transfers and equalization 
transfers for each of the regions, and provide descriptive statistics. 
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Table 4.18 
Scenario 2: Simulated allocation of resources for 2002 
Determining the allocation of equalization transfers 
(in millions of Lei) 
 
Factor 1: 
Population 
Factor 2: 
School-aged 
pop. 
Factor 3: 
Pension-age 
pop. 
Expenditure 
Need 
Own Fiscal 
Capacity 
Shared 
Revenue 
Conditional 
transfers 
Fiscal 
Imbalance 
(FI>0) 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap 
Weight 0.24 0.53 0.23       
Judets/Municip.          
Balti 57 588 111 735 62 961 232 284 90820 27 025 0 114 439 0.121 
Cahul 21 916 47 027 18 278 87221.97 22436 6950 0 57 836 0.061 
Chisinau 43 814 106 569 35 926 186310.2 39105 13900 0 133 305 0.141 
Edinet 32 365 76 405 45 365 154134.6 32711 8750 0 112 674 0.119 
Lapusna 32 321 62 953 30 353 125627.2 30847 7693 0 87 087 0.092 
Orhei 34 683 85 735 34 759 155177 30801 8750 0 115 626 0.122 
Soroca 31 952 74 502 36 725 143179.1 35865 9600 0 97 714 0.103 
Taraclia 5 330 11 346 4 856 21531.25 9609 2580 0 9 342 0.010 
Tighina 19 437 44 104 17 164 80704.52 17454 4625 0 58 626 0.062 
Ungheni 29 505 75 728 30 604 135836.2 22328 8050 0 105 458 0.111 
Gagauzia UTA 18 735 51 088 17 857 87679.7 26843 6650 0 54 187 0.057 
Mun. Chisinau 88 177 171 086 63 651 322914 315637 236000 0 0 0.000 
TOTAL 415 824 918 278 398 498 1 732 600 674 456 340 573 0 946 294 1.000 
Source:  World Bank Staff estimates based on budget data (Ministry of Finance) and Department Statistical and Social Analysis. 
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Table 4.19 
Scenario 2: Simulated allocation of resources for 2002 
(in millions of Lei) 
 
Judets or 
municipalities 
Own 
Revenues 
Shared 
Revenues 
Local 
Taxes and 
Fees 
Total 
Revenues 
(excl. transf.)
Education 
Fund 
Health 
Fund 
Equalization 
Fund 
Intergov. 
Transfers 
Simulated 
Revenues 
(incl transf.)
Total 
Projected 
Expenditures
Projected 
Budget 
Balance 
Balti 77 202 27 025 18 799 123 026 0 0 87 072 87 072 210 098 206 849 3 249 
Cahul 24 145 6950 9 448 40543 0 0 44 005 44 005 84548 84 556 -8 
Chisinau 31 816 13900 7 483 53199 0 0 101 427 101 427 154626 165 438 -10 812 
Edinet 38 030 8750 5 865 52645 0 0 85 729 85 729 138374 112 726 25 648 
Lapusna 32 404 7693 10 798 50895 0 0 66 261 66 261 117156 127 252 -10 096 
Orhei 33 108 8750 7 470 49328 0 0 87 976 87 976 137304 127 677 9 627 
Soroca 37 037 9600 8 770 55407 0 0 74 347 74 347 129754 115 226 14 528 
Taraclia 7 356 2580 1 786 11722 0 0 7 108 7 108 18830 20 736 -1 906 
Tighina 22 057 4625 4 866 31548 0 0 44 606 44 606 76154 77 106 -952 
Ungheni 22 548 8050 6 239 36837 0 0 80 239 80 239 117076 117 730 -654 
Gagauzia UTA 22 635 6650 4 865 34150 0 0 41 229 41 229 75379 78 186 -2 807 
Mun.Chisinau 326 118 236000 90 927 653045 0 0 0 0 653045 499 118 153 927 
Total 674 456 340 573 177 316 1 192 345 0 0 720 000 719 999 1 912 344 1 732 600 179 744 
Per Capita (L '000) 185.08 93.46 48.66 327.20 0.00 0.00 197.58 197.58 524.78 475.46 49.33 
Source:  World Bank Staff estimates based on budget data (Ministry of Finance) and Department Statistical and Social Analysis. 
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Table 4.20 
Scenario 2: Simulated allocation of resources for 2002 
(In Per Capita Terms, Thousands Lei) 
 
Transfers from: 
 
 
Judets or 
municipalities 
Own 
Revenues 
Shared 
Revenues 
Local Taxes 
and Fees 
Total 
Revenues 
(excl. transf.)
Education 
Acc. 
Health 
Acc. 
Equaliz. 
Acc. 
Total 
Intergov. 
Transfers 
Simulated 
Revenues 
(incl transf.)
Total 
Projected 
Expenditures
Projected 
Budget 
Balance 
Balti 152.97 53.55 37.25 243.77 0.00 0.00 172.53 172.53 416.31 409.87 6.44 
Cahul 125.71 36.19 49.19 211.09 0.00 0.00 229.12 229.12 440.21 440.25 -0.04 
Chisinau 82.86 36.20 19.49 138.55 0.00 0.00 264.15 264.15 402.71 430.86 -28.16 
Edinet 134.08 30.85 20.68 185.61 0.00 0.00 302.26 302.26 487.87 397.44 90.43 
Lapusna 114.40 27.16 38.12 179.68 0.00 0.00 233.93 233.93 413.62 449.26 -35.64 
Orhei 108.93 28.79 24.58 162.29 0.00 0.00 289.45 289.45 451.74 420.06 31.67 
Soroca 132.27 34.28 31.32 197.87 0.00 0.00 265.51 265.51 463.38 411.50 51.88 
Taraclia 157.50 55.24 38.24 250.97 0.00 0.00 152.19 152.19 403.16 443.98 -40.82 
Tighina 129.49 27.15 28.57 185.21 0.00 0.00 261.87 261.87 447.08 452.67 -5.59 
Ungheni 87.20 31.13 24.13 142.47 0.00 0.00 310.32 310.32 452.79 455.32 -2.53 
Gagauzia UTA 137.87 40.50 29.63 208.00 0.00 0.00 251.12 251.12 459.12 476.22 -17.10 
Mun. Chisinau 422.03 305.41 117.67 845.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 845.11 645.91 199.20 
Average 148.78 58.87 38.24 245.89 0.00 0.00 227.70 227.70 473.59 452.78 20.81 
CoV 0.60 1.33 0.69 0.78   0.38 0.38 0.25 0.14 3.25 
Minimum 82.86 27.15 19.49 138.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 402.71 397.44 -40.82 
Maximum 422.03 305.41 117.67 845.11 0.00 0.00 310.32 310.32 845.11 645.91 199.20 
Source:  World Bank Staff estimates based on budget data (Ministry of Finance) and Department Statistical and Social Analysis.
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The best way to make sense out of these simulated reforms is to compare the aggregate 
results from each simulation to the counterfactual (i.e., the current situation without reform, or the 
status quo).92 Each of the two reform scenarios can and should be assessed in terms of the logic of 
the reforms and how they address important issues, such as providing no negative incentives for 
revenue mobilization, equalizing the right concept, or finding a balance between the objectives of 
equalization and enhancing central government objectives on health and education. It is also 
important that the proposed systems get tested and the simulation results compared to those in the 
status quo (or counterfactual). These latter comparisons are presented in Table 4.21 in nominal totals 
and Table 4.22 in per capita terms. Both tables compare the total revenues and the budget balance 
that result for each of the jurisdictions under each of the three scenarios (the status quo, Scenario 1, 
and Scenario 2). In any change in the distribution regime it is inevitable to have winners and losers. 
Tables 4.21 and 4.22 also indicate who are the winners and losers in Scenarios 1 and 2 versus 
thestatus quo.   
 
Scenario 1 has a few big winners, and fewer big losers.  Big winners are relatively poorer 
judets, such as Edinet, Soroca, and Orhei. Big losers are Chisinau municipality and Lapusca Judet. 
The results for Scenario 1 are seemingly quite acceptable: the inequality in total revenues per capita, 
as measured by the coefficient of variation is lower than in the counterfactual.  Scenario 1 also yields 
a higher average budget balance than the counterfactual.  
 
The results for Scenario 2 are quite distinct. In this case, Chisinau municipality is the big 
winner and almost every other jurisdiction loses. The main reason is that in the pursuit of non-
discrimination in the derivation-based revenue sharing, Chisinau municipality is allowed to keep 
the 100 percent of CIT revenues, which more than offsets the centralization of all VAT revenues. 
Nevertheless, it would always be possible to adjust the simulation for Scenario 2 and, instead, 
decentralize only a percentage of CIT revenues (thereby adjusting column “Simulation 2” in 
Table 4.7, accordingly). At the limit, if no decentralization of the CIT is made (with these 
additional moneys added to Equalization Account of the Regional Transfer Fund), the situation 
would reverse again with Chisinau municipality being the big loser and all other judets becoming 
winners.  The value of Simulating Scenario 2 is to highlight the interdependence of the transfer 
system with other elements of the fiscal decentralization policy, in this case revenue 
assignments.  For example, any other intermediary assumption (between the two extremes just 
shown in this paragraph) is also possible to simulate, including one initial position, which could 
render a neutral result for Chisinau Municipality as compared to the status quo.  In the particular 
case at hand, all depends on how the percentage of the derivation-based shared taxes (i.e., the 
CIT in the example) is calibrated to generate the desirable result. 
                                                 
92 It is also possible to use regression analysis to examine the main features of each alternative system, for example how 
strong the level of equalization is. However, there are too few observations to make that analysis reliable in the case of 
Moldova. 
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Table 4.21 
Comparative analysis of the different scenarios: 
Total revenues and budgetary balance (in millions of Lei) 
 
 Total Revenues (incl transf.) Budget Balance 
Difference Simulation i versus 
counterfactual 
 Counterfact. Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Counterfact. Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Balti 225 656 225 428 210 098 18 807 18 579 3 249 -228 -15 558 
Cahul 94 003 91 165 84 548 9 447 6 609 -8 -2 838 -9 455 
Chisinau 172 929 169 427 154 626 7 491 3 989 -10 812 -3 502 -18 303 
Edinet 118 595 151 761 138 374 5 869 39 035 25 648 33 166 19 779 
Lapusna 138 055 127 186 117 156 10 803 -66 -10 096 -10 869 -20 899 
Orhei 135 148 150 550 137 304 7 471 22 873 9 627 15 402 2 156 
Soroca 123 997 141 538 129 754 8 771 26 312 14 528 17 541 5 757 
Taraclia 22 522 20 216 18 830 1 786 -520 -1 906 -2 306 -3 692 
Tighina 81 978 82 846 76 154 4 872 5 740 -952 868 -5 824 
Ungheni 123 967 128 733 117 076 6 237 11 003 -654 4 766 -6 891 
Gagauzia UTA 83 050 82 430 75 379 4 864 4 244 -2 807 -620 -7 671 
Mun. Chisinau 590 045 535 492 653 045 90 927 36 374 153 927 -54 553 63 000 
Total 1 909 945 1 906 772 1 912 344 177 345 174 172 179 744 -3 173 2 399 
 
Sources: :This table summarizes information contained in previous tables, as: Table 4-9 (counterfactual), columns 9 and 13; Table 4.16 (Simulation 1), columns 
9 and 11; and Table 4.19(Simulation 2), columns  9 and  11.  The last two columns in this table are derived from its column 5 minus column 4, and column 6 
minus column 4, respectively. 
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Table 4.22 
Comparing the different scenarios: total revenues and budgetary balance (in per capita terms; in thousands of Lei) 
 
 Total Revenues (incl transf.) Budget Balance 
Difference simulation versus 
counterfactual 
 Counterfactual Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Counterfactual Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Balti 447.13 446.68 416.31 37.27 36.81 6.44 -0.45 -30.83 
Cahul 489.43 474.66 440.21 49.19 34.41 -0.04 -14.78 -49.23 
Chisinau 450.37 441.25 402.71 19.51 10.39 -28.16 -9.12 -47.67 
Edinet 418.13 535.06 487.87 20.69 137.62 90.43 116.93 69.73 
Lapusna 487.40 449.03 413.62 38.14 -0.23 -35.64 -38.37 -73.78 
Orhei 444.65 495.32 451.74 24.58 75.26 31.67 50.67 7.09 
Soroca 442.82 505.47 463.38 31.32 93.97 51.88 62.64 20.56 
Taraclia 482.21 432.84 403.16 38.23 -11.14 -40.82 -49.37 -79.05 
Tighina 481.28 486.37 447.08 28.60 33.70 -5.59 5.10 -34.19 
Ungheni 479.44 497.87 452.79 24.12 42.55 -2.53 18.43 -26.65 
Gagauzia UTA 505.84 502.06 459.12 29.62 25.85 -17.10 -3.78 -46.72 
Mun. Chisinau 763.58 692.98 845.11 117.67 47.07 199.20 -70.60 81.53 
Average 491.02 496.63 473.59 38.25 43.85 20.81 5.61 -17.43 
CoV 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.69 0.95 3.25 9.21 -2.98 
Minimum 418.13 432.84 402.71 19.51 -11.14 -40.82 -70.60 -79.05 
Maximum 763.58 692.98 845.11 117.67 137.62 199.20 116.93 81.53 
Sources: previous Tables 
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Phasing in a new system of transfers  
 
An important step in the reform of the system of transfers is whether to introduce 
reforms “cold turkey” or whether to phase-in the reforms over a period of years to smooth out 
the transition to the new regime.  The Government of Moldova will have to weigh these 
considerations if it decides to go forward with the reforms.  A more gradual approach would 
typically make the changes in regional funding more politically acceptable, since it would 
give time for the territorial units’ administrative structures to adjust. The changes in 
transfers—and the losers that reform will generate—are often an impediment for the serious 
implementation of a new system that imply significant departures from the status quo.  
Drastic changes in the system of transfers and the overall level of funding can hurt local 
governments’ ability to carry through longer term plans, may create uncertainty, and may 
increase political friction, destabilizing the reforms.  
 
Basically there are two approaches to phase in a new transfer system.  One approach 
is to introduce the new mechanism gradually, while maintaining part of the status quo for a 
period of time.  In this case, for a number of years the transfers would be the result of a 
combination of the original allocation mechanism (i.e., the status quo) and the new allocation 
system (i.e., the approved alternative scenario). 
 
  The other approach is to hold jurisdictions partially harmless, by partially 
compensating the losers for their loss in revenues due to the regime shift.  Often these 
approaches fix the base transfer or entitlement for the local governments in nominal terms.  
The transition to the new system is achieved through real growth and inflation, both of which 
kept to the shrinkage of the historical transfer. This is typically harder to implement at the 
beginning, because additional funds for the purpose of holding harmless are often not 
available. Unless there is significant growth in revenues or additional resources could be 
identified, a holding harmless provision would significantly reduce the available pool of 
funds for equalization (i.e., the reform implementation may take longer than initially 
desirable).  However, a phased-in program or the use of a hold-harmless scheme may be a 
preferable alternative to having no reform whatsoever.  
 
 In this regard, a viable alternative is to design from the outset a phased-in program of 
reforms for the system of transfers, aiming at converging to the new system (say, scenario 1) 
in an explicitly agreed period of time.  For instance, in the previously discussed scenarios the 
program of reform could start with an intermediary position between the two scenarios—as 
discussed in the previous section—which could generate a financially-neutral result for 
Chisinau municipality in the first year.  From the second year onwards both the uniform CIT 
sharing rate and the conditional transfer expenditure uniform shares (for education and 
health) would gradually adjust year after year, so that, say, at the end of the fourth or fifth 
year the implementation of the program of reforms would be fully accomplished, with the 
system entirely converged to the Scenario 1.  
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Managing the new system of transfers 
 
A final consideration is the need to formalize the management and upkeep of the new 
system of transfers. There will be from the start a need to collect better statistics and improve 
the existing ones. There will also be a need to update, from time to time, the equalization 
formula, introducing changes in the mechanism to keep it within its objectives, and to 
maintain a dialogue with the subnational governments and other stakeholders in order to 
guarantee the required political support for the sustainability of the system. Administering 
and improving a system of equalization transfers and conditional grants is a time and 
qualified human resource consuming activity that will require exclusive attention and 
dedication within the Ministry of Finance.93  In this regard, it is crucial to put in place the 
essential institutions and capacity building programs (see options in Chapters 1 and 5). 
 
                                                 
93 Some countries, such as Australia, India, and Nigeria, have also used, in some cases very successfully, the 
institution of a “Grants Commission.”  The Commission is a semi-autonomous institution at the central 
government level, which is exclusively charged with the administration and upkeep of the transfer system. The 
“Grants Commission” has to be impartial and object in administering the equalization grant system. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.4.1: Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Judets 
 
  
Average monthly 
nominal salary by 
judets in 2000, Lei
Percent of 
population that is 
elderly (60 and 
over y. o.) 
Share of Pupils 
in Population 
(%) 
Infantile Mortality 
(Rate to 1000 
New Born in 
2000) 
  1. Chisinau municip. 614.7 10.3 14.1 16.8 
  2. Balti 358.9 15.6 15.6 18.1 
  3. Cahul 307.0 11.9 17.7 24.1 
  4. Chisinau 315.3 11.7 17.2 21.8 
  5. Edinet 281.0 20.0 14.2 14.9 
  6. Lapusna 275.7 13.4 18.0 20.9 
  7. Orhei 317.9 14.3 17.0 18.2 
  8. Soroca 305.6 16.4 15.5 18.1 
  9. Taraclia 274.6 13.0 16.5 12.5 
10. Tighina 251.1 12.6 18.7 21.4 
11. Ungheni 293.1 14.8 18.1 15.5 
12. Gagauzia TAU 299.1 12.8 19.9 11.8 
 Average Republic 407.0 13.6 16.3 18.3 
 
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.29 0.18 0.10 0.21 
Source:  World Bank Staff estimates based on information from Ministry of Finance and Department 
Statistical and Social Analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5:  TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
A.  LOCAL FISCAL MANAGEMENT 
 
 
The budget process at the local government level in Moldova is regulated by two 
basic pieces of legislation: The Law on the Budgetary Process and System and the Law 
on Local Public Finance.94 Although the original legal framework in the Budget Process 
Law has become obsolete, the government has kept updating this law, which has 
undergone several important reforms. These include, for example, the adoption of a 
modern budget classification system, pilot programs on program-based budgeting and the 
development of performance measurement techniques, the beginnings of a medium term 
fiscal framework, and the adoption of a treasury function at all levels of government.  
 
Although important reforms are in progress, the budget process at the local level 
in Moldova still presents important problems. The modern budget classification is still 
not fully used in budget execution and budget reporting is late and incomplete. The 
approval of budgets is not always timely. Despite the recent reform introducing a modern 
treasury function, the preparation for this reform was inadequate and an effective treasury 
function will require more human and physical resources. Controls over budget execution 
remain weak.  Ex-post external audit is also weak and budget evaluation is non-existent. 
The current reforms of the budget process at the subnational level lack an adequate scope 
because they leave out important problems with the local budget process. The reform 
effort could benefit from being more comprehensive by capturing some of the 
interrelationships that exist among the different stages of the budget process. Moldova 
could also learn from the more comprehensive approaches to the budget process reform 
recently adopted by Russia and Ukraine.   
 
Increased expenditure efficiency in Moldova requires an adequate degree of 
budget autonomy to pursue policy priorities that fit the needs and preferences of local 
residents. Increased expenditure efficiency also requires budget institutions that are 
effective in implementing those policy priorities by providing clear positive incentives as 
well as penalties to spending agencies that do not adhere to the stated priorities during 
budget execution. Expenditure efficiency also requires a high degree of accountability 
enhanced by external ex-post audit and by evaluating the performance of programs and 
feeding back that information in the next cycle of budget formulation. 
                                                 
94 The initial intention within the Ministry of Finance had been to have the contents of Law on Local Public 
Finance as part of an amended Law on the Budgetary Process and System. However, parliament opted for 
two separate laws. In the long term the Ministry of Finance plans to integrate these laws and several other 
pieces of legislation into a budget code. The Law on Local Public Finance has been fully implemented 
during 2001 for the first time and it regulates the relations between the state budget and local budgets. The 
main objective of the Law on Local Public Finance is to structure the transfer of funds from the state to 
local budgets. 
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B.   BUDGETARY AUTONOMY 
 
All local budget authority in Moldova is delegated by the central government. 
However, if the public sector in Moldova is to realize the benefits of decentralization, as 
many other unitary countries have been able to do, there is a minimum degree of 
budgetary autonomy local governments will require. The principle of autonomy is stated 
in the Law on Local Public Administration (articles 3 and 4). Financial autonomy implies 
that local councils can establish tariffs for services provided, establish tariffs to cover 
expenses for the creation and maintenance of public services, and determine prices to be 
paid by service users. In addition, article 13 of the Law on Local Public Administration 
states that local authorities are competent to approve the local budget, manage its 
execution, borrow, and establish in accordance with the laws, local taxes and fees, as well 
as mechanisms for their collection.  
 
However, local budgetary autonomy is a complex concept, including multiple 
dimensions and implications over degree:   
 
Functionality versus hierarchy. Local governments must be able to plan and approve 
their own budgets separately from the budget of the central government and any other 
upper-level government. This means that local governments must be able to approve their 
own budgets even if the upper-level government fails to approve its budget in a timely 
fashion. For this to happen, local government revenue sources must be certain and stable. 
For funds that come from upper-level governments, such as tax sharing and transfers, the 
funds must be determined by fixed and stable rules in the case of revenue sharing, and by 
formula in the case of transfers.  The instability of tax assignments at the sub national 
level is one of the main culprits.  Another possibility for maintaining the autonomy of 
local governments in this regard is to introduce different and lagged budget process 
schedules for lower-level governments so that when it comes time to make their own 
decisions, the upper-level governments already have made theirs.   
 
Sub national budgetary practices in Moldova have not complied with this 
dimension of local budgetary autonomy. The budget processes at the three levels of 
government continue to be hierarchically interlinked.  Judet budgets cannot be formulated 
until the central government budget is formulated, and similarly between judets and 
primarias. This hierarchical dependence takes a special twist in Moldova. 
   
Given the dependence of local governments on central government transfers, the 
budget process at the local level is, to a large extent, driven by and mirrors the budget 
process at the central level.  The local budget process starts in April when the Ministry of 
Finance issues the budget circular (the “Methodological Instructions”) to the judet 
councils. The circular contains, besides the fiscal objectives of the central government, 
the planned tax sharing arrangement and transfers from the central government. Not long 
after and following the hierarchical tradition of the previous regime, the judet councils 
issue their own budget instructions to their primarias or local governments. As it was in 
Soviet times, the next step in the budget process is a bottom-up flow of information, 
together with dialog and negotiations between each pair of levels of government. First, 
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the primarias forward the judets their budget projections. After discussions with each 
local government, the judets get together a consolidated budget of their own budget and 
the aggregate of the primarias’ budgets with the judet. These consolidated proposals are 
forwarded to the Ministry of Finance, where again there are discussions and negotiations 
with each judet. Once agreement is reached, each local government proceeds to submit 
their budget to the respective local councils for approval. The Budget Process Law 
requires local executives to submit their budget to the local councils not later than 
November 1st.  In the case of the judets, this deadline is November 15th. Local councils 
are supposed to approve their budgets not later than December 10th and judet councils, 
not later December 20th (Box 5.2).   
 
It is evident how hierarchy wins over function in the scheduling of deadlines. 
Since the lowest level of government, the primarias, depend on the budgetary decisions 
on revenue sharing, transfers and also expenditure assignments, made by the judet 
councils, it would seem more reasonable that he judet budgets get approved before those 
of the primarias. By the same token, that the central government budget would get 
finalized and approved before those of the judets. After all, the judets depend on the 
revenue sharing and transfer decisions of the central government and not the reverse. 
 
Autonomy versus self-supporting.  Local budget autonomy implies the ability of local 
governments to increase and decrease the size of their budgets through the exercise of an 
adequate degree of tax autonomy. At present, judet councils and local governments 
(primarias) lack revenue autonomy (Chapter 3).95  Practically, all revenues for the judets 
come from tax sharing and other transfers. Local government have their own revenues 
and some discretion to set rates. But this does not lead to revenue autonomy, mainly 
because their budgets are determined at the discretion of the judet councils.  In theory, 
local governments are supposed to keep revenues from fees and other local revenues, but 
in reality they are not free to do so because judets can adjust revenue sharing and 
transfers in a way that can effectively confiscate (or claw back) local revenues. Thus, 
basic legislated principles and actual practice are congruent. While the Law on Local 
Public Finance and the Law on Local Public Administration proclaim that local 
governments are autonomous, the Budget Law and actual budgetary practice give judet 
governments practically full discretion to set the budget of local governments. Thus, in 
practice, the principle of fiscal autonomy of local governments is not obeyed. 
 
There is an important misconception about the nature of local autonomy in 
Moldova.  It is often argued that true autonomy at the primaria level can never exist 
because most of them are not self-supporting from the revenue side. Autonomy, no doubt, 
can be deeper and wider if local governments can be self-supporting without any need for 
transfers from upper level governments. But equating self-support with autonomy is a 
misconception. Any system of intergovernmental finance has both net donor and net 
deficit units. The fact that some jurisdictions have to be assisted with transfers does not 
                                                 
95 Several circumstances have contributed to squeezing the little level of fiscal autonomy that exists at the 
local level. One such circumstance has been the drastic shrinking of budgetary resources experienced at all 
levels of government over the entire transition period in Moldova. The lack of skilled and trained local 
budget officials (on autonomous decision making) made things worse. 
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detract from genuine autonomy at both the local and regional levels.96 This autonomy 
exists not only among net donor but also among net deficit jurisdictions. Autonomy 
requires stable and certain revenue sources, including those from transfers and shared 
revenues, the ability to meaningfully raise own revenues at the margin, and discretion in 
making budgetary choices involving priorities and method of delivery.  
 
Predictability versus uncertainty.  To enjoy budget autonomy local governments need a 
sufficient degree of stability and predictability of revenues and expenditures. Moldova 
has no formal revenue assignment at the sub-national level, since sharing rates for the 
major taxes are decided every year in the annual budget law. The current system of 
transfers is still changed every year by upper-level governments. The entire budget 
system is informed by a principle of negotiation and uncertainty, not very different from 
what was practiced in Soviet times. The introduction of a medium-term budget 
framework and the use of stable rules and formulas, with explicit and stable revenue 
assignments at the sub-national level, are critical to increase budget predictability and 
certainty. 
 
Discretion versus rigidity.  Local budget autonomy requires that local governments have 
discretion to use their resources, or most of them, according to their own priorities and 
that they have freedom to deliver public services using the production techniques and 
combinations of inputs they consider to be most cost efficient. Although on paper judets 
and primarias do enjoy certain autonomy in expenditure decisions, in practice this 
autonomy is reduced in two significant ways.97    First, staffing decisions are often 
constrained by central government norms such as teacher-pupil ratios. A different 
interpretation of current central rules on staffing is that the central governments only 
recommends staffing levels to local governments which are not compulsory, although 
central government regulations establish the maximum staffing levels based on several 
factors including size of the population and financial status. Therefore local governments 
approve their own staffing levels subject to the ceilings imposed by the central 
government in statutes of 15 June 1999 and 22 July 1999 and decision No. 139 of 
February 9, 1998.  Second, local government wages are practically set by the central 
authorities. See Box 5-1. This lack of flexibility detracts from the ability of local 
governments to keep more able employees or to take advantage of local labor market 
conditions. 
 
Allegiance versus dual-subordination.  Local budget or finance officials need to respond 
exclusively to local authorities. Unlike other transitional countries, Moldova has kept the 
old system of dual subordination of local finance officials to the local government and to 
                                                 
96 It must be noted that most judets in Moldova are not self-supporting either, but autonomy at this level is 
seldom questioned. 
97 As is the case in other countries in transition, the law in Moldova proclaims the fiscal autonomy of local 
governments, such is the case in article 9 of the Law on Local Public Administration, but little is said to 
further guarantee or develop this proclaimed local fiscal autonomy. See Munteanu and Popa (1999). The 
lack of effective fiscal autonomy is decried in a 2001 declaration of the national league of mayors in 
Moldova. 
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the Ministry of Finance.98 A truly decentralized system cannot have budgetary autonomy 
and at the same time its key finance officials subordinated to the central government 
authorities. If there is to be budgetary autonomy, and decentralization is to make 
progress, finance officials at the local level need to be exclusively subordinated to the 
local government for which they work.99 But, this would mean also that the salaries and 
any fringe benefits for local finance officials would have to be paid exclusively by the 
local governments. This approach would require that the interest of the central 
government at the subnational level would have to be carried out by central government 
de-concentrated offices. One such arrangement is the current system of territorial treasury 
offices (Trezoreria).  
 
All the way versus halfway.  International experience shows that maximum efficiency 
gains from decentralization are obtained when autonomy and accountability reach all 
levels of government, and not only, for example, the second tier. Therefore, autonomy 
and accountability need to be provided at the primaria level rather than stopping just at 
the intermediate level. In fact, the evidence from other countries shows that the most 
important gains in efficiency are attained when decentralization reaches further down to 
the implementation units, such as schools and hospitals. The ongoing sectoral reviews, 
including the health and education sectors, need to search for ways to increase the 
autonomy and accountability of officials in charge of the day-to-day operations of 
hospitals and schools as well. 
 
Free versus induced choices.  The pursuit of central government objectives needs to 
respect subnational budgetary autonomy. The decentralization of public services with 
national significance provides the advantage of increasing the efficiency of expenditures, 
but also poses the risks of under-spending by local governments and of significant 
spending disparities across local governments. Possibly the best way to address this type 
of concern is to use conditional matching grants, whereby the central government 
“bribes” (or induces) subnational governments to spend more on particular items of 
national importance. The central government may also choose to impose minimum 
expenditure requirements on local governments in areas such as basic education and 
primary health services. The use of these requirements is clearly detrimental to local 
governments’ discretion and autonomy to make their own expenditure decisions. 
Therefore, their use should be minimized in a system of decentralized government. 
 
 
                                                 
98 Law # 496 of June 2001 strengthened the attachment of local finance officials to the central government, 
but even after this amendment law local finance officials remained under the dual subordination of Local 
Councils and the Ministry of Finance. 
99 By doing this, Moldova would be joining the ranks of other transitional countries, which have abandoned 
the dual subordination arrangements of the Soviet Union. 
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C.  BUDGET STRUCTURE AND FORMULATION 
 
Despite recent important innovations in Moldova’s budget process, local budgets 
still fall short of the required standards of providing a clear list of expenditure priorities 
and complete information for policy-makers to make the right choices. 
 
Negotiation pervades the budget process. The Budget Process Law and the Law on 
Local Government Finance regulate budget preparation at the subnational level. The 
budget calendar for local governments must be in line with the state budget calendar. 
Every year, the Ministry of Finance issues a calendar and a Methodology Note with 
instructions to the intermediate level of governments on how to prepare their budgets (see 
Box 5.2 for the 2002 calendar). Each intermediate government does the same for their 
local governments (primarias, including communes and villages). The Ministry of 
Finance does not deal directly with the local government.   
 
The budgets of subnational governments need to be balanced. That is, deficits 
cannot be planned, nor can borrowing from the central government or from commercial 
banks be counted on to fund recurrent budget expenditures. On paper at least there is a 
modern budget classification system (article 7 of the Law on the Budgetary System and 
the Budget Process). The provision is for functional, economic and organizational 
classification of budget expenditures. There has been much more of a problem with 
keeping budget execution accounts with this modern classification system. 
 
 
Box  5.2  Budget Calendar for Local Governments for 2002 
 
April 20 MOF issues Methodology Note for local governments. 
June 10 Judets, ATU Gagauzia, and Chisinau municipality submit budget requests to 
MOF. 
August 1st  Discussions of the budget between MOF and judets, ATU Gagauzia and 
Chisinau municipality will take place. 
 
Local budgets: 
 
Nov. 1st  Mayor of the village, commune, city and municipality review the developed
draft budget and based on a decision, shall submit it to the local council for
approval. 
Dec. 10  Council members approve local budgets. 
 
Judets, the ATU Gagauzia and Chisinau municipality by: 
 
Nov. 15 Submit draft budgets to corresponding councils for approval. 
Dec. 20  Approval of the draft budgets by the councils. 
Jan. 15  Prepare financial plan submitted to MOF. 
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Extra-budgetary funds are allowed in Moldova’s budget system, although more 
recently local governments in Moldova do not appear to have used extra-budgetary funds 
as widely as governments in other countries in transition. The recent requirement that 
both revenues and expenditures from the extra-budgetary funds at all levels of 
government be realized through the Treasury Offices has contributed to keeping these 
extra-budgetary accounts under control. 
 
The methodological guidelines for budget formulation do not vary much from 
year to year.  The first stage in budget formulation is the projection of total revenues from 
all sources. For tax revenues, the judet’s department of finance makes its forecasts on the 
bases of last year revenues, new data from the tax inspectorates about major trends and 
taxpayers100, and the macroeconomic indicators for economic activity from the Ministry 
of Economy.  These forecasts for each tax and in the aggregate are discussed with the 
Ministry of Finance, and they finally get “approved” by it.  Although some disagreement 
between judets and the Ministry of Finance has occurred, there is much more conflict and 
need for coordination on the expenditure side of the budget. 
 
On the expenditure side, the methodological guidelines from the Ministry of 
Finance include a set of norms on the basis of which the judets’ finance departments can 
formulate their expenditure forecasts. These norms are for the entire country and tend to 
cover the very minimum expenditures (Chapter 2).  
 
 The judet finance departments in essence replicate with the primarias the same 
steps they have followed with the Ministry of Finance, including projections for their 
revenues and expenditures. At this stage again, the most complex issue in settling local 
government budgets is the use of expenditure norms. Judets appear to use for the most 
part the same norms they get from the Ministry of Finance for most primarias, but they 
also appear to reduce these norms when negotiating the budgets for the smaller villages, 
on the basis, for example, that there is no “need” for central heating in small villages. In 
substance, the norms finally applied are negotiated between the primarias and the judet 
councils, and the primarias are free to submit their own requests and to produce 
beforehand their own forecast of expenditure needs. The final outcome of this 
complicated process of negotiation is a set of differentiated budgets for each primaria. All 
primarias have the same expenditure norms although divided in two groups 
(municipalities and villages) and each primaria has a different package of shared tax ratio 
and transfers.  
 
It is unclear who sets expenditure priorities. In theory, subnational governments have 
freedom to set their own expenditure priorities without minimum expenditure 
requirements or other a priori restrictions. In practice, allocative efficiency at the 
subnational level is restricted by implicit expectations by the central government on the 
                                                 
100 The information provided by the territorial tax inspectorates includes tax return information for the 
major taxes and a forecast for each large taxpayer. Traditionally there has been some coordination between 
the state tax inspectorates and the local finance offices in the projection of budget revenues. There appears 
to be a clear need to update the methodology used for revenue projections, in particular to let different 
assumptions on macroeconomic performance play a more important role in the forecasts. 
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use of general transfer funds and also by local expenditure priorities listed in the laws.  
For example, the Law on Local Public Finance (article 4) declares as priority 
expenditures the payment of salaries to public employees, allocations to the state social 
insurance budget, the payment of communal services, the payment of food and medicines 
in public institutions, and other expenses stipulated by the local council when approving 
the annual budget. Probably, the proper interpretation of this article is the setting of 
priorities for payment under budget sequestering for the lack of sufficient revenue 
inflows to fund the entire budget. The intent would seem to avoid budget arrears in 
politically sensitive areas, such as wage arrears, even at the expense of other urgent needs 
on education and health care. On the other hand, article 9 of the same Law on Local 
Public Finance seems to contradict this interpretation for setting budget priorities by 
stating that in the case of a shortfall in forecast revenues then “all expenses shall be 
reduced with the corresponding amounts.” The latter would seem to call for equal 
proportional cuts across the board. To add to the confusion, the Budget Process Law 
states different priorities for the budget. According to this law, debt services must be first 
priority for payment.  
 
Decentralization will require that local governments are set free to establish their 
own priorities for their budgets, both at the time of budget preparation and in the 
contingency of a budget amendment or sequestering. Mandated priorities make it difficult 
to increase the allocative efficiency of budgets.  
 
Budget formulation is still incremental and input-oriented.  Budget formulation in 
Moldova has continued for the most part the practices of the old Soviet model, being 
input-oriented and building incrementally on the resource allocations of past years, 
without the due concern on goals, outcomes or performance. The result has been little 
prioritization of public expenditures and whatever prioritization has taken place has been 
on the input side of the budget. 
 
However, recently important changes have been initiated. Starting with the 2002 
budget, the Ministry of Finance commenced the adoption of a “program and performance 
budgeting” approach on a limited basis at the central government level. This new 
approach is being used in 2002 in parallel with the traditional methodology for the 
budgets of the Ministry of Finance, the Statistical and Sociological Analysis Department, 
in the area of higher education of the Ministry of Education, and in the area of hospitals 
of the Ministry of Health.101  Although an unrealistic target, the current plans are to 
expand the performance budgeting approach to the rest of the budget in 2003.  While it 
will take longer to implement the shift in budgeting approach at the local level, it is clear 
that this is the right direction to go, and the Government should invest in capacity 
building and training to this end.  
 
                                                 
101 The performance budget pilot project is supported by a USAID project. 
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Medium-term expenditure framework is still incipient.  The lack of predictability and 
stability in budget flows has been a significant negative feature of the subnational budget 
process in Moldova. One way to increase the predictability of budget funds is to adopt at 
least at the central level a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework-MTEF (See Box 5.3). 
 
 
Fortunately, Moldova’s government has already started to introduce a medium 
term perspective on budgeting at the central government level. Even though the Budget 
Process Law only requires budget projections for two years, the Ministry of Finance has 
been requiring three-year projections from all spending units, including subnational 
governments (consolidated at the judet level). The three-year projections are broken 
down by functional expenditure program and by economic items. In 2001, the Ministry of 
Finance required revenue projections for 2002 and also 2003 and 2004. These projections 
are developed on the basis of revenue collections over the past several years taking into 
account any changes in policy up to 2002 and potential improvements in tax 
administration. The Ministry of Finance also collected expenditure projections for 2003 
and 2004 with the 2002 budget. The expenditure projections were based on the 
expenditure norms and staff positions that had been introduced by June 1, 2001 and using 
specific inflation rate forecasts provided by the Ministry of Economy.102 Although this 
innovation still falls short of a full MTEF, it has been credited with helping to contain 
overall growth in public expenditures and the budget deficit, mostly due to the 
conservative assumptions the Ministry of Finance has been requiring to be used in the 
projections. The immediate agenda is to start using multiyear projections to set 
expenditure priorities.  
 
Yet the agenda for reform has been set right, the central government should 
establish its own MTEF and over time the fundamentals of this practice may be expanded 
                                                 
102 For 2002 the forecast was 12 percent and for 2003 and 2004, 8 percent and 7 percent respectively. 
Box 5.3   A Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
 
 An MTEF requires an explicit statement of specific medium-term fiscal objectives 
and the development of, say, three-year projections for the budget, including expected 
revenues and transfers, aggregate expenditures by function, the projected budget deficit and 
its financing. This budget tool allows establishment of a stronger link between budget 
priorities and budget formulation. The MTEF offers several other advantages. It reveals more 
clearly the recurrent expenditure implications (in terms of operation and maintenance costs) 
of capital investment projects. It enhances efficiency by allowing expenditure programs to 
follow more stable and predictable paths. It encourages government officials to look ahead 
and establish expenditure priorities over time. It provides governments with an early signal to 
anticipate budgetary imbalances due to spending commitments in future years. On the other 
hand, the MTEF should be seen only as a planning tool and not as a budget that commits 
funds in future time periods. This is important because the macroeconomic conditions of 
future years may or may not allow for the conversion of planned spending into actual 
expenditures in the annual budget. The development of the MTEF is a complex task which 
should be undertaken in stages. 
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to sub national budgets. However, no benefit will be derived from this and other budget 
process innovations unless they are used to solve current bottlenecks and eliminate 
negative practices. For example, Moldova’s budget process still continues the old 
practice of not setting concrete expenditure ceilings prior to the detailed preparation of 
budget proposals by the local governments and other spending units. In particular, the 
methodological instructions for the preparation of the 2002 budget still sets rates of 
growth for the consolidated budget, without specific budget ceilings. This perpetuates the 
existing budgetary inertia, where the emphasis is on expanding existing budgets and 
programs rather than making hard choices on how best to use the resource envelop that 
each sub national government/ agency has available.  
 
The expenditure projections within the new MTEF should be used as the total 
expenditure ceilings for each agency for forthcoming years. Although it is not clear at 
this point that the Ministry of Finance intends to roll over the MTEF projections as 
expenditure ceiling for budget preparation, this would be a good way to increase 
budgetary discipline and increase efficiency in the use of budgetary resources both at the 
central and local levels. 
 
Capital expenditures are poorly budgeted.  There has been very little capital spending in 
Moldova during the transition years. This has been particularly true at the subnational 
level. Most of the capital projects that have taken place have been the result of direct 
negotiations between the upper and lower level government.  This practice extends the 
negotiation system to the capital budget arena.  
 
There will be a need to improve the current system of capital grants within the 
overall reform of the transfer system (Chapter 4). But there is also a need to review the 
budget formulation process in the capital arena. The Budget Process Law requires that 
capital spending must be a separate component in the annual budgets. Even though there 
is some risk that this practice may lead to putting too much emphasis on capital spending 
as opposed to recurrent expenditures, this risk at the moment does not appear to be a 
serious one. The questions are whether governments should have their separate public 
investment programs (PIP) and whether and how to integrate these programs into a 
medium term expenditure framework (MTEF). A PIP is typically a three-year rolling 
cycle of planned public investments, which states goals and objectives for capital 
expenditure programs, lists their potential financing sources, and allows capital spending 
coordination with the regular annual budgets. The PIP process offers many advantages. It 
typically includes: the determination of the size and sources of funds for public 
investment, the selection of projects to be included in the PIP using cost-benefit analyses 
or other suitable techniques; the development and updating of the PIP document every 
fiscal year; the monitoring of its execution; and the reporting on and review of its 
implementation.  
 
One problem with the PIP approach is that the decision-making process is 
typically housed outside the finance bureaus or the ministry of finance, for example with 
the planning agency or a ministry of economy. This can lead to disjointed policy 
decisions and biased budget choices, for example, putting too much emphasis on capital 
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expenditures and too little on the required operation and maintenance (recurrent) 
expenditures. If the PIP can be housed with finance bureaus and the PIP fully integrated 
within a MTEF, then the advantages of using separate budgeting for capital purposes can 
overcome the risks of biased decision making. Given the serious needs for capital 
infrastructure in Moldova it is important to improve capital budgeting, for example 
adopting a PIP framework, at the same time the government avoids the bias of 
considering any type of capital expenditures more productive than any kind of recurrent 
expenditures. 
 
The costs of tax expenditures and contingent liabilities are not transparent in the 
budget.  There are several other areas of the budget preparation process that can be 
improved over time. The granting of tax incentives and other favorable tax treatment to 
particular activities or enterprises (i.e., the cost of “tax expenditures”) still goes 
unreported and not subject to regular budget scrutiny at the present time. Asking all 
levels of government to report on their destination and amounts should increase the 
transparency of budgets, reveal their budgetary costs, and is more likely to make them the 
subject of public scrutiny. It would be a good practice to require in the future a budget 
annex listing the beneficiaries and, if possible, estimates of the revenues foregone. The 
transparency of budget reporting would also be increased if all levels of government are 
required to provide full information on loans and loan guarantees provided by the 
budgets. This is justified because loans and guarantees represent potential future 
liabilities (i.e., contingent liabilities) and, therefore, an unplanned use of budget 
resources. Requiring the explicit reporting of these liabilities will make it more likely that 
the opportunity cost of these uses of funds would be taken into account at budget time 
and therefore lead to greater fiscal responsibility.  It should be recognized that consistent 
choices on expenditure prioritization can only be satisfactorily exercised if all concerned 
expenditure items (including “revenue expenditures” and “contingent liabilities”) are 
simultaneously presented and analyzed in the same specific budgetary document 
 
 
D.  BUDGET EXECUTION 
 
 
After budget approval by the local councils before the end of the previous year, 
the judets also need to submit their financial plans to the MOF for budget execution by 
January 15th.  The submitted financial plan allocates monthly budgetary resources 
throughout the year. Some adjustments can be made to the financial plan, such as for 
purchased goods and services. However, budget resources for wages and salaries cannot 
be changed.  Changes across budget line items within a group or chapter (from an article 
to another article) can be made by the local finance department. Transfers of funds across 
chapters in the budget are not allowed. However, the Law on Local Public Finance 
(article 24) introduces the possibility of a budget amendment procedure.103 Any budget 
                                                 
103 This legislation, however,  falls short of establishing clear trigger points to initiate a formal budget 
amendment process. Article 24 states that “When necessary the executive authorities shall make a proposal 
to the respective councils on the amendment of the approved budgets and these decisions should maintain 
budget balance.” 
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additions must be approved by the local councils and, to maintain budget balance, the 
additional revenues need to be identified or other expenditures reduced. The amended 
financial plan must be approved by the local council and submitted again to the Ministry 
of Finance. 
 
Confusing local budget execution authority.  Quite recently, Law # 496 (June, 2001) 
shifted responsibility to execute judet budgets from the judet council itself to the 
Prefect’s Office. Budget formulation and approval still remained the functions of the 
judet council. The general justification provided for this shift in authority was that in 
many instances judets used funds for a purpose quite different from that intended (at the 
center), such as the money intended for paying teacher salaries was used for other 
purposes. These alleged infractions had been mentioned in several reports of the 
Chamber of Accounts. There has been considerable confusion regarding the obligation 
judet councils had to use the money in a prescribed way, because the moneys were not 
part of conditional grants with explicit restrictions regarding their use.  Actually, it 
appears that in most cases judet councils were exercising their legal authority. It would 
seem that the conflict arose from a clash of expenditure priorities in judet budgets 
between the center and the judets themselves. In a decentralized system, local priorities 
would have been respected in the use of general funding (as opposed to conditional 
grants).  Law # 496 may have marked the beginning of a re-centralization process in 
Moldova.  
 
The shifting of power for the execution of local budgets to the Prefect’s Office 
created a basic contradiction in the budgeting system.104 On the one hand, the Judet 
council remained responsible for approving the budget while the prefect became 
responsible for executing it. 105  In this way, the incentives had been set for judet councils 
to behave irresponsibly and approve budgets that could not be executed by the prefects. 
Thus, the fear has been that, despite the introduction of the treasury function at the local 
level and the increased control by prefects, arrears and other budget problems would 
develop at the local level. 
                                                 
104 Note that at the primaria level the mayor is still responsible for the execution of local budgets. Several 
reasons have been behind the stripping of budget execution powers from the judets. The general concern at 
the central level in recent times has been the perception of a lack of sufficient control of the legality of the 
actions taken by local governments. Or what is similar, the generalized impression at the central level is 
that local governments have been quite arbitrary in their public finance decisions, in particular those 
involving local governments. 
105 Officially the role of the prefect has been to act as “administrative trustees over local governments.” 
This has meant that the office of the prefect exercises control over the legality of all decisions and acts of 
the local and regional governments. The law required subnational governments to report all these decisions 
to prefecture. The prefect was entitled to ask for changes in acts and regulations he considered against 
national laws and in the case that the local governments refused to make those changes the dispute 
supposedly was sent to court. It is not clear that the latter has ever happened. Although the idea has been to 
uphold national laws, the figure of the prefect has diminished in practice local autonomy and the extent of 
decentralization in Moldova. Heavier reliance on the courts and less on administrative supervision by 
central government representatives such as the prefect may be a better way to ensure local government 
compliance with the national laws. According to the Law on Local Public Adminstration, the ATUs have 
the status of legal persons and are granted financial autonomy in all matters that pertain to the management 
of local affairs. 
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Incipient implementation of the treasury function.  Until recently, the lack of adequate 
accounting and cash management procedures meant that budget execution control was 
implemented by tracking transfers of funds through bank accounts. One consequence of 
this was the slow disbursement of appropriated funds to spending units after the budget 
had been approved. Another problem was that that budget execution system did not 
provide effective expenditure control and monitoring to prevent the buildup of budget 
arrears. The budget execution system also was inefficient because it allowed idle cash 
balances to exist in the accounts of some spending units, while other units were forced to 
operate under sequester, even though they had not gone over their budget appropriations.  
In summary, the budget execution process in Moldova lacked a proper treasury function.  
 
In recognition of this problem, the central government in the recent past moved 
for the fast introduction of a modern treasury function throughout Moldova.  Actually, 
the government accomplished its plans of introducing a treasury system, if not fully 
operational, at all levels of government by the fall of 2001. The new treasury system 
covers all local government revenues, including fees in 2000. Coverage of local 
government expenditures became effective for all local governments in August 2001, 
with the exception of Chisinau municipality, which became integrated into the new 
treasury system only in October 2001. This fulfills the mandate in the Law on Local 
Public Finance. The main function of the treasury system at the local level is to perform 
the cash execution of local government budgets through the territorial offices of the 
treasury and the banking system. The territorial offices of the treasury are dependencies 
of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance pays the salary of all treasury 
employees. The city seats of the judets and the previous rayons all have a territorial 
treasury office. These offices service the budgets of the smaller primarias in the 
surrounding geographical area.  
 
Currently all revenues, including those of local governments, are deposited in the 
single accounts of the treasury system before the funds are channeled to the different 
government accounts. The central government account of the Treasury is administered by 
the Central Bank. Similar services are rendered by commercial banks to the territorial 
offices of the Treasury. Commercial banks compete through public tenders to provide 
these services to the treasury office.106 
 
Unfortunately, there is as yet no computerized network between the primaria 
offices and the territorial treasury offices. The subnational government budgets are 
executed according to the approved monthly financing plan that each primaria needs to 
have. These financing plans are recorded in the territorial treasury offices, which ensure 
the amounts being paid by the primarias do not exceed those allocated in the primaria’s 
financing plan. Until June 2001, it was the Chairman of the judet council who authorized 
final payments. After June 2001, this authority has been shifted to the Prefect. At the 
                                                 
106 The role of the Central Bank does not extend beyond the transfers of central government resources. If 
financing comes from central government sources, the transfer of money takes place from the Central 
treasury account at the Central Bank and is registered in the accounts of the territorial treasuries, which 
operate through the commercial bank system in the territories. 
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primaria level, it has been the mayor who authorizes payment. After the introduction of 
the treasury function on the expenditure side of the budget, the process changed. When 
suppliers submit payment invoices to the local government, the local treasury office 
verifies that the invoices are part of the financial plan. After the approval by the treasury 
office, the documents are sent to the local councils or to the prefect’s office for 
authorization of payment, and finally submitted to the commercial banks for actual 
payment. 
 
The introduction of the treasury function should also contribute significantly to 
increase the technical efficiency of budgets. Until now, technical efficiency has been 
negatively affected by the lack of certainty or even predictability of the flow of funds 
over the course of budget execution. Lack of cash planning and poor management have 
aggravated the consequences of a turbulent economic environment giving rise to budget 
execution under sequestering and cash rationing. So far, this has left spending units 
unable to execute spending plans and make efficient use of the available resources. Even 
though the new treasury function will not eliminate the consequences of the unstable 
economy, it should help increase the predictability of the flow of funds considerably, thus 
contributing to increased technical efficiency in budget execution.  
 
Moreover, the adoption of a full treasury function at all levels of government can 
be instrumental in addressing some long-standing weaknesses in budget execution, 
including the lack of an adequate accounting system based on double entry principles and 
the low use of information technology for record keeping and sharing information. 
 
However, as it stands, there are still two potential problems with the introduction 
of the new treasury. First, it remains unclear that control of expenditures is being 
conducted at the commitment stage, as opposed to the payment stage, although the 
treasury offices seem to carry out pre-approval of any significant expenditure items.107 
Second, the fast pace of these reforms, completed in many judets over a period of two 
months, has led to a lack of adequate preparation and training among many local 
governments and territorial treasury offices. Outside the Central Bank, the treasury 
system is still not fully computerized, and investment on information technology is 
particularly deficient at the local level. The central government has to provide all local 
governments with the basic computer equipment.  
 
There is a second set of problems in budget execution. These issues cover three 
areas: the buildup of budget arrears, the practice of budget sequestering, and a soft budget 
constraint mentality. 
 
                                                 
107 At least on paper, there is control at the commitment stage. For transactions over Lei 10,000, there has 
to be a tender approved or otherwise the treasury will not authorize payment. All contracts are registered in 
the territorial treasury offices. If there is no valid contract signed, the treasury does not consider the 
transaction valid and therefore does not authorize payment. For transactions under Lei 10,000 there is no 
need for them to be entered in the contract registry and the treasury pays them as long as the payments are 
within the totals allowed in the financial plan. 
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Build up of budget arrears. There has been an increasing accumulation of budget arrears 
at the primaria and judet levels, in spite of the fact that both deficit financing in general 
and the accumulation of arrears in particular are prohibited. 108 There is some hope that 
the accumulation of arrears will decrease over time as the new treasury function shifts the 
control function from the payment stage to the commitment stage. But it is still uncertain 
whether arrears will be eliminated in the future. The treasury function is most effective to 
control excessive commitment for discretionary items, such as supplies by private 
businesses. But there has hardly been a major problem in this area, because most often 
businesses have demanded pre-payment for supply delivery. The problem of arrears has 
been more common among recurrent expenditure items such as salaries and utilities. Here 
the treasury function will be less able to control arrears. Controlling budget arrears and 
over-commitment will require political will, explicit enforceable policies, and penalties 
on budget managers who transgress budgetary rules. 
 
Budget sequestering.  The Law on the Budgetary System and Budget Process provides 
for a budget sequestration procedure for the cases in which actual revenue collections fall 
well below budgeted revenues. The Law on Local Public Finance does not incorporate a 
sequestration procedure, but this does not mean that budget sequestration is not 
implemented at the local level. At the central level, the Ministry of Finance may reduce 
expenditures proportionally across the board or may propose a different set of priorities, 
subject to approval by the cabinet and eventually by parliament.  
 
Budget sequestering and cash rationing should be used as a last resort tool to 
maintain budget balance and fiscal discipline. The practice of sequestering not only can 
disrupt budget priorities, but it can also deprive spending units of certainty and disrupt 
planning and budget execution in general.  Nevertheless, budget sequestering has been an 
important instrument to contain the budget deficit at all levels of government. The 
negative implications of budget sequestering on the redirection of budget priorities 
should be minimized in the future by making use of the normal, formal budget 
amendment procedures, which require a new vote from the local councils to approve the 
amended budget.  
 
Soft budget constraint.  One of the most weakening features of any system of 
decentralized finance is the existence of a soft budget constraint or the ability of local 
governments to rely on extraordinary central government transfers. This is most 
damaging to local fiscal discipline and to any incentives for local revenue mobilization. 
Recent actions by the central government have contributed to create an atmosphere of 
soft budget constraints in Moldova, such as the Lei 181 million debt forgiveness of local 
governments (about half on behalf of Chisinau) engineered by the central authorities in 
2000 (see Table A.5.2).109   
 
                                                 
108 Information on very recent performance is not available but domestic arrears on salaries, pensions 
contributions, electricity and heating, among a few other items increased by 324 million lei in 1998 and by 
159 million lei from January to June 1999. See Table A.5.1 in the Appendix for a profile a wage arrears by 
judet in 2001.  
109 Article III (and Annex 2) of amendment Law # 1410-XIV (Dec.8th, 2000). 
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E.   BUDGET AUDIT AND OVERSIGHT 
 
Like in many other transitional countries, the weakest link in Moldova’s budget 
process is budget oversight (ex-post audit and budget evaluation). Budget oversight 
typically covers three different functions as follows.  
 
Internal control.  Internal control and audit functions are typically carried out by the 
spending agencies themselves and by the budget office. The internal audit function in 
Moldova has been executed traditionally by the Department for Financial Control and 
Revision of the Ministry of Finance and by the State Tax Inspectorate.110 The recent 
creation of a treasury function at all levels of government also dependent on the Ministry 
of Finance should strengthen the internal audit and control function. Moldova complies 
with the key feature of an effective system of internal audit and control that officials in 
charge of this function in the executive branch cannot be involved in any way in 
expenditure decisions. The territorial treasury offices and the budget execution 
authorities, at the subnational level, are obliged to file monthly, quarterly and annual 
reports on the execution of approved budgets.111 The quarterly and annual reports need to 
be approved by a joint meeting of the local councils and the local executive authorities. 
The annual report needs to be presented to the local council for approval not later than 
March 1 of the following year.  
 
External audit.   The charge of the function for external ex-post audit is to examine after 
the close of the fiscal year the correct use of funds by the executive branch and other 
organs of government. This function needs to be carried out externally or independently 
of the spending units in the executive branch. The external audit unit may respond to the 
legislative branch of government or be an independent institution. In Moldova, at the 
national level, article 13 of the Law on the Budgetary System and Process establishes that 
external audit of state budget revenues and expenditures is conducted by the Chamber of 
Accounts of the Parliament. The Chamber of Accounts reviews the previous fiscal year 
accounts for the central government and prepares an annual report for Parliament, which 
deals more deeply with several cases of fund mismanagement.112  
 
The status of external audit at the subnational level is murky. The Chamber of 
Accounts has powers extended to monitor and review the use of earmarked central 
government revenues by subnational governments.  Although pending on confirmation, 
judet governments claim being audited in recent years by the Chamber of Accounts. 
Judets and local Councils do not have their own external audit units in the analogous 
                                                 
110 There have been discussions about introducing internal audit units in the main spending agencies, such 
as line ministries, but so far this has not materialized. 
111 The Law on Local Public Finance makes local executive authorities responsible for the accurate 
execution of local budgets (Article 25 of the Law on Local Public Finance). 
112 As the Supreme Audit Institution in the country, the Chamber of Accounts is supposed to be above the 
daily political turmoil and use restraint and objectivity in its investigations. Unfortunately, there is some 
evidence that the Chamber has been used as a political tool, for example to complicate the processes for 
specific foreign investors. 
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form of regional chambers of accounts, although it has been said that their creation has 
been considered several times in the recent past.  Nevertheless, the local and judet 
councils are supposed to implement the external audit of their respective executives.  It 
has also been claimed that the finance departments of the judets have performed “external 
audits” of the primarias under their jurisdiction. There appears to be a wide variety of 
experiences across subnational governments, but in general, external audit appears to be 
extremely weak.  In any case, the assumption that there is external audit on judets is more 
of a stretch, since representatives of the council also have direct executive powers.  Since 
external audit requires an agency that is independent, or outside the executive (i.e., those 
in charge of implementing budgets), it is questionable that there is any external audit 
performed at the judet level.  In summary, external audit is an extremely weak aspect of 
the budget process at the subnational level. 
 
Performance evaluation.  The function for budget oversight is the evaluation of budget 
performance. In addition to the ex-post audits, which focus on financial aspects and 
compliance with established budget rules, the government should promote the practice of 
budget evaluation, focusing on budget performance and outcomes. Unlike the ex-post 
audit, budget evaluation can be carried out not only by independent units but also by the 
executive branch of government itself. In Moldova, audit at the local level is mostly 
focused on the reconciliation of accounts for budget units with the financial statements 
coming from the banks. 
 
Practically, performance measurement or ex-post evaluation of expenditures as 
compared with budget program targets and outcomes exist neither at the central nor at 
local levels. However, the government of Moldova has taken the first steps to put into 
place some form of budget evaluation by adopting a pilot approach to program and 
performance budgeting. Assessing the performance of budget programs and feeding those 
findings back into the budget preparation cycle will be key to improving public 
expenditure efficiency and also increasing accountability. The analysis of the 
performance of expenditure programs vis-a-vis the original objectives will help decision 
makers to redirect and better prioritize budget resources. The introduction of satisfactory 
budget evaluation practices throughout subnational governments may take time in 
Moldova, because of the inherent complexities involved in its implementation and the 
high level of technical skills required. However, these practices could well start at the 
central level and in the larger municipalities in areas of national significance, such as 
health and education.     
 
F.    RECCOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Many important reforms in the budget process at the central level have already 
been initiated. It will be important for the government of Moldova to stay the course with 
the current pilot projects supported by international technical assistance agencies. 
Significant progress has been made in some areas, such as the treasury function, and there 
is the promise that significant strides could be made in other areas such as program 
budgeting and external audit and evaluation. If these innovations are to reach fruition and 
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be extended to the subnational level, it is important that the government keep the pace of 
the reforms. 
 
Improving budgetary autonomy to increased fiscal policy efficiency.  The gains in 
expenditure efficiency associated with fiscal decentralization can only be realized with an 
adequate degree of autonomy at the local level.  In particular, local governments need:   
• to have discretion on how to spend resources to minimize the costs of 
delivering public services, 
• some degree of autonomy in raising their own resources at the margin  
• to face fixed and stable rules for revenue sharing and explicit formulas for 
transfers, 
• to have lagged budget calendars at different levels of government 
considered, and norms and legal requirements which impose upper level 
government expenditure priorities on lower level governments reduced or 
eliminated. 
 
Eliminating ad hoc negotiations and establishing hard budget constraints.  The reforms 
in expenditure and revenue assignments and the system of transfers proposed here will go 
a long way to eliminate case by case negotiation and bargaining, and introduce a hard 
budget constraint environment in the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations.  
Enabling a hard budget constraint environment requires central government restraints on 
extraordinary transfers, guarantees and bailing out subnational debt, as well as expanding 
the budget coverage to consider all implicit expenditures, including tax expenditures.  
Beyond the resources provided by rules and formulas for shared revenues and transfers, 
judets and primarias would have to rely more on their own revenues (local taxes and 
fees).  Also, perhaps in the medium-term, they should be allowed to responsibly borrow 
for capital expenditures, if the government is prepared to put in place the adequate 
financial reforms based on market incentives and properly regulated municipal capital 
market. This would lead to more responsible and accountable government and greater 
efficiency and aggregate fiscal discipline. 
 
Strengthening the incentives for local governments.   Introduce the right incentives for 
reform of the budget process at the local level by allowing local governments to follow 
their own priorities, and keep any savings from more efficient spending or enhanced tax 
collection efforts.  Top-down enforced reforms will not work without the introduction of 
vigorous economic incentives that can induce the local authorities to behave in the 
socially desirable direction. 
 
Strengthening budget formulation to preserve spending priorities.  The general budget 
formulation approach must evolve at all levels of government from an input-oriented 
exercise to one that focuses on outputs and performance. The government has made a 
good start with the pilot work on program-based budgeting for several central 
government agencies. It will be desirable to continue to use the traditional budget format 
for a while at least at the subnational government level, but practically all budgetary units 
could start specifying well-defined, feasible outcomes which could be expected from 
their main programs.  
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The budget formulation process can be simplified significantly if the budget 
authority at all levels of government provides a statement of budget priorities and specific 
expenditure caps for each spending unit. These expenditure ceilings should be linked to 
the expenditure projections from the rolling medium-term expenditure framework. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of a functional medium term expenditure framework at the 
subnational level may take more time and will require a centrally financed, substantial 
capacity building program.  The Budget structure could be improved by requiring explicit 
accounting of contingent liabilities, cost of soft loans and foregone tax revenues from tax 
concessions. There will be no harm in keeping a separate capital expenditure budget, as 
long as the responsibility to commit resources to investment projects rests solely with the 
financial authorities and all the steps of the regular budget process are followed.  If a 
public investment program (PIP) is used this should be an integral part of the medium-
term expenditure framework.  Moreover, the transparency and usefulness of subnational 
budgets could be much improved by declaring illegal the use of extra-budgetary funds at 
the subnational level. 
 
Improving budget execution to expenditure efficiency and financial control.  The 
government needs to reassess the investment needed for the full introduction of the 
treasury function at the local level. In particular, it would be desirable to have a 
computerized network between the primaria offices and the territorial treasury offices.  A 
considerable amount of confusion, and political friction, between the central and 
intermediate level governments could be avoided in the future if the central authorities 
are entirely explicit about the unconditional or conditional nature of the funds being 
transferred to subnational governments. The new budget classification system must be 
used in both budget execution and reporting. This will require additional resources and 
training and preparatory work at the local levels. Controlling budget arrears and over-
commitment will still require careful monitoring and the government should consider 
amending the budget process law to include explicit penalties for budget managers who 
accumulate arrears and transgress other budgetary rules. The budget process law should 
also be amended to include an automatic trigger for the budget amendment process, for 
example if there is a budget shortfall above, say, five or ten percent. This would help 
minimize the disruption of priorities that usually occurs during budget sequestration 
episodes. The central government needs in the future to dispel any perceptions of a soft 
budget constraint for local governments, by disengaging itself from any subnational debt 
forgiveness. 
 
Strengthening external audit to increase transparency and accountability.   External 
ex-post audit and general oversight over budget performance needs to be further 
developed in Moldova. External ex-post audit needs to be conducted by agencies that are 
independent from the executive branch of government. Apparently, this has been the case 
only at the judet level, where the Chamber of Accounts is supposed to conduct annual 
financial audits. In addition to the accounting audits which focus primarily on the 
financial performance and compliance with established budget rules, the government 
should promote the practice of budget evaluation, focusing on budget performance vis-a-
vis programmed outcomes. Unlike the accounting audit, budget evaluation can be carried 
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out not only by independent units but also by the executive branch of government itself, 
and its feedback into the budget formulation process is critical to increasing efficiency in 
the use of public resources. 
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Statistical Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5.1 
Profile of wage arrears in 2001 
(in thousands of Lei) 
 01.01.2001 01.02.2001 01.03.2001 01.04.2001
Judet Balti 
Judet Cahul 
Judet Chisinau 
Judet Edinet 
Judet Lapusna 
Judet Orhei 
Judet Soroca 
Judet Tighina 
Judet Ungheni 
Judetul Taraclia 
UTA Gagauz-Yeri 
Municipality Chisinau 
16 235,9
3 664,5
7 515,5
12 820,7
6 113,5
6 598,0
9 529,4
4 239,5
7 261,4
1 610,9
4 556,3
13 738,7
18 295,0
4 528,6
6 788,0
15 064,0
6 409,2
6 223,4
10 662,1
4 143,8
7 135,1
1 905,3
5 078,6
10 571,8
20 233,4 
4 306,0 
5 798,2 
15 914,5 
5 582,0 
5 641,9 
10 258,6 
4 093,6 
6 976,9 
1 922,3 
4 236,6 
12 379,8 
13 638,3
3 974,8
5 684,5
16 170,6
5 031,8
5 859,3
8 579,4
4 209,0
6 133,9
1 923,5
3 993,2
12 230,4
Total 93 884,3 96 804,9 97 343,8 87 428,7
Table A.5.2 
Local debt forgiveness in 2000 arising from Ministry of 
Finance loans during 1994-1998 
 
Local Public Authorities 
Amount of Debts 
(Thousand of Lei) 
Judet Councils 
Balti 
Cahul 
Chisinau 
Edinet 
Lapusna 
Orhei 
Soroca 
Taraclia 
Tighina 
Ungheni 
 
11,349.9 
9,725.4 
8,325.2 
7,588.3 
2,400.9 
4,471.5 
5,310.1 
299.0 
1,438.8 
14,904.5 
UTA Gagauzia 19,613.5 
Municipality of Chisinau 95,673.7 
Total 181,100.8 
Source:  Ministry of Finance  
